QB-2022-002822 |
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
MEDIA & COMMUNICATIONS LIST
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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(1) Michael Farley (formerly "CR") (2)-(474) Individuals identified in Annex 1 to the Claim Form |
Claimants |
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- and - |
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Paymaster (1836) Limited (trading as Equiniti) |
Defendant |
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(instructed by Keller Postman UK Limited) for the Claimants
Andrew Sharland KC and Hannah Ready (instructed by Freeths LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 27-28 February 2023
Further written submissions: 18/19 May 2023 and 1 June 2023
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Crown Copyright ©
The Honourable Mr Justice Nicklin :
Section | Paragraphs | |
A. | Parties and background | [2]–[12] |
B. | The original claims | [13] |
C. | The Anonymity Application | [14]–[24] |
D. | Statements of case | [25]–[42] |
(1) | Particulars of Claim | [25]–[36] |
(2) | Defence | [37] |
(3) | Reply | [38] |
(4) | Further Information of the claims and Individual Schedules | [39]–[42] |
E. | Further claims | [43]–[54] |
F. | Applications | [55]–[72] |
(1) | Dismissal Application | [55]–[62] |
(2) | Striking Out Application | [63]–[65] |
(3) | Application by the Claimants in the Second Claim | [66]–[72] |
G. | Events following the hearing on 27-28 February 2023 | [73]–[83] |
(1) | Anonymity Order substantially discharged | [73] |
(2) | Further Application and evidence in respect of derogations from open justice | [74]–[80] |
(3) | Application to amend the MPoC in the First Claim to advance personal injury claims | [81]–[83] |
H. | Legal principles | [84]–[122] |
(1) | Striking out | [84]–[86] |
(2) | Summary judgment | [87] |
(3) | Misuse of private information | [88]–[100] |
(4) | Data protection | [101]–[110] |
(a) 'Damage' in data protection cases | [102]–[103] | |
(b) Threshold of seriousness | [104]–[105] | |
(c) The ECJ decision in UI -v- Österreichische Post AG | [106]–[110] | |
(5) | Jameel abuse of process | [111]–[115] |
(6) | Anonymity and derogations from open justice | [116]–[122] |
I. | Anonymity Application | [126]–[136] |
(1) | Submissions | [126]–[128] |
(a) Claimants | [126]–[127] | |
(b) Defendant | [128] | |
(2) | Decision | [129]–[136] |
J. | Dismissal Application | [137]–[165] |
(1) | Submissions | [137]–[142] |
(a) Defendant | [137]–[138] | |
(b) Claimants | [139]–[142] | |
(2) | Decision | [143]–[165] |
K. | Conclusion and next steps | [166]–[167] |
A: Parties and background
"- The breach was caused by your [Sussex Police's] data processor [the Defendant]. You had notified them of the change of addresses and they failed to effectively update their systems.
- You have conducted a risk assessment and concluded that the risk of data subjects suffering significant consequences as a result of this incident is unlikely; the data disclosed is limited in nature and each data set has only been sent to one household, who can be identified.
- You have a contract with [the Defendant], which specifically states that all their staff should have received data protection training.
- You have undertaken to inform the data subjects and… have been provided with a link to the ICO's advice regarding identity theft. This can be forwarded to those data subjects to help them take any action they regard as necessary to protect their identities…"
B: The original claims
"… claim damages for breach of statutory duty pursuant to the General Data Protection Regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018 and/or misuse of private information arising from the Defendant's failures to keep the Claimants' personal data and private information (including financial pension information) secure by posting the same to incorrect postal addresses. The Claimants bring claims for financial and non-financial loss and damage in sums to be assessed."
C: The Anonymity Application
"(a) The Claimants are 474 serving police officers who are bringing claims following a data protection breach and misuse of their private information relating to sensitive financial information concerning their pension benefits.
(b) Some of the Claimants are high ranking officers and others work in sensitive areas of policing."
"17. The Claimants, being serving police officers are fearful on a number of fronts if their names and/or personal residential addresses are put into the public domain, in the sense that a third party may be able to interrogate the court file and obtain that information.
18. The Claimants are serving police officers who range from the rank of Police Constable through Sergeant, Inspector, Chief Inspector and Superintendent. Some of the Claimants are thus very high ranking officers. Further, some of these officers work in a range of sensitive areas with higher levels of security and vetting. These areas include firearms, counter-terrorism, intelligence, public protection, safeguarding and child protection.
19. As police officers, all Claimants, but particularly those of higher ranks and in these sensitive areas feel that they legitimately need to protect both their identity as having been involved in a data breach concerning their sensitive financial information, and their true address details.
