Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions)

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber)

7 September 2022 (*)

(Civil service – Temporary staff – Disciplinary regime – Removal from post – Opening of an administrative investigation – Initiation of disciplinary proceedings – Requirement for impartiality – Error of law – Manifest error of assessment – Articles 11, 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations – Duty of loyalty – Legal certainty – Freedom of expression – Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights – Principle of sound administration – Duty of care – Presumption of innocence – Right to be heard – Reasonable period of time – Proportionality of the sanction)

In Case T‑470/20,

DD, represented by L. Levi, lawyer,

applicant,

v

European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), represented by M. O’Flaherty, acting as Agent, and by B. Wägenbaur, lawyer,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber),

composed of L. Madise, acting as President, P. Nihoul and J. Martín y Pérez de Nanclares (Rapporteur), judges,

Registrar: P. Cullen, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

further to the hearing on 27 January 2022,

gives the following

Judgment

1        By his action under Article 270 TFEU, the applicant, DD, seeks, first, annulment of the decision of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) of 12 November 2019 by which it imposed on him the disciplinary sanction of removal from post (‘the decision to remove from post’) and of the decision of 15 April 2020 rejecting the complaint against the decision to remove from post (‘the decision rejecting the complaint’) and, secondly, compensation for the material and non-material damage which he has suffered.

I.      Background to the dispute

2        The applicant was recruited on 1 August 2000 by the Authority empowered to conclude contracts of employment (‘the AECC’) of a body of the European Union, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), now FRA, as a member of the temporary staff within the meaning of Article 2(a) of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union (‘the CEOS’). Initially employed under a fixed-term contract, he was given a contract of indefinite duration from 16 December 2006.

3        By letter of 13 June 2013, the then Director of FRA informed the applicant of his decision to terminate his contract.

4        By judgment of 8 October 2015, DD v FRA (F‑106/13 and F‑25/14, EU:F:2015:118), the Civil Service Tribunal annulled the decision to terminate on the grounds that, prior to the adoption of the decision, the Director of FRA had not expressly informed the applicant that, on the basis of various incidents, he was considering terminating his contract and had not invited him to make any observations in that regard.

5        On 29 February 2016, FRA, under a new director, reinstated the applicant in his position, as part of the execution of the judgment of 8 October 2015, DD v FRA (F‑106/13 and F‑25/14, EU:F:2015:118).

6        By email of the same day, the applicant was asked by his head of department to prepare a 15- to 20-page internal brief, by 18 March 2016 at the latest, on human rights standards and the case-law related to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, at international and EU level.

7        By email of 18 March 2016, the applicant sent to his head of department a 31-page document described as a ‘very first tentative draft of the brief on freedom of religion’, entitled ‘Internal Brief on possible relevant FRA projects on the freedom of thought, conscience and religion’ (‘the brief at issue’).

8        At the beginning of April 2016, the brief at issue was stored in FRA’s document management system (‘the DMS’), to which all the applicant’s colleagues had access.

9        On 7 April 2016, the applicant’s head of department informed the applicant that he had forwarded the brief at issue to the Director of FRA and invited him to send the link to the document in the DMS to one of his colleagues so that he could read the document and the analysis contained therein.

10      By email of 16 October 2017, the applicant’s head of department asked him to revise the brief at issue and to expand on the analysis devoted to freedom of religion from the European Union’s point of view, in view of possible publication.

11      Furthermore, on 7 November 2017, the applicant lodged an internal appeal against his assessment report for the year 2016 (‘the 2016 assessment report’), arguing that the assessment of his effectiveness, capacity and conduct should have been ‘very good’, instead of ‘satisfactory’. In that context, with regard to the brief at issue, first, the applicant argued that it was regrettable that, while during the appraisal dialogue his head of department, in his capacity as assessor, had confirmed that the presentation was very useful and achieved its purpose, he had criticised it in his subsequent comments. Secondly, the applicant argued that the assessor’s comments on the fact that the brief at issue consisted mainly of case-law references were inaccurate, as the presentation also contained a legal, conceptual and policy analysis.

12      On 1 December 2017, the applicant submitted a revised version of the brief at issue.

13      On 5 December 2017, the Director of FRA rejected the internal appeal against the 2016 assessment report. On that occasion, the Director of FRA stated that he had learned that the brief at issue was, to a very large extent, a direct copy of several sources, including Council of Europe documents, which were not referenced in that brief, and that the applicant had not informed his head of department of that state of affairs, leading him to believe that that brief was the result of his own work.

14      On 9 February 2018, the Director of FRA consulted the European Anti-Fraud Office (‘OLAF’) about the possible opening of an administrative investigation into the applicant’s conduct.

15      On 20 March 2018, OLAF decided not to open an investigation due to the fact that there were ‘not sufficient elements indicating that a potential fraud, corruption or other illegal activities have occurred’.

16      On 23 March 2018, the Director of FRA opened an administrative investigation into the conduct of the applicant in relation to the brief at issue (‘the decision to open the investigation’). The investigating officer declared an absence of conflict of interest. The purpose of the investigation was to determine, first, the precise extent to which the brief at issue had been presented by the applicant as the result of his own work and included extracts from documents external to FRA which were not cited or referenced, secondly, which of those documents, if any, were covered by copyright, thirdly, whether there were other documents written by the applicant in the context of his work at FRA in the field of freedom of thought, conscience and religion which met the two conditions mentioned above and, fourthly, where appropriate, whether there had been any infringement of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’) or of intellectual property law.

17      On 23 and 24 April 2018, the investigator interviewed seven witnesses and the applicant, who provided the investigator with written observations.

18      On 17 June 2018, the investigator sent the applicant his preliminary findings.

19      On 2 July 2018, the applicant made observations on the investigator’s preliminary findings.

20      On 23 July 2018, the investigator submitted his final report (‘the inquiry report’), which concluded that the applicant had failed to comply with Articles 11, 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations and with his duties of loyalty and cooperation. The investigator found, in essence, first, that copying and using the work of others without reference to it and passing it off as his own constituted a form of deception, dishonesty and misappropriation contrary not only to Article 12 of the Staff Regulations but also to almost any moral standard, second, that the applicant had deliberately misled the members of his department and concealed important information, thereby infringing Articles 11 and 12 of the Staff Regulations, third, that the fact that the applicant had taken three weeks to draft the brief at issue, which was largely a copy, constituted another, relatively minor, infringement of Article 12 of the Staff Regulations, fourth, that the reference to the brief at issue as an achievement in the context of his assessment for the year 2016 was misleading and also constituted an infringement of Article 12 of the Staff Regulations, fifth, that the use of copyrighted material without informing the author, namely the Council of Europe, further infringed Article 12 of the Staff Regulations, sixth, that the applicant had acted in a misleading and/or dishonest manner and, as a result, had not acted solely with the interests of the European Union in mind, in breach of Article 11 of the Staff Regulations and the duty of loyalty, and, seventh, that the use of the work of others without reference to it and without informing his superiors violated Article 21 of the Staff Regulations and the applicant’s duty of cooperation.

21      On 15 October 2018, the applicant was heard by the Director of FRA under Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations (‘the hearing of 15 October 2018’) and subsequently submitted a written statement, dated the same day.

22      By a decision of 23 October 2018, the Director of FRA initiated disciplinary proceedings before the Disciplinary Board against the applicant (‘the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings’). That decision was notified to the applicant on 7 November 2018.

23      On 26 February 2019, the Disciplinary Board was constituted by decision of the Director of FRA.

24      On 27 February 2019, the Director of FRA prepared the report to the Disciplinary Board pursuant to Article 12 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations (‘the report of the Director of FRA’).

25      On 21 March 2019, the applicant submitted his statement of defence to the chair of the Disciplinary Board.

26      On 22 March 2019, the applicant’s hearing before the Disciplinary Board took place.

27      On 7 May 2019, the Disciplinary Board issued a reasoned opinion (‘the Disciplinary Board’s opinion’), in accordance with Article 18 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, finding that the accusations of conduct contrary to the applicant’s obligations under Articles 11, 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations were well founded, namely presenting documents written by other people as his own without acknowledging the sources thereof. The Disciplinary Board recommended that the applicant be demoted by two grades, to grade AD 7. The Disciplinary Board did not mention any mitigating circumstances.

28      The Disciplinary Board noted, in essence, first, that the applicant had acted not only with the interests of the European Union in mind, but with his own interests in seeking credit for a text of which he was not the author, secondly, that he had not adopted the responsible behaviour expected of an agent of FRA, thirdly, that his actions could have caused damage to FRA’s reputation, and fourthly, that he had not assisted his superiors, or had even acted against them, by presenting the work of others as his own.

29      Thus, the Disciplinary Board found that the applicant had infringed, first, Article 11 of the Staff Regulations, by deliberately presenting copied work as his own, secondly, Article 12 of the Staff Regulations, in so far as presenting the work of others as his own would have had an adverse effect on the applicant’s reputation, and thirdly, Article 21 of the Staff Regulations, in so far as the applicant had not carried out the tasks entrusted to him, but had presented the work of others as his own and there was a risk that the brief at issue, or parts of it, would be incorporated in one or more documents published by FRA, which could have had an adverse effect on the reputation of the latter.

30      On 11 July 2019, the applicant was heard by the Director of FRA in accordance with Article 22 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations (‘the hearing of 11 July 2019’) and submitted his written statement.

31      On 11 October 2019, the applicant received a note from the Director, dated 10 October 2019, expressing his intention to impose the sanction of removal from post and inviting him to submit his observations in that regard in writing within 10 working days.

32      On 24 October 2019, the applicant sent his observations to the Director of FRA.

33      On 12 November 2019, the Director of FRA, as the AECC, adopted the decision to remove from post, taking effect on 15 November 2019. In that decision, the Director of FRA endorsed the conclusions of the Disciplinary Board, except for the proposed sanction, as he considered that downgrading did not sufficiently reflect the seriousness of the breaches of professional obligations under Articles 11, 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations. The Director of FRA noted, in particular, first, that the Disciplinary Board had not referred to any mitigating circumstances, but had mentioned aggravating circumstances, namely, that the applicant’s conduct was deliberate, that he had tried to obtain personal credit for work that constituted plagiarism, that he had not recognised the seriousness of his conduct and that there had been a real risk of damage to FRA’s reputation and, secondly, that the bond of trust had been seriously undermined.

34      Furthermore, the Director of FRA considered that the Disciplinary Board had not sufficiently taken into account the seriousness of the infringements of the Staff Regulations with regard to, first, the conduct of the applicant, which the Director of FRA described as an ‘infringement of the utmost seriousness’ and, secondly, the effects of such conduct on FRA’s reputation, since, in his view, the applicant, acting alone, had deliberately created a serious risk of damage to that reputation over a considerable period of time. The Director of FRA agreed with the Disciplinary Board’s finding that the bond of trust had been seriously undermined, but considered that the bond had been irrevocably broken and, therefore, that downgrading was not an appropriate sanction.

35      On 16 December 2019, the applicant lodged a complaint against the decision to remove from post.

36      On 15 April 2020, the Director of FRA issued the decision rejecting the complaint.

II.    Forms of order sought

37      The applicant claims that the Court should:

–        annul the decision to remove from post;

–        if need be, annul the decision rejecting the complaint;

–        compensate the material and non-material damage suffered by him;

–        order FRA to pay the costs.

38      FRA contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the action as unfounded;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

III. Law

A.      The request for omission of information from the public record

39      By a document lodged at the Court Registry on 1 February 2021, the applicant requested, on the basis of Article 66 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the omission of certain information from the public record, namely all the information on all the accusations brought against him – plagiarism – because those accusations would be very damaging to his professional prospects.

40      In that regard, it should be noted that, according to Article 66 of the Rules of Procedure, the request for the omission of certain data vis-à-vis the public must be reasoned by the party submitting it.

41      In the present case, first, the applicant confines himself to arguing, in general terms, that, despite the anonymisation of his name granted by the Court, mention of the accusations against him in the public version of the judgment would be likely to have pernicious effects on his career prospects. Secondly, the applicant does not identify the elements in the pleadings and their annexes which, in his view, should be treated as confidential.

42      Consequently, the reasoning is not such as to support the claim of omission of data vis-à-vis the public.

43      In any event, the Court considers that, in order to ensure the intelligibility of the present judgment, it is necessary to mention the nature of the accusations.

44      Accordingly, the applicant’s claim regarding the omission of data vis-à-vis the public must be rejected.

B.      The first and second heads of claim, seeking the annulment of the decision to remove from post and the decision to reject the complaint

1.      The subject matter of the claim for annulment

45      According to settled case-law, a claim for annulment formally directed against the decision rejecting a complaint has the effect of bringing before the Court the act against which the complaint was submitted, where that claim lacks any independent content (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 July 2018, Curto v Parliament, T‑275/17, EU:T:2018:479, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).

46      In the present case, the decision rejecting the complaint has no independent content since its scope is not different from that of the decision to remove from post. The rejection of the complaint confirms the decision to remove from post and specifies the grounds for the latter by responding to the criticisms made by the applicant in regard to it, the grounds for that rejection decision coinciding, in essence, with those of the decision to remove from post.

47      The claim for annulment must therefore be regarded as being directed against the decision to remove from post alone, the legality of which must, however, be examined by taking account of the statement of reasons in the rejection decision, which is deemed to coincide with that of the decision to remove from post (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 December 2009, Commission v Birkhoff, T‑377/08 P, EU:T:2009:485, paragraphs 58 and 59; of 16 January 2018, SE v Council, T‑231/17, not published, EU:T:2018:3, paragraph 22; and of 14 July 2021, KO v Commission, T‑389/20, not published, EU:T:2021:436, paragraph 15).

48      Consequently, there is no need to give an independent ruling on the second head of claim, seeking annulment of the decision rejecting the complaint.

2.      Substance

49      In support of the claims for annulment, the applicant puts forward eight principal pleas in law and one plea in law in the alternative:

–        the first plea in law alleges errors of law and a manifest error of assessment, infringement of the principle of legal certainty, infringement of Paragraph 7(1) of the Bundesgesetz über das Urheberrecht an Werken der Literatur und der Kunst und über verwandte Schutzrechte (Law on copyright in literary and artistic works and neighbouring rights) of 9 April 1936 (BGBl. 1936, 111/1936) (‘Austrian Copyright Law’) and infringement of Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’);

–        the second plea in law alleges breach of the principle of sound administration and of the duties of diligence and care, breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence, breach of the rules relating to the burden of proof, failure to establish the truth of the facts, inaccuracy of the facts relied on and breach of the duty to remain measured in statements made;

–        the third plea in law alleges lack of neutrality, impartiality and objectivity on the part of the Director of FRA as the AECC, breach of the presumption of innocence and abuse of power;

–        the fourth plea in law alleges manifest errors of assessment concerning the applicant’s infringement of Articles 11, 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations;

–        the fifth plea in law alleges that the administrative procedure was initiated in the absence of any prima facie evidence and that the disciplinary procedure was initiated unlawfully;

–        the sixth plea in law alleges non-compliance with the framework of the investigation by the investigator and infringement of Articles 4(2) and 7(6) of FRA Management Board Decision 2013/01 of 22 May 2013 on the conduct of administrative enquiries and disciplinary proceedings, Articles 4(1)(a) to (d) and 5(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ 2018 L 295, p. 39), and, prior to the applicability of Regulation 2018/1725, of Articles 4(1)(a) to (d) and 5(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data (OJ 2001 L 8, p. 1), and of the infringement of the effects of an annulment judgment;

–        the seventh plea in law alleges the investigator’s lack of impartiality, neutrality and objectivity;

–        the eighth plea in law alleges infringement of the rights of the defence, in particular the right to be heard, and infringement of Articles 1 and 2 and of Article 12 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations;

–        the ninth plea in law, submitted in the alternative, alleges breach of the principle of proportionality.