20. The latter point is of obvious relevance and concern to all police officers as their private residential address ought not to be available in the public domain at all having regard to their job and function. Therefore, there is a risk that suspects, associates, victims of crime, witnesses or others involved with the relevant officer may obtain their home address. The Claimants' knowledge that this may happen adds to their anxiety and fear for their safety.
21. Further, it is likely that when the claim is issued at court, there may be some press interest and that could lead to the Claimants' names and their addresses being made available to non-parties who conduct a search of the court file. This is likely to lead to reports that certain named officers have been the subject of a data leak.
22. Importantly, bearing in mind that there are certain categories of personal data as set out … above which may be in the hands of third parties already, it is entirely conceivable that much in the same way as wrongdoers may seek to "phish" for information from victims, those wrongdoers may obtain a further piece of the jigsaw by obtaining full names, middle names, initials or true home addresses of the Claimants as contained on the court file."
"Anonymity orders are derogations from open justice which must be strictly justified. Although, on the evidence available, I consider that the Claimants may well succeed in demonstrating that there remain cogent grounds for withholding their addresses, the Court will want to look again at the justification, and evidence in support, for withholding the Claimants' names. In this respect, attention is drawn to Various Claimants -v- Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority [2022] EMLR 4. Some Claimants may have a stronger justification for anonymity than others, and the evidence may vary between the Claimants."
"All, or certainly a great majority of the Claimants, regard their addresses as being confidential. If a claim form with names and addresses were made public this could provide any member of the public with a list of over 400 police officers and their addresses. … [Many] of the officers work in sensitive areas of policing and some are senior officers. Such a list could be put to nefarious use.
Making the addresses of the Claimants public would necessarily give rise to a troubling risk of harm both for the Claimants, and for their families. This is in the context of increasing anti-police sentiment, and violence against police officers.
Having spoken with officers in counterterrorism roles, we also understand that the publication of the addresses of the Claimants may well give rise to a terrorism risk. As we understand, credible intelligence has been disseminated to law enforcement that extremist groups have actively used information about police officers to plot terror attacks. The officers we have spoken with are unable to provide any further details due to issues of security and sensitivity.
The publication of the Claimants' addresses would cause distress to many of the Claimants. Several Claimants have made clear that they would wish to discontinue their claims if their addresses are to be made public.
In addition, publication would risk aggravating the condition of those with pre-existing psychological conditions. We have served medical reports on behalf of over 30 Claimants evidencing a psychological injury as a result of the Defendant's breach. Those reports will be made available to the Court for consideration in advance of the hearing on 27 and 28 February.
I would suggest that the real risk of the Claimants being physically targeted, in addition to distress they – and their families – would be caused, poses a strong moral argument in favour of the Court withholding the addresses of the Claimants.
(1) Officer A had been a police officer since 2009. S/he is an Armed Response Officer. Officer A's identity has protected within the police for the last six years and s/he operates under a general pseudonym number. The officer has no collar number shown on his/her uniform. If Officer A is required to give evidence, s/he is assigned a specific pseudonym and s/he gives evidence from behind a screen.
(2) Officer B was formerly also an Armed Response Officer, but is now working in covert policing. S/he targets high level criminality, including highly resourced organised crime groups. Like Officer A, if required to give evidence s/he does so using a pseudonym and from behind a screen. His/her covert work is likely to mean that s/he will be issued with a false identity. Vehicles used by Officer B are registered to PO boxes.
(3) Officer C works as a covert intelligence source handler. S/he states that everything about his/her identity is unknown at a public level and there are enhanced safeguarding measures in place to protect his/her identity. Officer C operates under a pseudonym and his/her vehicle registrations details are protected.
(4) Officer D works in an exclusively covert unit in the police engaged in source handling. S/he is responsible for managing covert human intelligence sources, a role s/he has held for 8 years. Officer D targets serious and organised crime groups and his/her identity is protected through the use of a pseudonym and car registration details are redacted.
(5) Officer E is a Counter Terrorist Specialist Firearms Officer. This is a covert policing role that Officer E has held since 2017. S/he works with the National Crime Agency, and in liaison with MI5, MI6 and specialist military forces (such as SAS). Officer E's work includes infiltration of suspected terrorist activities and surveillance on convicted terrorists on their release from prison. Officer E states that his/her anonymity is of the utmost importance in the roles s/he carries out and to national security.
(6) Officer F works in a covert unit engaged in surveillance targeting organised crime groups and significant drug traffickers. S/he has been operating undercover for 9 years. Officer F also works under a pseudonym and enhanced measures are in place to prevent him/her from being identified as a police officer. His/her vehicle's registration details are redacted and s/he has been issued with a credit card in a false identity.