50      Those pleas in law must be examined in the following order: first, the first plea in law; second, the fifth plea in law; third, the sixth plea in law; fourth, the eighth plea in law; fifth, the second plea in law, in so far as it alleges breach of the principle of sound administration and of the duty of diligence, the duty of care and the duty to remain measured in statements made; sixth, together, the seventh and third pleas in law, the latter in so far as it alleges abuse of power and lack of neutrality, impartiality and objectivity on the part of the AECC; seventh, together, the second and third pleas in law, in so far as they concern a breach of the presumption of innocence; eighth, together, the fourth and second pleas in law, the latter in so far as it concerns a breach of the requirement of a high standard of proof in administrative investigations and disciplinary proceedings; and ninth, the ninth plea in law.

51      As a preliminary point, it should be noted that Article 49(1), first subparagraph, Article 50(2), first subparagraph, and Article 50a of the CEOS provide that the disciplinary procedure set out in Annex IX to the Staff Regulations is applicable by analogy to temporary staff. In that regard, the Director of FRA exercises the powers conferred by the CEOS on the AECC and by the Staff Regulations on the Appointing Authority (‘the AA’).

(a)    The first plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of legal certainty, errors of law and a manifest error of assessment, infringement of Paragraph 7(1) of the Austrian Copyright Law and infringement of Article 11 of the Charter

52      The first plea in law consists, in essence, of three parts. In the first part, the applicant argues that the Staff Regulations do not contain any provision criminalising plagiarism, in the second part, the applicant argues that Austrian law does not contain any prohibition of plagiarism and, in the third part, the applicant argues that the decision to remove from post infringed his freedom of expression in so far as FRA’s interpretation of Articles 11, 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations contradicts the principle of legal security.

(1)    The first part of the first plea in law

53      The applicant claims, in essence, that the decision to open the investigation, the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings, the decision to remove from post and the decision rejecting the complaint are vitiated by the same error of law, namely, the conclusion that plagiarism constitutes a breach of the Staff Regulations.

54      FRA submits that the first part of the first plea in law is manifestly unfounded and challenges the applicant’s arguments.

55      It should be noted, as a preliminary point, that the principle of legal certainty, which is one of the general principles of EU law, requires, inter alia, that the effects of legal rules be clear, precise and foreseeable, in particular where they may have unfavourable consequences for individuals and undertakings (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 January 2020, Aquino and Others v Parliament, T‑402/18, EU:T:2020:13, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited).

56      In order to determine whether the conduct of which the applicant was accused could be sanctioned as an infringement of Articles 11, 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations, which are applicable to temporary staff by virtue of the first paragraph of Article 11 of the CEOS, and whether the applicant was in a position to know exactly the extent of the obligations which the Staff Regulations imposed on him in relation to the conduct of which he was accused, it is necessary to define the nature of that conduct.

57      In that regard, it should be noted that, while, in the decision to remove from post, the Director of FRA found that it was not disputed that the applicant had committed plagiarism in the performance of his duties, the Disciplinary Board did not use the word ‘plagiarism’ in its opinion. The conduct of which the applicant was accused, which the Disciplinary Board considered to be incompatible with Articles 11, 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations, is, in essence, defined in that opinion as the deliberate presentation of a document resulting from copying as being his own work.

58      It should also be noted that, according to the case-law, the meaning and scope of terms for which EU law provides no definition must be determined in accordance with their usual meaning in everyday language, taking into account the context in which they are used and the objectives pursued by the legislation of which they form part (see judgment of 10 March 2005, easyCar, C‑336/03, EU:C:2005:150, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited). In that regard, it should be noted that the term ‘plagiarism’ is not defined in EU law.

59      By contrast, in common parlance, plagiarism refers to the act of someone who, in the artistic or literary field, gives as their own what they have taken from another’s work.

60      It may also be noted that, in points 63 to 66 of his Opinion in Pelham and Haas (C‑476/17, EU:C:2018:1002), with regard to the interpretation of Article 2(c) and Article 5(3)(d) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (OJ 2001 L 167, p. 10), and Article 9(1)(b) and the first subparagraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property (OJ 2006 L 376, p. 28), Advocate General Szpunar addressed the concept of ‘plagiarism’ by setting out a series of conditions for a quotation to be considered lawful under Directive 2001/29. Thus, according to Advocate General Szpunar, two of those conditions make it possible to distinguish a quotation from plagiarism, namely, first, the need for interaction between the quoting work and the quoted work and, secondly, the incorporation of the quoted extract into the quoting work as it is, or in any event without distortion, and in such a way that it is easily possible to distinguish the quotation as an extraneous element.

61      On the basis of those considerations, plagiarism can be defined as the act by which a person assumes ownership of a third party’s artistic or literary work by copying it.

62      In the present case, FRA’s description of the conduct alleged against the applicant, namely the deliberate presentation of a largely copied document as the product of his own work, implies, first, that there was no interaction between the brief at issue and the copied material and, secondly, that it was not easy to distinguish the copied passages as an element extraneous to the brief at issue.

63      Consequently, FRA’s description of the conduct alleged against the applicant corresponds to the definition of plagiarism as set out in paragraph 61 above.

64      It is therefore necessary to verify whether plagiarism is likely to constitute an infringement of the obligations arising from Articles 11, 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations.

65      In that regard, it should first be noted that plagiarism is not mentioned as unlawful conduct in Articles 11, 12 or 21 of the Staff Regulations.

66      However, it should be noted that Article 12 of the Staff Regulations refers to any act or conduct of an official or member of the temporary staff which may adversely affect the dignity of his or her position, without listing such acts or conduct or providing any examples.

67      Moreover, the case-law has made it clear that a breach of Articles 11 and 12 of the Staff Regulations presupposes conduct of which the official or member of the temporary staff must reasonably understand the inappropriateness, in view of his grade and the duties he performs (see judgment of 5 October 2020, Broughton v Eurojust, T‑87/19, not published, EU:T:2020:464, paragraph 149 and the case-law cited). That case-law must be applied, by analogy, to the duty of loyalty and cooperation laid down in Article 21 of the Staff Regulations, in so far as that article governs the obligations under the Staff Regulations of officials and temporary staff in their relations with their superiors and in the performance of the tasks assigned to them. The first paragraph of Article 11, Article 12 and the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Staff Regulations are specific expressions of the duty of loyalty incumbent on all officials and other servants (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 May 1997, N v Commission, T‑273/94, EU:T:1997:71, paragraph 129, and of 19 May 1999, Connolly v Commission, T‑34/96 and T‑163/96, EU:T:1999:102, paragraph 127).

68      Since plagiarism consists of taking ownership of a third party’s artistic or literary work by copying it, it is likely to undermine the respect due to the work done by others, but also the requirement to carry out the tasks entrusted to them with professionalism and loyalty. Thus, such behaviour is likely to be considered as contrary to the obligations arising from Articles 11, 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations.

69      It is therefore necessary to ascertain whether, having regard to the definition of the act of plagiarism set out in paragraph 61 above and the applicant’s obligations under Articles 11, 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations to behave appropriately in the performance of his duties, the applicant could reasonably have understood that the plagiarism of which he is accused was likely to be incompatible with those obligations, for the reasons set out in paragraph 68 above.

70      In the present case, it should be noted that the applicant is a lawyer by training, holds a doctorate in law and has worked for EUMC and then FRA for almost 20 years. However, given his grade, AD 9, the fact that he was in a position of responsibility and the fact that FRA had entrusted him with the task of conducting legal research and analysis and providing advice on policy development, the applicant was in a position to know that plagiarism was a punishable act.

71      In that regard, moreover, the fact that the applicant claims that the copied texts were not covered by copyright shows that he is aware that the use of others’ works may be subject to certain rules.

72      Furthermore, it is apparent from FRA’s tasks that it collects and analyses information and data, so that it has to deal with the conditions relating to the lawful use of the writings of others, as is also demonstrated by its internal rules on publishing and producing research results. The applicant’s knowledge of those rules, from which the importance of referencing sources is clearly derived, thus also demonstrates that the applicant could not have been unaware that plagiarism is an action that is reprehensible in general, but also, in particular, in the eyes of the agency that employed him.

73      Consequently, the applicant must have reasonably understood the inappropriateness of the conduct complained of, namely plagiarism.

74      In so far as the case-law has established that any conduct of which an official must reasonably understand the inappropriateness, in view of his or her grade and the duties he or she performs, is liable to infringe Articles 11, 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations, the applicant cannot validly maintain that the scope of those articles as regards plagiarism does not have the degree of foreseeability required by EU law and thus infringes the principle of legal certainty.

75      Finally, it is settled case-law that officials and other servants are deemed to be familiar with the Staff Regulations and the internal rules applicable to the staff of their institution, body or agency of the European Union, so that their alleged ignorance of the obligations incumbent on them in that regard cannot constitute good faith (see judgment of 14 February 2019, L v Parliament, T‑91/17, not published, EU:T:2019:93, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).

76      It follows from the foregoing that the first part of the first plea in law must be rejected as unfounded.

(2)    The second part of the first plea in law

77      The applicant considers that the copied texts are not protected by Austrian Copyright Law, which is the territorially applicable law in the present case, as FRA has its seat in Austria, and the materially applicable law, since the copied texts are public works. Consequently, no copyright provisions have been infringed.

78      FRA submits that the second part of the first plea in law is manifestly unfounded and contests the applicant’s arguments.

79      It should be noted that the employment relationship between an official or other servant and his or her institution, body, office or agency of the European Union is governed exclusively by the Staff Regulations and the CEOS, as they result from Article 270 TFEU and are interpreted by the case-law. Furthermore, under Article 270 TFEU, the Court of Justice of the European Union has jurisdiction to rule on any dispute between the European Union and its servants within the limits and under the conditions laid down by the Staff Regulations and the CEOS. Thus, in order to rule on disputes concerning the European Union’s civil service, references to any national law and its application are irrelevant (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2021, LP v Parliament, T‑519/20, not published, EU:T:2021:642, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).

80      Furthermore, where an official does not comply with the obligations arising from the Staff Regulations, Article 86 of those regulations provides that he or she is liable to disciplinary action. The fact of acting in accordance with national law does not confer on the person concerned immunity from the application of the provisions of the Staff Regulations. In that regard, it should be noted that the applicant does not identify any legal basis for considering that, where an official acts in accordance with national law, it would be contrary to the applicable rules to find that he or she has failed to fulfil his or her obligations.

81      Consequently, it is sufficient to find that the applicant’s references to Austrian law are irrelevant, without it being necessary to examine Austrian Copyright Law.

82      The second part of the first plea in law must therefore be rejected as unfounded.

(3)    The third part of the first plea in law

83      The applicant alleges, in essence, that the decision to remove from post infringed his freedom of expression in so far as EU officials may have their freedom of expression restricted only if the restrictions are sufficiently precise and clear and meet the criteria of the principle of legal certainty.

84      FRA submits that the third part of the first plea in law is manifestly unfounded and contests the applicant’s arguments.

85      It should be noted that the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union are required to respect the fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law (judgment of 3 December 2019, Pethke v EUIPO, T‑808/17, EU:T:2019:832, paragraph 43; see also, to that effect, judgment of 11 July 2013, Ziegler v Commission, C‑439/11 P, EU:C:2013:513, paragraph 154).

86      The first paragraph of Article 11 of the Charter, entitled ‘Freedom of expression and information’, provides that ‘everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers’.

87      Furthermore, Article 52(1) of the Charter provides that any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by the Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essential content of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.

88      It follows from that article that, in order to be held to be in conformity with EU law, a limitation on a right protected by the Charter must, in any event, meet three conditions. First, the limitation must be ‘provided for by law’. In other words, the measure in question must have a legal basis. Secondly, the limitation must be aimed at an objective of general interest, recognised as such by the European Union. Thirdly, the limitation must not be excessive. It must be necessary and proportional to the aim pursued, and the ‘essential content’, that is, the substance, of the right or freedom in question must not be affected (see judgments of 28 May 2013, Trabelsi and Others v Council, T‑187/11, EU:T:2013:273, paragraphs 78 to 81, and of 29 January 2020, Aquino and Others v Parliament, T‑402/18, EU:T:2020:13, paragraphs 59 to 62).

89      In that regard, it should be recalled that, according to well-established case-law, officials and other servants of the European Union enjoy the right to freedom of expression, including in areas covered by the activities of the EU institutions (see judgments of 6 March 2001, Connolly v Commission, C‑274/99 P, EU:C:2001:127, paragraph 43, and of 15 September 2017, Skareby v EEAS, T‑585/16, EU:T:2017:613, paragraph 77; see also, to that effect, judgment of 13 December 1989, Oyowe and Traore v Commission, C‑100/88, EU:C:1989:638, paragraph 16).

90      In the present case, it is important to note first of all that FRA did not criticise the applicant for copying the work of other authors per se, but for taking over the work of others without mentioning or referencing their sources and without informing his superiors. It is not, therefore, the content of the brief at issue as such that FRA criticises the applicant for, but the misappropriation of the work of others. Since, in doing so, FRA did not seek to limit the applicant’s lawful use of external sources, it cannot be validly accused of seeking to prevent the applicant absolutely from exercising his right to freedom of expression.

91      By contrast, for the reasons set out in paragraph 68 above, the actions attributed to the applicant, in particular copying the work of others and passing it off as his own, cannot be regarded as a lawful expression of the right to freedom of expression within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 11 of the Charter.

92      In that regard, even if it were to be accepted that the applicant’s conduct was covered by the right to freedom of expression, the obligations under Articles 11, 12 and 21 of the Statute constitute, in any event, legitimate restrictions on the exercise of that right.

93      According to settled case-law, freedom of expression may be subject to the limitations set out in Article 10(2) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’), according to which the exercise of that freedom, involving duties and responsibilities, may be subject to certain formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties laid down by law, which constitute necessary measures in a democratic society (judgments of 6 March 2001, Connolly v Commission, C‑274/99 P, EU:C:2001:127, paragraph 40; of 13 December 2012, Strack v Commission, T‑199/11 P, EU:T:2012:691, paragraph 137, and of 15 September 2017, Skareby v EEAS, T‑585/16, EU:T:2017:613, paragraph 78).

94      It should be noted that Article 17a(1) of the Staff Regulations recognises that officials have the right to freedom of expression, subject to strict compliance with the principles of loyalty and impartiality. The case-law has established that it is legitimate to subject officials, by virtue of their status, to obligations such as those contained in Articles 11, 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations, which are thus ‘prescribed by law’ in accordance with Article 10(2) of the ECHR and pursue the legitimate aim of protecting the interests of the European Union. Those obligations are admittedly restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression and are intended to preserve the relationship of trust which must exist between the institution and its officials and may be justified by the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of others within the meaning of Article 10(2) of the ECHR (see, to that effect, judgments of 6 March 2001, Connolly v Commission, C‑274/99 P, EU:C:2001:127, paragraph 44; of 13 December 2012, Strack v Commission, T‑199/11 P, EU:T:2012:691, paragraph 138; and of 15 September 2017, Skareby v EEAS, T‑585/16, EU:T:2017:613, paragraph 79). By contrast, it follows from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights that a rule cannot validly impose restrictions on freedom of expression if it is not stated with sufficient precision to enable citizens to regulate their conduct, which is also required by the principle of legal certainty (see judgment of 20 January 2011, Strack v Commission, F‑132/07, EU:F:2011:4, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).

95      In that regard, it should be noted that, as is apparent from paragraphs 53 to 76 above, the actions of which the applicant is accused are likely to be contrary to the duty of loyalty, the legal basis of which consists of Articles 11, 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations.

96      As expressed in the case-law, the restriction imposed on freedom of expression by obligations such as those whose legal basis is Articles 11, 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations pursues the legitimate aim of protecting the interests of the European Union, and in particular of maintaining the relationship of trust which must exist between an institution and its officials.

97      That limitation cannot be considered excessive. By contrast, in the present case, the essential content of freedom of expression was respected in that the applicant was still able to express his opinions freely in the brief at issue, without being entitled to present the work of others as the result of his own work by failing to mention his sources.

98      Consequently, by considering that plagiarism could constitute an infringement of the obligations under Articles 11, 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations, FRA did not unlawfully interfere with the applicant’s freedom of expression and the requirement of strict legality under Article 52 of the Charter was respected.

99      Therefore, the third part of the first plea in law must also be rejected as unfounded.

100    In the light of the foregoing considerations, the first plea in law must be rejected in its entirety as unfounded.

(b)    The fifth plea in law, alleging that the administrative investigation was opened improperly in the absence of prima facie evidence and that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated improperly

101    The applicant claims, in essence, that the administrative investigation was opened arbitrarily, since there were no reasonable grounds to suspect a disciplinary offence relating to him.

102    FRA submits that the fifth plea in law is unfounded.

103    It should be noted that, under Article 2 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, which refers to Article 1 of that annex, the AA or the AECC have a wide discretion to decide whether, in the light of the evidence in their possession, it is appropriate to initiate an administrative investigation and then, where appropriate, one of the disciplinary proceedings provided for in Sections 4 and 5 of that annex (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 June 2013, Goetz v Committee of the Regions, F‑89/11, EU:F:2013:83, paragraph 184).

104    However, that broad discretion cannot justify the AA or the AECC conducting a procedure without even having prima facie evidence against the persons concerned. Consequently, in order to protect the rights of a person concerned, the AA or the AECC must ensure that, before opening an investigation, it has evidence which gives rise to a presumption that that person has failed to fulfil his or her statutory obligations and, before opening disciplinary proceedings, sufficiently precise and relevant evidence to support its suspicions (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 June 2013, Goetz v Committee of the Regions, F‑89/11, EU:F:2013:83, paragraph 185).

105    In the present case, in the first place, as regards the administrative investigation, it should be noted that it was initiated on the basis of a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had failed to fulfil his statutory obligations. In the context of the 2016 appraisal procedure, the applicant’s head of department had discovered in October 2017, as is clear from the report of the Director of FRA, that a large part of the brief at issue included passages copied from other sources without being referenced.

106    Next, as regards the applicant’s allegation that the decision to open the investigation made no mention of Article 21 of the Staff Regulations and that the AECC did not know exactly, at the time of opening the investigation, which provisions of the Staff Regulations the applicant might have infringed, it should be noted that, as regards decisions to open an investigation, Article 1 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, to which Article 2 thereof refers in relation to administrative investigations carried out by the AA, does not require that authority, or, where appropriate, the AECC, to specify the specific provisions of the Staff Regulations which were infringed. Moreover, the case-law establishes that the failure to mention explicitly, when the disciplinary procedure is initiated, the provisions of the Staff Regulations which are ultimately found to have been infringed does not prejudice the rights of defence of the official or other servant concerned if the objections formulated when the procedure was initiated enabled him or her to ascertain precisely the rules of the Staff Regulations which he or she was alleged to have breached (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 October 2005, Rasmussen v Commission, T‑203/03, EU:T:2005:346, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited). The same applies, a fortiori, to decisions to open an investigation.

107    In the present case, in the decision to open the investigation, the AECC referred to its prior consultation with OLAF, where the Director of FRA criticised the applicant for copying parts of the brief at issue without including references, mentioning his sources, or informing his head of department of that fact, so that the applicant led him to believe that the document was the result of his own work. In doing so, the applicant failed to take into account that, due to the importance of its subject matter, the document could have been published or used in relation to third parties, exposing FRA to a considerable risk of damage to its reputation. Such complaints made it sufficiently clear to the applicant that he was alleged to have breached the provisions of the Staff Regulations requiring loyal conduct on the part of officials. It must therefore be held that the applicant was put in a position by the AA to know which provisions he was accused of having failed to respect (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 October 2005, Rasmussen v Commission, T‑203/03, EU:T:2005:346, paragraphs 46 to 48).

108    Furthermore, as regards the applicant’s allegation of a lack of prima facie evidence, based on the fact that OLAF had refused to initiate an investigation, it is sufficient to note that the AA may initiate an investigation in the absence of, or even in addition to, an investigation carried out by OLAF (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 June 2013, Goetz v Committee of the Regions, F‑89/11, EU:F:2013:83, paragraphs 135 and 136). Decision 2013/01 of the FRA Management Board on the conduct of administrative investigations and disciplinary proceedings, which is applicable in this case, does not contain any restriction in that respect either.

109    Finally, the applicant’s allegations that, first, his head of department knew that the brief at issue contained quotations and was therefore not the product of his own work and, secondly, that the decision to open the investigation contained factual statements which were not based on any prima facie evidence, namely that there was a risk that the brief at issue might have been published or used in relation to third parties, are unfounded.

110    First, the fact that the applicant’s head of department had been able to establish that the brief at issue contained quotations enabled him to believe that the work was referenced. Consequently, the discovery of extracts consisting of borrowings without reference to their sources was sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had failed to fulfil his statutory obligations. Secondly, with regard to the publication or use of the brief at issue vis-à-vis third parties, it should be noted that the applicant had already acknowledged in his internal appeal of 7 November 2017 against the 2016 assessment report that the brief at issue had been used for the development of a workshop on religion in the context of the FRA Fundamental Rights Forum of 2016 and as a reference document when the project on working with religious organisations was started by the FRA’s Fundamental Rights Promotion Department. Furthermore, according to the testimony of the applicant’s head of department to the investigator, a major FRA report based on the EU-MIDIS II survey on Muslims, published in the course of September 2017, could have made use of parts of that document, although it was decided to limit the length of the report to a maximum and to stick to a statistical compilation of the results.

111    In the second place, the applicant’s allegation that the AECC initiated disciplinary proceedings in the absence of sufficiently precise and relevant evidence that he had committed a disciplinary offence must be rejected. The applicant cites the judgment of 8 July 2008, Franchet and Byk v Commission (T‑48/05, EU:T:2008:257, paragraphs 351 and 352), in which the Court held that the objective pursued by the rules governing the disciplinary procedure and prohibiting the initiation of that procedure before OLAF’s investigations have been completed is, inter alia, to protect the official concerned by ensuring that the AA or the AECC has at its disposal, before initiating that procedure, the precise and relevant evidence, in particular exonerating evidence, which has been established in the course of the investigation carried out by OLAF, which has at its disposal extensive means of investigation. However, the situation is different in this case, as no investigation has been opened by OLAF. Therefore, that case-law is not applicable to the present case. In any event, the AECC initiated disciplinary proceedings before the Disciplinary Board on the basis of the inquiry report after having communicated to the applicant all the documents in the file and after having heard him, in accordance with Article 3 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations. In that sense, the inquiry report provided sufficiently precise and relevant evidence that the applicant had breached his obligations under the Staff Regulations, since it confirmed the suspicions which justified the opening of the investigation.

112    Consequently, the applicant cannot legitimately claim that a reasonable suspicion regarding the existence of a disciplinary offence did not exist and that the AECC erred in law in that respect.

113    In view of the foregoing, the fifth plea in law must be rejected as unfounded.

(c)    The sixth plea in law, alleging non-compliance with the framework of the investigation by the investigator, infringement of Articles 4(2) and 7(6) of FRA Management Board Decision 2013/01, infringement of Article 4(1)(a) to (d) and Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation 2018/1725 and Article 4(1)(a) to (d) and Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation No 45/2001, and failure to comply with the effects of an annulment judgment

114    The applicant claims that the decision to remove from post should be annulled, since it cannot be excluded that the procedure would have had a different outcome if Decision 2013/01 of the Management Board of FRA, Regulation 2018/1725, Regulation No 45/2001 and the effects of the judgment of 8 October 2015, DD v FRA (F‑106/13 and F‑25/14, EU:F:2015:118), had been strictly observed.

115    In the first place, the applicant submits that the investigator exceeded the limits of Article 4(2) of Decision 2013/01 in so far as the scope of the investigation was broadened. The collection of certain data was unlawful, as the investigator exceeded the scope of the investigation. Those data were also processed by the Disciplinary Board and subsequently by the AECC.

116    In the second place, the content of the decision to terminate of 13 June 2013, annulled by the judgment of 8 October 2015, DD v FRA (F‑106/13 and F‑25/14, EU:F:2015:118), could not constitute necessary, proportionate and accurate data for the purpose of the inquiry, within the meaning of Article 4(2) of Decision 2013/01.

117    FRA challenges the applicant’s arguments as partly inadmissible and partly unfounded.

118    It should be noted that the right to protection of personal data is not an absolute right (see judgment of 24 September 2019, Google (Territorial scope of de-referencing), C‑507/17, EU:C:2019:772, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited).

119    In the present case, the investigator’s inquiries were based on the disciplinary power that FRA has over its staff and on the powers that the AECC had specifically assigned to it. They were a legitimate exercise of public authority. Moreover, the investigator used the information obtained solely with a view to identifying a potential disciplinary offence committed by the applicant in the preparation of the brief at issue and with a view to possible disciplinary proceedings. Furthermore, it is not apparent from the documents in the file that the data collected by the investigator and by the Disciplinary Board were not limited to what was necessary to verify the truth of the facts alleged.

120    The processing of personal data is covered by the justification in Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation 2018/1725 (to which Article 5(a) of Regulation No 45/2001 previously corresponded), which concerns the case where that processing is necessary for the performance of a task covered by the legitimate exercise of official authority vested in the EU institution or body to which the data are disclosed. Since it was carried out in the general context of a disciplinary procedure, the processing in question necessarily falls within the legitimate exercise of the mission entrusted to AA or the AECC (see, by analogy, judgment of 6 February 2019, TN v ENISA, T‑461/17, not published, EU:T:2019:63, paragraph 79).

121    Furthermore, the applicant’s allegations that, first, the investigator exceeded the limits of the mandate given to him and, secondly, that the collection of data was unlawful because the investigator exceeded the scope of the investigation are unfounded.

122    First, the administrative investigation did not go beyond the scope of FRA’s investigation in so far as it considered an infringement of the Staff Regulations that was not limited to copyright infringement, since the purpose of the investigation, as set out in the decision to open the investigation, was essentially to ascertain the precise extent to which the brief at issue or other documents drafted by the applicant contained extracts from documents external to FRA which were not cited or referenced, whether those documents were covered by copyright and, if so, whether the Staff Regulations or the laws on intellectual property had been infringed.

123    Secondly, with regard to the applicant’s arguments concerning the unlawful extension of the investigation to certain observations he had made during his 2016 assessment, it should be noted that those observations gave indications that the applicant had claimed credit for a text of which he was not the author, taking credit for a document whose content had been borrowed heavily from other documents. Therefore, those observations were relevant in order to verify the existence of a breach of the Staff Regulations, one of the purposes stated in the decision to open the investigation.

124    Thirdly, as regards the applicant’s arguments concerning the unlawful extension of the investigation beyond the area of freedom of thought, conscience and religion, it follows from the wording of the decision to open the investigation that the investigation was also intended to ascertain whether other documents drafted by the applicant reproduced extracts from documents external to FRA which were not cited or referenced.

125    Fourthly, as regards the applicant’s arguments concerning the unlawful extension of the investigation to his working relations with his colleagues, which led to the taking of evidence on matters outside the scope of the investigation, it should be noted that the administration generally has a wide discretion in the conduct of administrative investigations, in particular in assessing the quality and usefulness of the cooperation provided by witnesses (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 October 2020, Broughton v Eurojust, T‑87/19, not published, EU:T:2020:464, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited). It follows that, in the exercise of their administrative investigative duties, the investigator and the head of the investigation have a wide discretion as to the usefulness of hearing a witness, but that that discretion is not discretionary, in so far as it must be exercised taking into account what is necessary to establish within a reasonable time all the relevant facts and law, both incriminating and exonerating, in accordance with the principle of sound administration and, more specifically, that of impartiality (judgment of 5 October 2020, Broughton v Eurojust, T‑87/19, not published, EU:T:2020:464, paragraph 81). Even if the evidence given in the context of an administrative investigation is, in general, a valuable contribution to the case file, it is also likely to contain elements of a very subjective nature, or even mere hypotheses formulated by the persons questioned in the course of the investigation. In that respect, the content of those testimonies cannot be sanctioned, unless they are insulting or criminally reprehensible, which is the case, in particular, of false testimony.

126    In the present case, the applicant merely asserts that the witnesses are mainly critical of his conduct, but does not indicate which passages of the witness statements support his assertions. A reading of the evidence provided reveals that the witnesses sometimes raise questions about the applicant’s attitude which, a priori, could have illustrated the deliberate nature of the conduct complained of. For example, witness A stated, with regard to the updated version of the brief at issue, that he had the impression that the applicant had made a minimal effort and had not shown any progress. Therefore, the subjective assessments of the witnesses are not such as to lead to a widening of the scope of the investigation.

127    Finally, fifthly, as regards the applicant’s argument that the Director of FRA wrongly inserted in his report to the Disciplinary Board information about the reasons for the decision to remove from post annulled by the judgment of 8 October 2015, DD v FRA (F‑106/13 and F‑25/14, EU:F:2015:118), FRA contests the admissibility of that argument, since it was not raised in the complaint lodged against the decision to remove from post. In response to the applicant, who notes that he had raised that argument on pages 17 and 18 of that complaint, FRA objected that that argument had been raised in the context of a distinct legal submission.

128    According to the case-law, the rule of concordance between the pre-litigation complaint and the subsequent action requires, under penalty of inadmissibility, that a plea or complaint raised before the EU Courts must already have been raised in the pre-litigation procedure, so that the AA or the AECC was in a position to know the criticisms that the person concerned was making of the contested decision. That rule is justified by the very purpose of the pre-litigation procedure, which is to enable an amicable settlement of disputes between officials or other staff and the administration. It follows that, in appeals by officials or other servants, the submissions made to the EU Courts may contain only heads of dispute based on the same cause of action as that on which the heads of dispute relied on in the complaint are based, it being specified that those heads of dispute may be developed, before the EU Courts, by the presentation of pleas in law and arguments which do not necessarily appear in the complaint but are closely related to it (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 June 2021, Lucaccioni v Commission, T‑316/19, EU:T:2021:367, paragraph 90 (not published) and the case-law cited).

129    It should be noted that the applicant put forward a similar argument during the pre-litigation procedure. In that regard, it is immaterial whether the argument was presented as a distinct legal submission. Consequently, that argument must be regarded as admissible.

130    That being so, the fact that the decision to terminate of 13 June 2013 was annulled by the judgment of 8 October 2015, DD v FRA (F‑106/13 and F‑25/14, EU:F:2015:118), on the ground that, prior to the adoption of that decision, the applicant had not been expressly informed of the proposed termination of his contract and invited to comment thereon, does not imply that any factual information contained in that decision must be regarded as materially inaccurate or irrelevant for the purposes of the disciplinary procedure at issue in the present case. Furthermore, the applicant does not indicate which data are, in his view, materially inaccurate or irrelevant for the purposes of that disciplinary procedure.

131    Consequently, there cannot have been a breach of the applicant’s personal data by reason of the reference made to the decision to terminate annulled by the judgment of 8 October 2015, DD v FRA (F‑106/13 and F‑25/14, EU:F:2015:118).

132    In the light of the foregoing considerations, it must be concluded that the data collected were limited to what was necessary to verify the truth of the facts alleged against the applicant.

133    In any event, it is necessary to note the case-law according to which a procedural irregularity may lead to the annulment of the contested decision only if it is shown that that irregularity could have had an influence on the content of the decision (see judgment of 7 May 2019, WP v EUIPO, T‑407/18, not published, EU:T:2019:290, paragraph 128 and the case-law cited).

134    Furthermore, according to the case-law, it does not follow from any provision of Regulation No 45/2001 that the infringement of the rights which it guarantees automatically affects the legality of acts adopted by the institutions and bodies of the European Union (see judgment of 7 May 2019, WP v EUIPO, T‑407/18, not published, EU:T:2019:290, paragraph 129 and the case-law cited). The same conclusion applies to Regulation 2018/1725. In addition, the same considerations apply to Decision 2013/01.

135    Thus, even if the inclusion in the report of the Director of FRA of certain data collected in the course of the investigation constituted an illegality, that could only be sanctioned by annulment of the contested decision if it were established that it could have influenced the content of that decision, which is not the case. As the Director of FRA mentioned in point 114 of the decision rejecting the complaint, the Disciplinary Board stated in paragraph 34 of its opinion that it had not relied on the decision to terminate annulled by the judgment of 8 October 2015, DD v FRA (F‑106/13 and F‑25/14, EU:F:2015:118), in reaching its decision. Moreover, it is not apparent from the documents in the file that the decision to remove from post was based on the data identified by the applicant.

136    It follows that the sixth plea in law must be rejected as unfounded.

(d)    The eighth plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence, in particular the right to be heard, infringement of Articles 1 and 2 and of Article 12 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations

137    The applicant claims, in essence, that there are several accusations on which he was not able to comment. The decision to remove from post should therefore be annulled, since it cannot be ruled out that it would have had a different content if his rights of defence, and in particular his right to be heard, had been strictly respected.

138    FRA contests the applicant’s arguments. As to the assertion concerning certain additional aspects that the Disciplinary Board allegedly identified in paragraph 39 of its opinion, the applicant does not indicate what those additional aspects are. Consequently, that assertion is inadmissible and, moreover, irrelevant.

139    As a preliminary point, it should be noted that Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter provides that the right to sound administration includes, inter alia, the right of every person to be heard before an individual measure which would adversely affect him is taken. According to the case-law, respect for the rights of the defence constitutes a general principle of EU law which is applicable whenever the administration proposes to take an act adversely affecting a person (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 November 2019, ADDE v Parliament, T‑48/17, EU:T:2019:780, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited). That is particularly the case where the procedure may result in a sanction (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 September 2010, Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission and Others, C‑550/07 P, EU:C:2010:512, paragraph 92 and the case-law cited). That fundamental principle of EU law must be ensured even in the absence of any rules concerning the procedure at issue (judgments of 10 July 1986, Belgium v Commission, 234/84, EU:C:1986:302, paragraph 27; of 9 November 2006, Commission v De Bry, C‑344/05 P, EU:C:2006:710, paragraph 37; and of 27 October 2016, ECB v Cerafogli, T‑787/14 P, EU:T:2016:633, paragraph 72).

140    That principle requires that the person concerned be given the opportunity to make his or her views known in a meaningful way about the matters which might be held against him or her in the measure to be taken (see judgment of 9 November 2006, Commission v De Bry, C‑344/05 P, EU:C:2006:710, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).

141    Furthermore, it is for the EU Courts to ascertain, where it is faced with an irregularity affecting the rights of the defence, whether, in the light of the specific factual and legal circumstances of the case, the procedure at issue could have led to a different result in so far as the applicant could have defended himself better in the absence of that irregularity (see judgment of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited). However, there is only reason to annul a contested decision on the ground that the rights of the defence have been disregarded where the applicant sufficiently demonstrates that, in the absence of that procedural irregularity, he or she could have had a better opportunity to defend himself or herself, even if only to a limited extent (see judgment of 5 October 2020, Broughton v Eurojust, T‑87/19, not published, EU:T:2020:464, paragraph 100 and the case-law cited).

142    In the present case, the applicant fails to demonstrate that fact. He confines himself to stating that he was not heard on certain aspects on which the decision to remove from post is based, in his view, without setting out what arguments he could have put forward concerning those aspects and their possible impact on the content of that decision. It cannot be accepted that, if the applicant had been heard on those aspects, he might have had a better chance, albeit a reduced one, to defend himself.

143    As regards the accusations concerning unreferenced borrowings from the Wikipedia website and insubordination, which were allegedly made only after the inquiry report had been completed, the Disciplinary Board acknowledged that the applicant had not been heard in relation to them. However, it appears from paragraphs 29 and 31 of the Disciplinary Board’s opinion, page 2 of the decision to remove from post and point 162 of the decision rejecting the complaint that the Disciplinary Board and the AECC, consequently, decided not to rely on those accusations or to base their opinion and decisions on them.

144    With regard to the preparatory document for the ‘working group 28’, mentioned in the report of the Director of FRA, but not in the inquiry report, it appears from paragraph 44 of the Disciplinary Board’s opinion that the latter did not rely on the document in preparing its opinion. Nor did the AECC rely on that document, as confirmed by the fact that no reference to it is made in the decisions to remove from post and reject the complaint.

145    As regards the applicant’s argument that he was not heard in relation to certain conclusions of the Disciplinary Board’s opinion, FRA submits that that argument is inadmissible since the applicant does not identify those conclusions. However, it is clear that the conclusions referred to are those contained in paragraph 39 of the Disciplinary Board’s opinion and that those are specifically mentioned in paragraph 119 of the application. The applicant’s argument is therefore admissible. In that regard, however, it is sufficient to note that the Disciplinary Board only detailed, in a more precise manner, those passages consisting of unreferenced borrowings from the brief at issue which were clearly identifiable in the light of Annex 5 to the report of the Director of FRA. Consequently, the applicant, who had the opportunity to comment on that Annex 5, cannot validly claim that the Disciplinary Board issued an opinion on points in relation to which he could not be heard.

146    It follows that the present plea in law must be rejected as unfounded.

(e)    The second plea in law in so far as it alleges breach of the principle of sound administration and of the duty of diligence, the duty of care and the duty to remain measured in statements made

147    The applicant claims, in essence, that the duty of diligence or duty of care were breached by the investigator and by the Director of FRA at the initiation of the disciplinary procedure, by the decision to remove from post and by the Disciplinary Board.

148    Before examining the merits of the present plea, it is necessary to examine the plea of inadmissibility raised by FRA in relation to the alleged breach of duty of diligence by the Director of FRA in initiating the disciplinary procedure, on the basis that a decision to initiate a disciplinary procedure consists solely of a preparatory act and cannot be challenged per se. The applicant considers that such a decision can be challenged as an incidental plea.

149    In that regard, according to the case-law, the preparatory acts of a decision do not adversely affect officials and it is only when an action is brought against the decision adopted upon the conclusion of the procedure that the applicant may challenge the legality of the earlier acts which are closely linked to it. Although certain purely preparatory measures may adversely affect the official in so far as they may influence the content of a subsequent challengeable act, those measures cannot be the subject of an independent action and must be challenged in an action brought against that act (see judgment of 9 March 2005, L v Commission, T‑254/02, EU:T:2005:88, paragraph 122 and the case-law cited). Since the claims for annulment relate to the decision to remove from post and the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings is a preparatory act in the procedure leading to the adoption of the decision to remove from post, the applicant is entitled, in the context of the present action, to challenge the lawfulness of the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings. FRA’s plea of inadmissibility should therefore be rejected.

150    Consequently, it is necessary to examine the merits of the present plea in law.

151    It should be noted that, according to settled case-law, the duty of care reflects the balance of reciprocal rights and obligations which the conditions of employment and the rules applicable to staff have created in the relationship between the public authority and the members of the public service, which implies, in particular, that, when deciding on the situation of an official, the authority must take into consideration all the factors which are likely to determine its decision and that, in so doing, it must have regard not only to the interests of the service but also to the interests of the official concerned. The latter obligation is imposed on the administration by the principle of sound administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter (judgments of 5 December 2006, Angelidis v Parliament, T‑416/03, EU:T:2006:375, paragraph 117; of 13 December 2017, Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, T‑482/16 RENV, EU:T:2017:901, paragraph 131 (not published); and of 16 June 2021, Lucaccioni v Commission, T‑316/19, EU:T:2021:367, paragraph 124).

152    Furthermore, the principle of sound administration entails, inter alia, an obligation on the part of the administration to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant elements of the case (see judgment of 5 June 2019, Bernaldo de Quirós v Commission, T‑273/18, not published, EU:T:2019:371, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).

153    In the present case, it should be noted that FRA did not breach its obligation to examine carefully and impartially the relevant elements of the situation at issue.

154    In the first place, it is clear from the inquiry report that, during the administrative investigation, the obligation to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant evidence relating to the claims concerning the availability of the brief at issue on the DMS for external use was respected, to the fact that the applicant had not warned his colleagues that the brief at issue contained unreferenced borrowings and to the fact that the applicant had sent a revised version of the brief at issue citing all the sources only after the unreferenced content had been discovered. As can be seen from pages 11 to 15 of the inquiry report, the investigator examined the applicant’s observations on the preliminary findings of the inquiry and analysed the correspondence between the applicant and his colleagues as well as the testimonies that the applicant used to support his allegations, both incriminating and exonerating, as evidenced by the investigator’s consideration of certain points raised by the applicant. For example, on page 13 of the inquiry report, the investigator stated that, according to the applicant, his head of department knew that the brief at issue was a draft. However, the investigator noted, on page 8 of that report, that, when presenting the brief at issue, the applicant had not mentioned that it was an unfinished document with unreferenced borrowings. The fact that the applicant’s head of department and some colleagues knew that the brief at issue was a draft or the fact that the applicant had not known what use his colleagues planned to make of it had no bearing, in the investigator’s view, on the fact that the brief at issue contained unreferenced borrowings. As regards the availability of the brief at issue on the DMS, the applicant did not dispute that his colleagues had access to the brief. In that respect, the investigator merely stated that the applicant’s colleagues were not aware that the document contained borrowings without any reference to their sources. In view of the above, the investigator carefully considered all the elements in the file, both incriminating and exonerating the applicant.

155    In the second place, the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings states that the Director of FRA considered the observations made by the applicant at the hearing of 15 October 2018, which did not, however, alter the facts as found by the investigator. It appears from the report of the Director of FRA that the latter was well aware of all of the applicant’s arguments, as indicated by the fact that he added both the minutes of the hearing of 15 October 2018 and the applicant’s written statement dated the same day as an annex. The statement by the Director of FRA that, at that hearing, the applicant had not been in a position to contradict the investigator’s conclusions is not capable, on its own, of calling into question the fact that the Director of FRA had carefully and impartially considered the applicant’s observations.

156    In the third place, it is apparent from the report of the Director of FRA that he carefully and impartially examined all the relevant evidence relating to the fact that the applicant had not warned his colleagues that the brief at issue contained unreferenced borrowings. In particular, in that regard, the reference on page 6 of that report to the fact that, in response to B’s request to send him the brief at issue following a media enquiry, the applicant sent the document indicating that it was his first draft may be noted.

157    In the fourth place, the Disciplinary Board’s opinion shows that the applicant’s arguments were carefully and impartially examined and that the Disciplinary Board considered, in the light of the material in the file, that there was evidence that the applicant had opposed his superiors, that he had presented the brief at issue as his own work, that there was a risk that that brief or parts of it might have been incorporated into one or more documents published by the FRA and that the borrowings contained in that brief should have been referred to. In that respect, the applicant is wrong to argue that the Disciplinary Board did not substantiate the claim that he had opposed his superiors. The Disciplinary Board explained, in paragraph 48 of its opinion, that that finding was based on the fact that the applicant had presented the writings of others as his own work. As regards the risk of incorporating the unreferenced borrowings into one or more documents published by FRA, the Disciplinary Board stated in paragraph 45 of its opinion that the applicant’s head of department had confirmed that the brief at issue could have been used as a source for the preparation of a report. As regards the statement in paragraph 39 of the Disciplinary Board’s opinion that the author could be expected to indicate references in a draft, the applicant argued that the internal rules on the citation of sources provided that the insertion of references took place at another stage. In paragraphs 38 to 42 of its opinion, the Disciplinary Board examined the reasons given by the applicant for failing to mention the references to the borrowings in the brief at issue. It concluded that the applicant’s explanations were unconvincing and inconsistent, since, first, an author could be expected to include certain references at the outset and insert footnotes at a later stage, secondly, there was no indication, such as the use of inverted commas or the mention of sources, that the material had been copied, and thirdly, certain parts of the analysis had not simply been copied, but slightly modified.

158    In the fifth place, it is apparent from the decision to remove from post that the AECC stated the reasons why the Director of FRA had endorsed the Disciplinary Board’s findings of fact. In the light of the explanations on pages 3 to 6 of the decision to remove from post, it appears that that director outlined the facts that he found against the applicant and it appears from point 74 of the decision rejecting the complaint that he referred to the Disciplinary Board’s findings of fact and explained in detail the reasons why he departed from the Disciplinary Board’s opinion with regard to the proposed sanction.

159    In the sixth place, FRA did not infringe the applicant’s right to protection of personal data, as established in paragraph 132 above.

160    In the seventh and last place, it is apparent from the decision to remove from post and the decision rejecting the complaint that the Director of FRA took full account of the applicant’s observations made at the hearing on 11 July 2019. As set out in point 193 of the decision rejecting the complaint, the Director of FRA rejected in the decision to remove from post all the points raised at that hearing since the applicant had not added any other relevant observations regarding the increase in sanction. In addition, the Director of FRA responded in detail, in points 27 to 67 of the decision rejecting the complaint, to the observations raised by the applicant at the hearing of 11 July 2019 as regards the infringement of the principle of legal certainty and his freedom of expression, in points 68 to 81 of that decision, to those relating to the breach of the principle of sound administration, the duties of diligence and care and the principle of the presumption of innocence, in points 82 to 92 of that decision, to the observations concerning the irregular opening of the investigation and the disciplinary procedure, in points 93 to 120 of that decision, to the arguments concerning the failure to respect the framework of the investigation and the right to protection of personal data, in points 121 to 155 of that decision, to the arguments concerning the lack of impartiality of the investigator and the Director of FRA, in points 156 to 159 of that decision, to the allegations concerning the lack of factual basis for the infringement of Articles 11, 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations, in points 160 to 188 of the decision rejecting the complaint, to the observations on the breach of the rights of defence, in particular the right to be heard, in points 189 to 200 of the decision rejecting the complaint, to the arguments concerning the breach of the rule against unreasonable delay, and finally, in points 201 to 216 of the decision rejecting the complaint, to the arguments concerning the breach of the principle of proportionality.

161    In addition, the Director of FRA specifically mentioned the reasons for imposing the most serious sanction. In particular, he stated that the downgrading did not sufficiently reflect the seriousness of the misconduct, highlighted the aggravating circumstances identified by the Disciplinary Board and stated the reasons why the Disciplinary Board did not take into account the seriousness of the misconduct, considering that the bond of trust had been irrevocably broken and, therefore, that downgrading was not an adequate sanction.

162    In any event, most of the applicant’s allegations are in fact aimed at challenging the conclusions reached by FRA, and not the fact that it examined all the evidence at its disposal with care and impartiality and therefore with restraint in its conduct.

163    In the light of all the foregoing considerations, it must be concluded that FRA took due account of the various allegations made by the applicant and responded in a detailed and careful manner to the submissions made by him throughout the procedure. The applicant therefore has no basis to argue that the investigator, the Director of FRA or the Disciplinary Board breached the duty of care, the duty of diligence and the principle of sound administration. The second plea in law must therefore be rejected in so far as it alleges a breach of the principle of sound administration, the duties of care and diligence and the duty to remain measured in statements made.

(f)    The seventh plea in law, alleging lack of impartiality, neutrality and objectivity on the part of the investigator, and the third plea in law, alleging abuse of power and lack of impartiality, neutrality and objectivity on the part of the AECC

164    By his third plea in law, the applicant alleges abuse of power and lack of impartiality, neutrality and objectivity on the part of the AECC. In essence, he argues that the real purpose of the administrative procedure was to ‘get rid of him’ by all means and that the Director of FRA did everything possible to ensure that no exonerating evidence was taken into consideration, thereby exceeding his powers.

165    By his seventh plea in law, the applicant claims that the investigator’s lack of impartiality, neutrality or objectivity, both subjective and objective, justifies the annulment of the decision to remove from post.

166    FRA contests the applicant’s arguments.

167    First, it should be noted, as regards the requirement of impartiality, that it is incumbent on the administration to comply with that requirement in its two components, namely, on the one hand, subjective impartiality, according to which no member of the institution concerned must manifest bias or personal prejudice, and, on the other hand, objective impartiality, according to which that institution must offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt as to possible bias (see, in this sense, judgments of 20 December 2017, Spain v Council, C‑521/15, EU:C:2017:982, paragraph 91 and the case-law cited, and of 16 June 2021, KT v EIB, T‑415/20, not published, EU:T:2021:368, paragraph 78). It is also clear from the case-law that subjective impartiality is presumed until the contrary is proved (see judgment of 8 February 2018, Institute for Direct Democracy in Europe v Parliament, T‑118/17, not published, EU:T:2018:76, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

168    Secondly, it should be noted that the concept of misuse of powers, which is the subject, in essence, of the complaint made in that regard by the applicant, has a very precise scope, referring to the use by an administrative authority of its powers for a purpose other than that for which they were conferred. A decision is vitiated by misuse of powers only if it appears, on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent evidence, to have been taken to achieve ends other than those intended. In that respect, it is not enough to invoke certain facts in support of one’s claims; it is also necessary to provide sufficiently precise, objective and consistent evidence to support their truth or, at the very least, their probability, failing which the material accuracy of the institution’s assertions cannot be called into question. Thus, the overall assessment of the evidence of misuse of powers cannot be based on mere allegations, insufficiently precise evidence or evidence which is neither objective nor relevant (see judgment of 7 June 2018, OW v EASA, T‑597/16, not published, EU:T:2018:338, paragraph 98 and the case-law cited).

169    Thirdly, with regard to the third plea in law, in so far as it alleges abuse of power and a lack of impartiality, neutrality and objectivity on the part of the AECC, it must be pointed out that the acts of the institutions of the European Union enjoy a presumption of legality in the absence of any indication capable of calling such legality into question (see judgment of 13 July 2000, Griesel v Council, T‑157/99, EU:T:2000:192, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

170    In addition, it should be noted, with regard to the rules on the burden and administration of proof, that, in general, in order to convince the court of a party’s allegation or, at the very least, of its direct intervention in the search for evidence, it is not sufficient to rely on certain facts in support of its claim; it is also necessary to provide sufficiently precise, objective and consistent evidence to support their truth or probability (judgment of 6 March 2001, Connolly v Commission, C‑274/99 P, EU:C:2001:127, paragraph 113).

171    Finally, according to the case-law, it is for the applicant to prove his allegations, unless it emerges from the examination of the grounds for annulment that there is a body of sufficiently precise, relevant and consistent evidence to support the complaints raised and to lead to a reversal of the presumption of validity attaching to the contested decisions (see judgment of 19 September 2001, E v Commission, T‑152/00, EU:T:2001:232, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).

172    In the present case, the applicant has not explained how the evidence he presents demonstrates a lack of impartiality, neutrality and objectivity on the part of the AECC and an abuse of power.

173    In that regard, concerning the indication of a reference to the related cases T‑632/19 and T‑703/19, it should be noted, as did FRA, that they are not closely linked to the present case. The subject matter of those other cases is quite different. Thus, the fact that the applicant has brought other actions, based on other facts, against FRA cannot have any bearing on the fact that the actions in the present case are liable to result in a disciplinary sanction. In any event, the action in Case T‑632/19 was dismissed by the judgment of 14 July 2021, DD v FRA (T‑632/19, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2021:434), and that in Case T‑703/19 was also dismissed by the judgment of 21 December 2021, DD v FRA (T‑703/19, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2021:923).

174    As regards the other evidence adduced by the applicant, much of it relates to arguments which have already been put forward in the context of the second plea in law, in so far as it relates to a breach of the principle of sound administration, the duties of care and concern and the duty to remain measured in statements made, an examination of which led the Court to conclude that the administration had not breached its obligation to examine the relevant elements of the case carefully and impartially (see paragraph 163 above). The considerations relating to that evidence which led to that conclusion also make it possible to reject the complaint concerning the failure of the AECC to be impartial, neutral and objective.

175    As regards the rest of the evidence adduced by the applicant, it is not such as to prove an abuse of power or to cast doubt on compliance with the requirement of impartiality. First, as was found in the context of the examination of the fifth plea in law, the AECC did not open the administrative investigation and the disciplinary procedure in an irregular manner (see paragraph 112 above). Secondly, as found in the examination of the sixth plea in law, the Director of FRA respected the applicant’s right to protection of personal data (see paragraph 132 above). Thirdly, as regards the evidence of the applicant’s satisfactory performance, the AECC stated in the decision to remove from post that that had no bearing on the reality or seriousness of the breaches of his professional obligations. Finally, fourthly, the AECC provided adequate reasoning for the existence of aggravating circumstances.

176    Furthermore, it follows from the case-law that, even if it cannot be ruled out that differences between an official and his or her superior may create a degree of irritation on the part of the superior, that possibility does not imply, as such, that the latter is no longer in a position to assess objectively the merits of the person concerned (judgments of 12 September 2007, Combescot v Commission, T‑249/04, EU:T:2007:261, paragraph 71, and of 12 July 2018, PA v Parliament, T‑608/16, not published, EU:T:2018:440, paragraph 45).

177    Apart from the existence of some friction between the applicant and the Director of FRA, as highlighted in the decision rejecting the internal appeal against the 2016 assessment report, in which the Director of FRA sometimes adopted a harsh tone, it must be noted that the applicant has not proved, on the basis of sufficiently objective, relevant and consistent evidence, that the AECC had used its powers for a purpose other than that for which they were conferred, that it had shown personal bias or prejudice, or that there was no sufficient safeguard to exclude any legitimate doubt as to possible bias.

178    Thus, the applicant does not produce any evidence to support his allegations that the real purpose of the procedure was to ‘get rid of him’ by any means and that the Director of FRA, exceeding his powers, did everything possible to ensure that no exonerating evidence was taken into consideration.

179    By the seventh plea in law, the applicant submits that the investigator’s lack of impartiality, neutrality or objectivity, both subjective and objective, justifies the annulment of the decision to remove from post.

180    In the first place, as regards the subjective impartiality of the investigator, it must be concluded that the evidence put forward by the applicant does not constitute sufficiently precise, objective and consistent evidence, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 170 above, to demonstrate the investigator’s lack of subjective impartiality.

181    In that regard, first, the applicant does not indicate how the inclusion in the inquiry report of conclusions without his having been given the opportunity to comment beforehand constitutes bias or personal prejudice. In that sense, as regards the accusations relating to unreferenced borrowings from the Wikipedia website and the accusation of insubordination, which were allegedly made only after the inquiry report had been completed, it is true that, as noted in the context of the examination of the eighth plea in law, the Disciplinary Board acknowledged that the applicant had not been heard in relation to them (see paragraph 143 above). However, that fact alone would constitute an indication of the investigator’s subjective bias only if the investigator’s conclusions were based specifically on those elements, which the applicant did not allege and which is not apparent from the inquiry report.

182    Secondly, as was found in the context of the examination of the sixth plea in law, the investigator respected the framework of the investigation and the applicant’s right to protection of personal data (see paragraphs 119 to 136 above).

183    Thirdly, as noted below in the context of the examination of the second and third pleas in law in so far as they concern a breach of the presumption of innocence, the investigation was carried out with due diligence and with due regard for the applicant’s presumption of innocence (see paragraph 206 below).

184    Finally, fourthly, the terms used by the investigator in the inquiry report do not show that he was offended by the applicant’s arguments. It is true that the investigator complained about the applicant’s ‘lack of respect’ and added that ‘it would be hard to conceive that [the applicant] would lightly accuse a judge, whose conclusions [he] did not like, of a lack of impartiality, neutrality and independence without any evidence external to the inquiry’ (see page 16 of the inquiry report). However, first of all, the applicant does not indicate how the comments identified reflect a manifestation of bias or personal prejudice on the part of the investigator. Second of all, if the investigator considered that there had been a lack of respect arising from accusations that he considered unsubstantiated, he was entitled to mention that view in the inquiry report. Furthermore, the investigator’s comments were not such as to show that he had been offended, since his tone was correct and his expression of surprise did not go beyond what could be expected from an impartial investigator.

185    Therefore, the applicant still fails to provide a body of relevant and sufficiently consistent evidence to demonstrate the investigator’s lack of subjective impartiality.

186    In the second place, as regards the objective impartiality of the investigator, it should be noted that case-law shows that, in order to comply with the requirement of objective impartiality, an institution must offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt as to possible bias. Consequently, for the organisation of the administrative procedure not to ensure sufficient guarantees in that regard, it is sufficient that a legitimate doubt exists and that it cannot be dispelled (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 March 2019, August Wolff and Remedia v Commission, C‑680/16 P, EU:C:2019:257, paragraphs 27 and 37).

187    In the present case, the applicant has not established that the relationship between FRA and the investigator was such as to create a doubt as to the objective impartiality of the investigator.

188    First, the evidence provided by the applicant shows that the investigator had a career relationship with the European Commission, and not with FRA.

189    Secondly, the evidence adduced by the applicant in support of his argument that the investigator acted as legal adviser to FRA is not sufficient to support a legitimate doubt as to the existence of any bias. While it is true that in his email of 12 October 2012 to FRA, the investigator advised FRA on whether to appeal the judgment of 18 September 2012, Allgeier v FRA (F‑58/10, EU:F:2012:130), the fact remains that the investigator’s intervention was limited to sending an email of less than two pages, for which he was not remunerated, as he had not entered into any contract with FRA in that respect. That was also the only occasion on which the investigator gave legal advice to FRA. That evidence is therefore not sufficient to support the claim of a lack of objective impartiality on the part of the investigator, since, if, as the applicant submits, the investigator gave legal advice to FRA in his email of 12 October 2012 and offered his services as a legal expert, he was never engaged or paid by FRA as its legal adviser. That is therefore an isolated and irrelevant event.

190    Moreover, the applicant has produced several pieces of evidence which confirm that the investigator’s role was limited to that of an external consultant. Thus, it was in that capacity that he performed his duties in the context of an external audit in 2013, an administrative investigation in March 2018 and an evaluation of two reports drawn up following two administrative investigations in April 2018.

191    Thirdly, with regard to the financial interests between the investigator and FRA, it should be noted that the contracts between them amounted to EUR 10 000, EUR 10 000 and EUR 2 500 respectively. However, those amounts are reasonable as the tasks, for example in the case of the 2013 external audit, included conducting an investigation, preparing reports and interviewing witnesses. Thus, the amount of work required to perform those tasks justified the amounts of the contracts.

192    Furthermore, the facts of the present case are not analogous to those in the judgment of 18 September 2012, Allgeier v FRA (F‑58/10, EU:F:2012:130). In that case, the investigator was a former colleague of the then Director of FRA and was the chair of the office of the Danish Institute for Human Rights, which had entered into a contract with FRA worth almost EUR 500 000 to provide FRA with information relating to sexual orientation discrimination (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 September 2012, Allgeier v FRA, F‑58/10, EU:F:2012:130, paragraphs 60 and 61). In paragraph 62 of that judgment, the Court held that the existence and importance of the business relationship between FRA and the Danish Institute for Human Rights were such as to give rise to justified apprehensions on the part of the applicant concerning the objective impartiality of the investigator. However, a situation in which the investigator acted once as a legal adviser, free of charge, and received for his work as an external consultant an amount of EUR 22 500 is not comparable to the facts of the abovementioned case and is not such as to demonstrate the existence of a business relationship between FRA and the investigator of such importance as to raise legitimate doubts as to the latter’s objective impartiality.

193    In the light of the foregoing considerations, it is necessary to reject the seventh plea in law as unfounded, and the third plea in law as unfounded in so far as it alleges abuse of power and lack of impartiality, neutrality and objectivity on the part of the AECC.

(g)    The second and third pleas in law in so far as they allege a breach of the presumption of innocence

194    The applicant claims that the presumption of innocence associated with the requirement of a high standard of proof was breached, since the interpretation of his conduct and statements adopted by the investigator, the Disciplinary Board and the Director of FRA, which led them to consider the facts in dispute as established, was not the only one possible. Moreover, according to the applicant, the Director of FRA had already decided on 5 December 2017, that is to say before the administrative investigation was initiated, that the applicant had committed plagiarism.

195    FRA contests the applicant’s arguments on the merits.

196    Furthermore, FRA considers that some of the arguments in paragraph 58 of the application are inadmissible in so far as the applicant refers to the annexes to the application.

197    In that regard, it should be noted that, under the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable to proceedings before the General Court in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 53 of that statute, and Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, the application must contain the subject matter of the proceedings, the pleas in law and arguments relied on and a summary of those pleas in law and the form of order sought by the applicant. Those elements must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the action, if necessary, without further information. Thus, in order to ensure legal certainty and the proper administration of justice, it is necessary, in order for a plea or complaint to be admissible, that the essential elements of fact and law on which an applicant relies should emerge in a coherent and comprehensible manner from the text of the application itself, so as to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the action, where appropriate, without further information (see judgment of 6 February 2019, TN v ENISA, T‑461/17, not published, EU:T:2019:63, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).

198    The explanations provided by the applicant in the context of the application concerning the complaints relating to the breach of the presumption of innocence were sufficiently coherent and comprehensible to enable FRA to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on those complaints.

199    The arguments set out in paragraph 58 of the application should therefore be considered admissible and examined on their merits.

200    In that respect, it should be noted that the principle of the presumption of innocence, which constitutes a fundamental right, set out in Article 6(2) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 48(1) of the Charter, confers on individuals rights which the EU Courts ensure are respected. That principle is applicable to administrative proceedings concerning the nature of the infringements in question and the nature and degree of severity of the ensuing penalties (see judgment of 4 April 2019, Rodriguez Prieto v Commission, T‑61/18, EU:T:2019:217, paragraphs 91 and 92 and the case-law cited).

201    Moreover, a breach of the presumption of innocence can be found only where there is evidence to show that the administration had decided, from the outset of a disciplinary procedure, to impose a sanction on the person concerned in any event, irrespective of the explanations provided by that person (see judgment of 13 March 2003, Pessoa e Costa v Commission, T‑166/02, EU:T:2003:73, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).

202    In the present case, the applicant contends, in essence, that the presumption of innocence was breached by the Disciplinary Board’s opinion, by the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings, by the decision to remove from post and by the decision rejecting the complaint, since, first, the facts of which he was accused were not established in accordance with the requisite standard of proof and, secondly, the administration decided to impose a sanction on him irrespective of his explanations.

203    In so far as the applicant argues that the facts of which he was accused were not established in accordance with the required standard of proof, which resulted in a breach of the presumption of innocence, it should be noted that that argument does not relate to the breach of the presumption of innocence stricto sensu, since, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 201 above, the question raised by the present complaints is whether FRA had decided, at the outset of the disciplinary procedure, to impose a sanction on the applicant. In any event, as regards that argument, reference can be made to the findings made in the context of the examination of the fourth plea in law, and of the second plea in law in so far as it concerns a breach of the requirement of a high standard of proof in administrative investigations and disciplinary proceedings.

204    As regards the argument that the AECC had already decided on 5 December 2017, prior to the opening of the administrative investigation, that the applicant had committed plagiarism, it is true that the Director of FRA rejected the internal appeal against the 2016 assessment report, stating, with regard to the brief at issue, that he had been informed that most of it was a direct copy of several sources, including Council of Europe documents, which were not referenced in that brief. However, the fact remains that the investigator and the Disciplinary Board subsequently found, in essence, the truth of the facts establishing the acts ultimately attributed to the applicant in the decision to remove from post. Moreover, the applicant did not dispute the existence of the passages resulting from unreferenced borrowings. Finally, it is not apparent from the decision rejecting the applicant’s internal appeal against the 2016 assessment report that the Director of FRA was already considering the applicant’s dismissal at that stage. Thus, the Court considers that the Director of FRA’s statements on those passages are not capable of establishing that he had decided from the outset of the disciplinary procedure to impose a sanction on the applicant in any event.

205    It must therefore be noted that the applicant has not proved that the AECC decided, from the outset of the disciplinary procedure, to impose a penalty on him in any event, regardless of his explanations.

206    The second and third pleas in law must therefore be rejected as unfounded in so far as they allege breach of the presumption of innocence.

(h)    The fourth plea in law, alleging manifest errors of assessment concerning the applicant’s infringement of Articles 11, 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations, and the second plea in law in so far as it alleges breach of the requirement of a high standard of proof in administrative investigations and disciplinary proceedings

207    In the context of the second plea in law, the applicant contests the accuracy of the facts relied on by the administration and submits that the requirement of a high standard of proof in administrative investigations and disciplinary proceedings was not respected. By the fourth plea in law, the applicant claims that the finding of an infringement of Articles 11, 12 and 21 made against him is based on manifest errors of assessment.

208    The FRA contests the applicant’s arguments.

209    It should be noted that the administration has, in general, a wide discretion in the conduct of administrative investigations. Given its resources, it is incumbent on it to investigate cases in a proportionate manner, that is to say, in particular, in such a way as to enable it to allocate to each case its fair share of the time available to it (see judgment of 5 October 2020, Broughton v Eurojust, T‑87/19, not published, EU:T:2020:464, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).

210    However, the administration is also required, by virtue of the principle of sound administration, to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant elements of the case before it and to gather all the elements of fact and law necessary for the exercise of its discretion and to ensure the proper conduct and effectiveness of the procedures which it implements (see judgment of 5 October 2020, Broughton v Eurojust, T‑87/19, not published, EU:T:2020:464, paragraph 79 and the case-law cited).

211    It should also be recalled that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter requires the judge of the European Union to exercise full control over the accuracy of the facts (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 September 2013, L v Parliament, T‑317/10 P, EU:T:2013:413, paragraph 70, and of 10 January 2019, RY v Commission, T‑160/17, EU:T:2019:1, paragraph 38). In that regard, it must verify the material accuracy of the evidence relied on, its reliability and its consistency (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 October 2018, McCoy v Committee of the Regions, T‑567/16, EU:T:2018:708, paragraph 98; see also, by analogy, judgments of 15 February 2005, Commission v Tetra Laval, C‑12/03 P, EU:C:2005:87, paragraph 39, and of 7 April 2016, ArcelorMittal Tubular Products Ostrava and Others v Hubei Xinyegang Steel, C‑186/14 P and C‑193/14 P, EU:C:2016:209, paragraph 36). With that in mind, the assessment of the probative value of a document is also subject to full review (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 September 2004, Valmont v Commission, T‑274/01, EU:T:2004:266, paragraph 43). Thus, even the complex or delicate assessments made by the administration must be supported by solid evidence (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 February 2005, Commission v Tetra Laval, C‑12/03 P, EU:C:2005:87, paragraph 41, and of 7 April 2016, Akhras v Council, C‑193/15 P, EU:C:2016:219, paragraph 56). It is therefore incumbent on the court, even in that context, to carry out a thorough examination of the evidence (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 July 2008, Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala, C‑413/06 P, EU:C:2008:392, paragraph 146).

212    Furthermore, in the context of its review of legality, the EU Courts also carry out a full review in relation to the correct application of the relevant rules of law (judgment of 7 November 2007, Germany v Commission, T‑374/04, EU:T:2007:332, paragraph 81).

213    It is in the light of those considerations that it is necessary to examine whether the required level of proof has been reached, whether the accuracy of the facts has been well established and whether the AECC has remained within the limits of its discretion.

214    It is therefore necessary to examine, in the first place, whether the facts of which the applicant is accused have been established to the requisite standard of proof and, in the second place, whether the facts established constitute an infringement of Articles 11, 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations.

215    On a reading of the material in the file, it should be noted that the AECC correctly established the accuracy of the facts with which the applicant is accused, by endorsing the findings of the Disciplinary Board and considering that the applicant had deliberately presented the writings of others as his own work, without mentioning the sources, that he had asked for credit for a text of which he was not the author and that his actions could have caused damage to FRA’s reputation, in particular if the brief at issue or parts of it had been included in one or more documents published by FRA.

216    As regards plagiarism, FRA produced the brief at issue and marked all parts that correspond to unreferenced material written by others. As a result, 26 of the 32 pages of that brief include copied passages and most of the content of 19 pages is borrowed. Thus, it is clear that the applicant has taken most of the content of the brief at issue from other sources without referencing them. Furthermore, a large proportion of the passages that FRA did not identify as unreferenced borrowings are repetitions of the wording of legal provisions, which implies minimal intellectual effort.

217    In that regard, as regards, first of all, the facts relating to the presentation of the work of others as his own work, the applicant claims that the brief at issue was an unfinished internal document, that, in the accompanying email to his head of department, the applicant had specified that it was a ‘first draft’, that B, A, and his head of department were aware that it was a draft and that the applicant had a habit of adding references at the end of his work.

218    However, those arguments cannot succeed for the following reasons. As FRA submits, first, the fact that the applicant’s head of department and some colleagues were aware that the brief at issue was a draft does not change the fact that the brief at issue contained unreferenced borrowings, which was not disputed by the applicant. Secondly, some sources were already mentioned in the brief at issue, which contained a number of references on pages 2 to 5, 17, 19 to 20, 22 to 24 and 30 to 32. Therefore, in view of the appearance of that document, it could be presumed that it contained all the required references. In addition, FRA’s internal rules for editing and producing research results emphasise the importance of referencing sources throughout the editing process. In particular, the scientific editing checklist requires full referencing in case of direct quotation in a text, legal provisions and references to relevant previous work, reference checking of table sources and adherence to the style guide and consistency of references.

219    Thus, by including references in a text that was largely the result of copying without mentioning all the sources used, the applicant presented the work of others as his own work. Consequently, the Disciplinary Board and the AECC correctly established the accuracy of the facts of which the applicant is accused by concluding that he had sought to pass-off the work of others as his own research.

220    That finding is supported by the fact that the applicant claimed credit for a text of which he was not the author in his 2016 assessment, claiming authorship of a document resulting largely from copying. In his internal appeal of 7 November 2017 against the 2016 assessment report, the applicant highlighted the brief at issue and claimed that, ‘as anybody who reads the paper can easily verify, [the head of department’s statement that the brief at issue consists mainly of case-law citations] is inaccurate as the paper contains also legal, conceptual and policy analysis’ and that he had ‘demonstrated [his] professional knowledge/specific knowledge of religious freedom [when he wrote] the religious freedom briefing paper’. However, only Sections 4 and 5 of the brief at issue, on pages 29 to 32, contain an analysis and suggestions that can be considered to be the applicant’s work.

221    Furthermore, the applicant disputes the deliberate nature of his actions. Nevertheless, the presence in the brief at issue of certain references proves that he deliberately chose to mention some and not others. Moreover, the applicant’s statements concerning the brief at issue and his attempt to obtain credit for it in his assessment for 2016 confirm that he deliberately sought to pass it off as his own work.

222    In addition, other elements of the file show that the applicant presented the work of others as his own work. For example, in his email of 18 March 2016, he sent his head of department the brief at issue, claiming that he had made an introduction on freedom of thought, conscience and religion, a presentation of the key cases of the European Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee and an analysis of the European Union’s competences in that area. However, the introduction referred to by the applicant is found on pages 5 to 9 of the brief at issue and almost the entirety of that section, with the exception of two paragraphs and a table on page 5, are unreferenced borrowings. As mentioned in paragraph 11 above, the applicant argued in the internal appeal against the 2016 assessment report that that brief also contained a legal, conceptual and policy analysis.

223    Likewise, the section dedicated to the key cases of the European Court of Human Rights, which is found on pages 9 to 16 of the brief at issue, was completely copied. Finally, in his email of 8 April 2016 to B, with A in copy, the applicant described the brief at issue as ‘the document which I have drafted’, a formulation which suggested that it was essentially a personal work.

224    Accordingly, the fact that the applicant deliberately presented the writings of others as his own work, without mentioning the sources, has been correctly established.

225    Next, as regards the existence of a risk that the brief at issue or parts of it had been incorporated into one or more documents published by FRA and that its content could have been shared with the outside world, that risk was not purely hypothetical, as it appeared from page 5 of the inquiry report, paragraph 3 of the Disciplinary Board’s opinion and the testimony before the investigator of the applicant’s head of department that that brief could have been used as a source for the preparation of a report on the EU-MIDIS II investigation, a task related to a project proposed by FRA on religion and fundamental rights.

226    Furthermore, in his internal appeal of 7 November 2017 against the 2016 assessment report, the applicant claimed that the brief at issue was used for the development of the workshop on religion in the framework of the 2016 FRA Fundamental Rights Forum and by the FRA Fundamental Rights Promotion Department as a reference document when starting the project on working with religious organisations.

227    As regards the standard of proof required in the present case, the applicant alleges, in essence, that the investigator, the Disciplinary Board and the Director of FRA interpreted his conduct and statements and thereby established the facts in dispute, whereas their interpretation of that evidence was not the only one possible. The applicant claims that there is thus a disconnection between the factual basis, the evidence and the decision to remove from post.

228    However, the evidence provided by the applicant is not sufficient to contest the accuracy of the facts accepted by the administration.

229    In support of his assertions that, in the Disciplinary Board’s opinion, in the decision to remove from post and in the decision rejecting the complaint, it is not established to the required high standard of proof that he acted intentionally and deliberately, that he presented the brief at issue as his own work and that he tried to mislead his superiors, the applicant submits that he disputed all those facts at the hearing on 11 July 2019. Nevertheless, during that hearing, the applicant only acknowledged that the first draft of the brief at issue contained borrowings, but stated that what he had done was not prohibited and that, in any event, he had added the references later. In doing so, the applicant offered an alternative interpretation of the facts, without questioning the accuracy of the facts on which FRA based its decision to remove from post.

230    Thus, the facts relied on by the investigator, the Disciplinary Board and the Director of FRA may be accepted as proven and consistent, provided that the applicant confines himself to alleging a disconnection between the facts established by the administration and the evidence, without supporting his assertions with evidence of such a nature as to cast doubt on the accuracy of the facts relied on by the administration.

231    In the light of the foregoing, it must be considered that the facts of which the applicant is accused have been proved to the requisite legal standard by the AECC.

232    In the second place, it must be determined whether those facts were such as to provide a valid basis for the finding by the AECC that the applicant had failed to fulfil his obligations under Articles 11, 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations.

233    According to the first paragraph of Article 11 of the Staff Regulations, officials are to carry out their duties and conduct themselves solely with the interests of the European Union in mind. The same provision obliges officials to perform the duties entrusted to them objectively and impartially and in keeping with their duty of loyalty to the European Union.

234    Article 12 of the Staff Regulations states that officials are to refrain from any action or behaviour which may reflect adversely on their position.

235    The first paragraph of Article 21 of the Staff Regulations provides that, irrespective of their grade in the hierarchy, officials are required to assist and advise their superiors and are responsible for the performance of the tasks assigned to them.

236    The first paragraph of Article 11, Article 12 and the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Staff Regulations, which constitute the legal basis for the decision to remove from post, are specific expressions of the duty of loyalty incumbent on all officials and other servants, as is clear from the case-law referred to in paragraph 67 above.

237    An official’s duty of loyalty to his or her institution must lead him or her, especially if he or she is of senior grade, to conduct himself or herself in a manner that is beyond suspicion, in order that the relationship of trust between that institution and the official is at all times maintained (judgment of 15 May 1997, N v Commission, T‑273/94, EU:T:1997:71, paragraph 129; see also, to that effect, judgment of 19 May 1999, Connolly v Commission, T‑34/96 and T‑163/96, EU:T:1999:102, paragraph 128).

238    According to the case-law, a breach of Articles 11, 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations presupposes conduct which the official must reasonably understand, in the light of his or her grade and duties and the circumstances of the case, is such as to appear to third parties to be liable to cause confusion as to the interests pursued by the European Union which he or she is supposed to serve (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 October 2020, Broughton v Eurojust, T‑87/19, not published, EU:T:2020:464, paragraph 149; of 23 October 2013, Gomes Moreira v ECDC, F‑80/11, EU:F:2013:159, paragraph 63; and of 10 June 2016, HI v Commission, F‑133/15, EU:F:2016:127, paragraph 189).

239    In the present case, the AECC did not commit an error of assessment in finding an infringement of Articles 11, 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations. The applicant, by deliberately presenting the writings of others as his own work, without mentioning the sources of the borrowings contained in the brief at issue, by claiming credit for a text of which he was largely not the author and by creating a risk of damage to FRA’s reputation, did not behave in a way that was above suspicion, so that the bonds of trust existing between FRA and himself would always be maintained, as required by the obligation of loyalty.

240    First of all, the applicant did not regulate his conduct solely with the interests of the European Union in mind, within the meaning of Article 11 of the Staff Regulations, but pursued his own interests exclusively by deliberately presenting the work of others as his own in order to obtain credit for it.

241    Next, for a staff member of FRA to pass off the work of others as his or her own is likely to be detrimental to the dignity of his or her office within the meaning of Article 12 of the Staff Regulations, as well as to FRA’s reputation. A staff member of FRA, or indeed an official or servant of any institution, body or agency of the European Union, has a duty not only to respect the work of others, but also to produce work of quality, which is the result of reflection, which is not the case here, since most of the brief at issue is the result of copying and the applicant’s analysis is limited to Sections 4 and 5 of that brief, which amount to four pages.

242    Finally, the applicant did not actually carry out the task entrusted to him, within the meaning of Article 21 of the Staff Regulations, since, apart from presenting the work of others as his own, he did not carry out a genuine personal analysis of the issue he had to deal with. Furthermore, the applicant did not properly assist his superiors, also within the meaning of Article 21 of the Staff Regulations, since, by presenting the brief at issue to them as a document meeting the professional requirements imposed on him, on which they could, if necessary, rely for external distribution, he exposed them to the risk of being placed in a delicate and embarrassing situation.

243    Thus, the conclusions of the Disciplinary Board’s opinion concerning the infringement of Articles 11, 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations, endorsed by the Director of FRA, are reasonable and well founded in law, since, through his actions, the applicant had in mind not only the interests of the European Union, but his own interests, undermined the dignity of his office, failed to assist and advise his superiors and did not properly carry out the tasks entrusted to him.

244    Therefore, FRA has properly established that the applicant’s actions constituted an infringement of Articles 11, 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations. The fourth plea in law, and the second plea in law in so far as it relates to a breach of the requirement of a high standard of proof in administrative investigations and disciplinary proceedings must therefore be rejected as unfounded.

(i)    The ninth plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of proportionality

245    The applicant claims in the alternative that, by imposing the sanction of removal from post, which is the most serious sanction amongst the range of possible sanctions, FRA acted disproportionately in relation to the facts complained of. FRA did not indicate the reasons why it did not follow the Disciplinary Board’s opinion in that regard.

246    FRA contests the applicant’s arguments.

247    In that regard, it should be recalled that the terms of Article 86(1) of the Staff Regulations lay down the principle that any failure by an official to comply with his or her obligations under the Staff Regulations may result in disciplinary action being taken against him or her. According to Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, ‘the severity of the disciplinary penalties imposed shall be commensurate with the seriousness of the misconduct’. The article lists, in a non-exhaustive manner, in subparagraphs (a) to (i), the criteria which the AA must take into account in order to determine the seriousness of the misconduct and to decide on the sanction to be imposed.

248    According to well-established case-law, the AA has the power to make an assessment of the official’s responsibility which differs from that made by the Disciplinary Board and subsequently to choose the disciplinary sanction which it considers to be adequate to sanction the misconduct retained (see judgment of 17 May 2000, Tzikis v Commission, T‑203/98, EU:T:2000:130, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).

249    It should also be noted that the Court carries out a full review of the accuracy of the facts and the correct application of the relevant rules of law, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraphs 211 and 212 above.

250    Similarly, the EU Courts carry out a full review of the classification of facts (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 June 2012, BNP Paribas and BNL v Commission, C‑452/10 P, EU:C:2012:366, paragraph 102, and of 7 November 2013, Cortivo v Parliament, F‑52/12, EU:F:2013:173, paragraph 41) in the light of objective legal concepts. In particular, it exercises such a review over whether or not a fact falls within the legal concepts of aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

251    Finally, although the Staff Regulations do not provide for a fixed relationship between the disciplinary sanctions they indicate and the different kinds of misconduct that may be committed by officials, and do not specify to what extent the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances should be taken into account in the choice of sanction, compliance with Article 47 of the Charter presupposes that a ‘penalty’ imposed by an administrative authority which does not itself fulfil the conditions laid down in that article, as is the case here with the AECC, is subject to subsequent review by a judicial body which has the power to assess fully the proportionality between the misconduct and the penalty (see judgment of 15 May 2012, Nijs v Court of Auditors, T‑184/11 P, EU:T:2012:236, paragraph 85 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 9 September 2010, Andreasen v Commission, T‑17/08 P, EU:T:2010:374, paragraphs 146 and 147; ECtHR, 31 March 2015, Andreasenv. the United Kingdom and 26 other Member States of the European Union, CE:ECHR:2015:0331DEC002882711, paragraph 73). In that respect, the EU Courts verify, in particular, whether the weighting of aggravating and mitigating circumstances by the disciplinary authority was carried out in a proportionate manner (judgment of 16 March 2004, Afari v ECB, T‑11/03, EU:T:2004:77, paragraph 203).

252    It is therefore necessary to assess the arguments put forward by the applicant concerning an alleged breach of the principle of proportionality.

253    It should be pointed out that the Director of FRA rightly noted in the decision to remove from post that the Disciplinary Board did not mention any mitigating circumstances, but only aggravating ones.

254    It follows that it is necessary to examine the accuracy of the facts put forward by the applicant to demonstrate the existence of mitigating circumstances.

255    First, as regards the absence of any criminal intent on the part of the applicant, which he relies on as a mitigating circumstance, it should be noted, as the AECC set out in the decision to remove from post, that the Disciplinary Board established that the applicant had acted deliberately and was solely responsible for his actions and that, as it stated in the decision rejecting the complaint, the applicant had deliberately presented the brief at issue as his own work, had not informed his superiors of the lack of references and had tried to obtain credit for the brief at issue in his 2016 assessment. Those facts were established to the requisite legal standard by the administration (see paragraphs 215 to 224 above), so that the applicant cannot usefully rely on a mitigating circumstance in that regard.

256    Secondly, with regard to the mitigating factor of the absence of consequences for FRA of the applicant’s conduct in so far as the brief at issue was never made public and did not damage FRA’s reputation, the AECC stated in the decision to remove from post that there was no effect on FRA’s reputation, but that the applicant had, alone and deliberately, exposed FRA to a serious risk of damage to its reputation, which constitutes a serious breach of the applicant’s duty of loyalty. In the decision rejecting the complaint, the AECC added in that regard that it had identified tangible indications that there was a risk that such breaches of the Staff Regulations would occur in the future and that the sharing of the brief at issue through the DMS had presented a risk that that document would be used in the preparation of other documents. In that respect, it follows from paragraphs 225 and 226 above that the risk of damage to FRA’s reputation was real. Therefore, contrary to what the applicant maintains, the absence of concrete damage to FRA’s reputation cannot be considered as a mitigating circumstance.

257    Thirdly, as regards the applicant’s sincere apology and assurance that the conduct complained of would not be repeated, the AECC set out in the decision to remove from post that the exclusion of a risk of recidivism was not credible in so far as a lawyer such as the applicant, with his professional experience, should never have acted in such a way and the applicant did not appear to understand the seriousness of his conduct. It should be pointed out in that respect that the applicant only apologised on 24 October 2019, namely, after the Director of FRA had informed him of his intention to impose the sanction of removal from post. As the apology was submitted late, it cannot be accepted as a mitigating factor.

258    Finally, fourthly, as regards the evidence of the applicant’s satisfactory performance, it should be recalled that Article 10 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations does not provide for a fixed relationship between the penalties provided for in that annex and categories of misconduct, but sets out in a non-exhaustive manner the criteria which the AA must take into account in choosing the penalty in order to comply with the requirement of proportionality. Those criteria include ‘the conduct of the official throughout the course of his career’. In that respect, the AECC stated in the decision to remove from post that, in view of the applicant’s attitude during the procedure and his lack of awareness of the seriousness of the breaches of his professional obligations, his satisfactory performance had no bearing on the reality or seriousness of those breaches. Thus, although past performance may constitute a circumstance that may mitigate the seriousness of a breach, and thus the penalty incurred, it should be noted that in the present case the applicant’s past performance was not such as to call into question the conclusion that the bond of trust between FRA and the applicant was absolutely and irrevocably broken, in particular because of the deliberate nature of the applicant’s actions.

259    In view of those considerations and the seriousness of the conduct complained of, it must be considered that the AECC did not commit an error of assessment in taking into account and weighting the mitigating and aggravating circumstances of the case.

260    It follows that, contrary to what the applicant maintains, FRA did indicate the reasons why the infringements committed by the applicant were such as to justify the applicant’s removal from post. Furthermore, in the light of all the foregoing, it must be considered that it was without error that FRA was able to consider that the infringements committed by the applicant were such as to lead to his removal from office.

261    Thus, the Director of FRA was right to hold that the sanction of downgrading, proposed by the Disciplinary Board, did not sufficiently reflect the seriousness of the infringements committed by the applicant.

262    In the light of the foregoing considerations, it should be noted, first, that the applicant has not put forward any evidence allowing it to be concluded that the AECC made an error of assessment and, secondly, that the weighting of aggravating and mitigating circumstances was carried out by the AECC in a proportionate manner, so that there is no evidence to suggest that the sanction imposed is disproportionate to the conduct complained of.

263    It follows that the ninth plea in law must be rejected as unfounded, as must, therefore, the claims for annulment in their entirety.

C.      The third head of claim, seeking compensation for the damage allegedly suffered by the applicant

264    With regard to the claims for compensation, the applicant seeks to rely, first, on the unlawfulness of the decision to remove from post and, secondly, on the failure to observe the rule against unreasonable delay, in the context of which he includes infringement of the principle of sound administration, of the duty of care and of Article 22 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations.

1.      The claim for compensation submitted in conjunction with the claim for annulment

265    The applicant requests the Court to order FRA to compensate him for the material damage he suffered as a result of the loss of income in respect of his full net salary, including all allowances, until the date of his full reinstatement in FRA, with interest for late payment. In addition, he seeks compensation for the non-material damage he allegedly suffered, which he evaluates ex aequo et bono at EUR 50 000. The non-material damage consists of the impact on his reputation, his dignity, his right to privacy and personal data protection and his right to a family life, as well as the humiliation, anxiety, stress, sense of injustice and reduction of his chances of finding another job.

266    It should be noted that, according to settled case-law, claims for damages submitted in conjunction with claims for annulment which have no basis in law are themselves devoid of such a basis if they are closely linked to the claims for annulment (judgments of 30 September 2003, Martínez Valls v Parliament, T‑214/02, EU:T:2003:254, paragraph 43, and of 28 February 2018, Paulini v ECB, T‑764/16, not published, EU:T:2018:101, paragraph 86).

267    Therefore, since the alleged damage originated in the decision to remove from post and the claims for annulment of that decision were rejected as lacking any basis in law, as is apparent from paragraph 263 above, the claims for damages submitted in conjunction with the claims for annulment must also be rejected.

2.      The plea of unlawfulness, alleging breach of the principle of sound administration and of the duty of care, breach of the rule against unreasonable delay and breach of Article 22 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations

268    The applicant claims that the administrative investigation and disciplinary proceedings were not conducted within a reasonable time. Accordingly, he should be awarded compensation for the damage caused.

269    FRA contests the applicant’s arguments.

270    As a preliminary point, it should be noted that FRA contends that the applicant develops only the complaint relating to the failure to comply with the rule against unreasonable delay and that, consequently, the complaints relating to the breach of the principle of sound administration and the duty of care are inadmissible because of their lack of clarity and structure. In that respect, it should be noted that the obligation to conduct the disciplinary procedure within a reasonable time derives from the principle of sound administration (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 September 2000, Teixeira Neves v Court of Justice, T‑259/97, EU:T:2000:208, paragraph 123, and of 17 March 2015, AX v ECB, F‑73/13, EU:F:2015:9, paragraph 174), and the duty of care (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 July 2018, Curto v Parliament, T‑275/17, EU:T:2018:479, paragraphs 104 and 105).

271    It must therefore be concluded that the plea of unlawfulness is admissible in its entirety and is to be examined on its merits.

272    It should be noted that, according to settled case-law, in civil service litigation, the liability of an institution, body, office or agency of the European Union is subject to the fulfilment of a set of conditions, namely the unlawfulness of the conduct of which it is accused, the reality of the alleged damage and the existence of a causal link between the conduct of which it is accused and the alleged damage, those three conditions being cumulative (see judgment of 3 October 2019, DQ and Others v Parliament, T‑730/18, EU:T:2019:725, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).

273    It should be noted that the Staff Regulations set out in Section 5 of Annex IX to those regulations deadlines for the conduct of the disciplinary procedure before the Disciplinary Board. Thus, Article 18 of that annex provides that the Disciplinary Board is to send a reasoned opinion to the AA and to the official concerned within two months of the date of receipt of the AA’s report, provided that that time limit is appropriate to the complexity of the case. Article 22(1) of that annex provides that, after hearing the official concerned, the AA is to take its decision within two months of receiving the Disciplinary Board’s opinion. However, the Staff Regulations do not lay down, in Section 1 of Annex IX, any time limits for the conduct of the investigation.

274    It is settled case-law that, apart from the limitation periods, the time limits laid down for the conduct of a disciplinary procedure are not, in principle, mandatory. In the absence of a clearly expressed intention in the applicable texts to limit, for the sake of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations, the time limits during which the administration may act, those time limits constitute primarily a rule of sound administration whereby the institution is required to conduct the disciplinary proceedings diligently and act in such a way that each procedural step is taken within a reasonable time following the previous step (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 June 2021, DI v ECB, T‑514/19, under appeal, EU:T:2021:332, paragraph 177 and the case-law cited). As for the duty of care, it has also been held that its breach on the ground of lack of expediency may render the institution concerned liable for any damage caused, but that it cannot in itself affect the lawfulness of the contested decision (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 July 2018, Curto v Parliament, T‑275/17, EU:T:2018:479, paragraphs 104 and 105).

275    The reasonableness of the duration of the disciplinary procedure must be assessed in the light of the specific circumstances of each case and, in particular, the importance of the case for the person concerned, the complexity of the case and the conduct of the applicant and the competent authorities. No single factor is decisive. Each factor should be considered separately and their cumulative effect assessed. Some examples of delays attributable to the AA may not appear unreasonable if considered in isolation, but may be unreasonable if taken together. The requirements of procedural diligence do not, however, go beyond those consistent with the principle of sound administration. Where, as a result of decisions taken by the AA, a procedure has exceeded what would normally be regarded as a reasonable period of time, it is for that authority to establish the existence of special circumstances capable of justifying that excess (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 April 2016, FU v Commission, F‑49/15, EU:F:2016:72, paragraphs 137 to 139 and the case-law cited).

276    In order to verify, in the light of those principles, whether, first, the phase prior to the disciplinary procedure and, secondly, the disciplinary procedure itself took place within a reasonable period of time, it is necessary, first of all, to recall the main stages of the administrative procedure, before examining whether the objectively observed duration should be considered as reasonable or not.

277    In the present case, the administrative investigation was initiated on 23 March 2018 and the inquiry report was submitted on 23 July 2018, namely, after a total period of four months. During those four months, the investigator organised the hearing of seven witnesses and the applicant, which took place one month after the opening of the inquiry, namely on 23 and 24 April 2018. On 17 June 2018, namely, less than two months later, the investigator sent the applicant his preliminary findings. The applicant commented on those conclusions within less than a month, since he sent them on 2 July 2018. The investigator therefore submitted his inquiry report just over 20 days after receiving those observations from the applicant. It is clear from the above that the time elapsed between each stage was reasonable. In particular, the fact that the investigator issued his preliminary findings less than two months after the hearing is evidence of adequate expediency, since he had to analyse both the evidence file and the testimonies collected from eight people.

278    The applicant had just under three months for the preparation of his hearing of 15 October 2018 and his written statement, after which the disciplinary procedure was opened on 23 October 2018, exactly three months after the submission of the inquiry report. It is true that the Director of FRA did not produce the report provided for in Article 12 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations until 27 February 2019, namely, just over four months after the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings. Furthermore, the Disciplinary Board’s opinion was delivered on 7 May 2019, namely, just over two months after the receipt of the report from the Director of FRA. During the two-month period, the Disciplinary Board received the applicant’s statement of defence on 21 March 2019 and organised a hearing of the applicant, which took place on 22 March 2019. Thus, while it is true that the Disciplinary Board did not issue its opinion within two months to the day of receipt of the report from the Director of FRA, the fact that the opinion was issued within a reasonable time and that the hearing of the applicant was held less than one month after receipt of the report demonstrates the Disciplinary Board’s diligence in conducting the procedure.

279    It should be noted that the two-month time limit provided for in Article 22(1) of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations for the adoption of the decision by the AA, or the AECC, was not respected in this case. The decision to remove from post was adopted by the AECC on 12 November 2019, namely, more than six months after it had received the Disciplinary Board’s opinion.

280    That being so, it is also settled case-law that the time limit laid down in Article 22(1) of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations is not a mandatory time limit. In that regard, it is apparent from the case-law that that provision lays down a rule of sound administration the purpose of which is to avoid, in the interests of both the administration and the officials, unjustified delay in the adoption of the decision terminating the disciplinary procedure (judgments of 18 June 2015, CX v Commission, F‑27/13, EU:F:2015:60, paragraph 38, and of 10 June 2016, HI v Commission, F‑133/15, EU:F:2016:127, paragraph 121). In the present case, the time which elapsed between the receipt by the AECC of the Disciplinary Board’s opinion, assuming that such receipt was immediate after that opinion was given, and the adoption of the decision to remove from post did not exceed the limits of reasonableness. It should be noted that on 11 July 2019 the applicant was heard by the Director of FRA under Article 22(1) of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations. Thus, the applicant had just over two months to become aware of the Disciplinary Board’s opinion and to prepare that hearing and his written observations, comprising 14 pages and seven annexes, including a document dated 4 July 2019 which the applicant would not have been able to submit if his hearing had taken place earlier. Finally, on 11 October 2019, three months later, the Director of FRA sent the applicant his note informing him of his intention to impose a sanction of removal from post. On 24 October 2019, the applicant submitted his observations. Therefore, while it is true that the AECC did not take its decision within two months of receiving the Disciplinary Board’s opinion, the complexity of the case, as evidenced by the voluminous nature of the administrative file, the detailed nature of the applicant’s arguments and, above all, the desire to hear the applicant on several occasions justify the time taken.

281    It remains to be examined whether all those stages, and hence the total duration of the disciplinary procedure, were kept within reasonable limits. Even if it is true that the phase preceding the disciplinary procedure and the disciplinary procedure as a whole lasted approximately one year and eight months, in the light of the foregoing findings, the applicant cannot validly maintain that they exceeded reasonable time limits as a whole. Taking into account all the circumstances of the case and, in particular, the fact that the applicant made use of the opportunity to present his observations in detail at each stage of the procedure, the duration of the procedure is explained by the obvious complexity of the case, as is clear from the volume of the administrative file, and by the intensity of the adversarial arguments. Thus, taken as a whole, the duration of the procedure was reasonable.

282    In so far as, in addition to establishing that the administration committed an unlawful act, the reality of the alleged damage and the existence of a causal link between the conduct complained of and the alleged damage must be proved to the requisite legal standard in order for the administration to be held liable (see paragraph 272 above), failure to comply with the time limit laid down in Article 22(1) of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations is not sufficient to uphold the applicant’s claim for damages.

283    It is admittedly recognised in the case-law that a disciplinary procedure places an official in a situation of uncertainty as to his or her professional future, necessarily causing him or her some stress and anxiety. When that uncertainty continues for an excessive period of time, the intensity of the stress and anxiety caused to the official increases beyond what is justifiable. Thus, the excessive duration of a disciplinary procedure must be regarded as giving rise to a presumption of non-material damage to the person concerned (judgment of 13 January 2010, A and G v Commission, F‑124/05 and F‑96/06, EU:F:2010:2, paragraph 147).

284    However, as held in paragraph 281 above, the duration of the proceedings taken as a whole was not excessive, so that the existence of non-material damage resulting from failure to comply with the time limit laid down in Article 22(1) of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations cannot be presumed in the present case.

285    While the applicant argues, in paragraph 141 of the application, that his non-material damage is also due to ‘excessive duration of the entire procedure, which had no basis for being opened in the first place, which renders this psychological damage even graver’, it is clear from paragraphs 138 to 143 of the application that the stress and anxiety which the applicant allegedly suffered in the present case were linked to the opening of the proceedings and the content of the accusations brought against him, which, in his view, were such as to damage his reputation, his dignity, his right to private and family life and to the protection of his personal data. The applicant also claims that FRA’s failure to properly consider the many objections he raised throughout the procedure also caused him stress and anxiety and a deep sense of injustice.

286    It follows that the non-material damage which the applicant suffered during the period between the issue of the Disciplinary Board’s opinion and the adoption of the decision to remove from post cannot be attributed to the duration of that period, during which he still had the opportunity to defend himself before the AECC, but to the fact that his objections were not upheld by the AECC. The applicant’s arguments relating to the unlawfulness of the initiation of the procedure, the breach of his rights of defence, the lack of neutrality and objectivity of the investigator and the AECC, the failure to respect his right to the protection of his personal data and the unfounded nature of the accusations made against him were rejected in the context of the examination of his claims for annulment, so that the non-material damage allegedly caused by the conduct complained of in those arguments cannot be compensated. Consequently, it has not been established, as far as the applicant is concerned, that he suffered non-material damage causally linked to the exceeding of the time limit laid down in Article 22(1) of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations.

287    It follows from the foregoing that the claims for damages, in so far as they are based on infringement of the principle of sound administration and of the duty of care, of the reasonable time limit and of Article 22 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, must also be rejected, and that the action as a whole must therefore be dismissed.

D.      The requests for measures of organisation of procedure

288    The applicant requests the Court to order FRA to produce the following documents as measures of organisation of procedure.

289    First, the applicant requests the production of all payment orders, all allocation decisions, including supporting documents and notes to file, all purchase orders and all contracts binding FRA or the EUMC to the investigator (‘the first request for a measure of organisation of procedure’).

290    Secondly, the applicant requests the production of the external legal audit relating to the reporting of wrongdoing by staff and former staff members which the investigator was asked to carry out and for which he was paid in 2013 (‘the second request for a measure of organisation of procedure’).

291    Thirdly, the applicant requests the production of correspondence and legal opinion, advice or consultation drafted by an Austrian law firm in the field of intellectual property rights in 2018 or 2019 (‘the third request for a measure of organisation of procedure’).

1.      The first and second requests for measures of organisation of procedure

292    The purpose of the first and second requests for measures of organisation of procedure is to clarify the existence of a possible lack of impartiality on the part of the investigator, as alleged in the seventh plea in law.

293    According to the case-law, in order to enable the Court to determine whether it is conducive to the proper conduct of the procedure to order the production of certain documents, the party making the request must not only identify the documents requested, but also provide a minimum of evidence accrediting the usefulness of those documents for the purposes of the proceedings (see judgment of 13 December 2018, Pipiliagkas v Commission, T‑689/16, not published, EU:T:2018:925, paragraph 83 and the case-law cited).

294    It should be noted that FRA has set out the essential elements of the documents which the applicant requests to be produced. That information, which is not contested by the applicant, is sufficient to assess the nature of the relationship between FRA and the investigator. Thus, the applicant still fails to substantiate the usefulness of those documents.

295    In any event, it should be noted that the Court is the sole judge of whether it is necessary to supplement the information available to it in the cases before it (see judgment of 13 December 2018, Pipiliagkas v Commission, T‑689/16, not published, EU:T:2018:925, paragraph 87 and the case-law cited). The Court considers that it is sufficiently informed by the documents in the file.

296    Accordingly, the Court considers that there are no grounds for granting the applicant’s requests.

2.      The third request for a measure of organisation of procedure

297    The applicant requests the production of correspondence and legal opinion, advice or consultation from an Austrian law firm in the field of intellectual property rights in 2018 or 2019.

298    The purpose of this third request for a measure of organisation of procedure is to clarify for the Court whether the applicant’s conduct infringed Austrian Copyright Law, as argued in the second part of the first plea in law. In that regard, the applicant submits that the principle of legal certainty has been infringed inasmuch as Austrian Copyright Law does not contain any prohibition of plagiarism.

299    That claim is completely irrelevant. As was established in paragraph 79 above in the context of the examination of the second part of the first plea in law, the employment relationship between an official and his or her institution is governed exclusively by the Staff Regulations and the Court applies only the civil service law of the European Union, and not any national law.

300    Consequently, there are no grounds for granting the applicant’s request.

IV.    Costs

301    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

302    Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by FRA, in accordance with the form of order sought by FRA.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber)

hereby:

1.      Dismisses the action;

2.      Orders DD to pay, in addition to his own costs, those incurred by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA).

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 7 September 2022.

Table of contents

I. Background to the dispute

II. Forms of order sought

III. Law

A. The request for omission of information from the public record

B. The first and second heads of claim, seeking the annulment of the decision to remove from post and the decision to reject the complaint

1. The subject matter of the claim for annulment

2. Substance

(a) The first plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of legal certainty, errors of law and a manifest error of assessment, infringement of Paragraph 7(1) of the Austrian Copyright Law and infringement of Article 11 of the Charter

(1) The first part of the first plea in law

(2) The second part of the first plea in law

(3) The third part of the first plea in law

(b) The fifth plea in law, alleging that the administrative investigation was opened improperly in the absence of prima facie evidence and that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated improperly

(c) The sixth plea in law, alleging non-compliance with the framework of the investigation by the investigator, infringement of Articles 4(2) and 7(6) of FRA Management Board Decision 2013/01, infringement of Article 4(1)(a) to (d) and Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation 2018/1725 and Article 4(1)(a) to (d) and Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation No 45/2001, and failure to comply with the effects of an annulment judgment

(d) The eighth plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence, in particular the right to be heard, infringement of Articles 1 and 2 and of Article 12 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations

(e) The second plea in law in so far as it alleges breach of the principle of sound administration and of the duty of diligence, the duty of care and the duty to remain measured in statements made

(f) The seventh plea in law, alleging lack of impartiality, neutrality and objectivity on the part of the investigator, and the third plea in law, alleging abuse of power and lack of impartiality, neutrality and objectivity on the part of the AECC

(g) The second and third pleas in law in so far as they allege a breach of the presumption of innocence

(h) The fourth plea in law, alleging manifest errors of assessment concerning the applicant’s infringement of Articles 11, 12 and 21 of the Staff Regulations, and the second plea in law in so far as it alleges breach of the requirement of a high standard of proof in administrative investigations and disciplinary proceedings

(i) The ninth plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of proportionality

C. The third head of claim, seeking compensation for the damage allegedly suffered by the applicant

1. The claim for compensation submitted in conjunction with the claim for annulment

2. The plea of unlawfulness, alleging breach of the principle of sound administration and of the duty of care, breach of the rule against unreasonable delay and breach of Article 22 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations

D. The requests for measures of organisation of procedure

1. The first and second requests for measures of organisation of procedure

2. The third request for a measure of organisation of procedure

IV. Costs

*      Language of the case: English.

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