(7) Officer G is another officer who works in a surveillance unit targeting organised crime. S/he has operated under a pseudonym for the last 5 years. S/he has a credit card in a false name for use in connection with his/her undercover work and his/her car registration details are redacted.
(8) Officer H works as an intelligence development officer. There is a covert element to his/her role which involves targeting organised crime groups. Officer H is engaged in surveillance and depends upon not being identified as a police officer. S/he has a pseudonym and enjoys similar protections to other covert officers in terms of credit cards in false names and redacted vehicle registration numbers.
(9) Officer I has worked in intelligence since 2005. S/he primarily undertakes surveillance. S/he operates under a pseudonym and if s/he gives evidence in Court, the pseudonym is used, and Officer I gives evidence from behind a screen. His/her identity is protected both within and outside the police.
D: Statements of Case
(1) Particulars of Claim
(1) their personal data within the terms of Article 4(1) GDPR and s.3(5) DPA; and/or
(2) private and confidential information in respect of which they have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
"11.1 The combination of the Defendants acts in (a) wrongfully mis-addressing each ABS containing the Private Information; and (b) sending each ABS through the postal service to unknown third parties constituted a serious unjustified infringement and intrusion into each Claimant's right to privacy and/or a misuse of the Private Information as related to each Claimant
PARTICULARS
(a) The Defendant knew that the Private Information was private and confidential and within the scope of each Claimant's rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
(b) The Defendant disclosed the Private Information to unknown third parties, being person the Defendant knew the Claimants would not wish to have access to the Personal Information.
(c) Each Claimant did not consent to the use of the Private Information by it being sent through the postal service to known and/or unknown third parties.
(d) The Defendant allowed a situation to arise whereby the Claimant each lost control and autonomy over the Private Information.
11.2 Further, or in the alternative, each Claimant held a reasonable expectation that the ABS would be sent from the Defendant to him/her.
11.3 As a person in control of the Correspondence, the Defendant's act of mis-addressing each ABS containing the Private Information and sending the Correspondence to unknown third parties, constituted a serious unjustified infringement of each Claimant's right to respect for their correspondence. The Claimants repeat the particulars provided in the preceding sub-paragraph."
(1) "anxiety, alarm, distress and embarrassment by the fact that the Personal Data has passed and/or may have passed into the hands of unknown third parties"; and
(2) "as soon as each ABS was put into the postal service bearing the wrong address, the Claimants each suffered an immediate loss of control and/or autonomy and/or diminution in the Personal Data, including having regard to their right to determine how any Personal Data should be used, with whom it should be shared, where it is made available and when it should no longer be made available".
"(a) The Claimants have been caused anxiety, alarm, distress and embarrassment by the fact that the Personal Data has passed and/or may have passed into the hands of unknown third parties.
(b) As a result, each of the Claimants seek (sic) compensation for moral and/or non-material damage.
(c) Further, as soon as each ABS was put into the postal service bearing the wrong address, the Claimants each suffered an immediate loss of control and/or autonomy and/or a diminution in the Personal Data, including having regard to their right to determine how any Personal Data should be used, with whom it should be shared, where it is made available and when it should no longer be made available.
(d) … unless the Defendant can provide any ABS which was physically returned unopened to the Defendant as sender, the Claimants infer that the (sic) each envelope was opened and read by an unknown third party…
(e) The Claimants each seek as a discrete head of loss, the loss of autonomy and/or control over their ABS and the consequential distress as a result of the same. For the avoidance of doubt, all Claimants seek compensation in this regard even where it may be shown that an ABS was returned, on the basis that there was a loss of control and/or autonomy for the period between posting and physical return…
The Claimants claimed for damage and distress for similar "loss of control and/or autonomy" in respect of the misuse of private information claim.
(2) Defence
(1) The Defendant admitted that it had sent the Claimants' ABSs to out-of-date addresses, and gave its explanation for how that error had occurred.
(2) The Defendant admitted that each ABS contained some Private Information of the relevant Claimant. However, seven different versions of the ABS had been sent out, depending on the individual circumstances of the individual Claimant, so it was not the case that all Private Information was included in every ABS. No Equiniti account number was included in an ABS.
(3) The Defendant contended that each envelope was addressed to the relevant Claimant and marked "Private and Confidential" and provided a return address.
(4) At the date of the Defence, 102 ABSs had been returned to the Defendant unopened and a further 19, had been forwarded to the relevant Claimant unopened. The Defendant has sought information from the Claimants' solicitors as to the number of Claimants who had a mail redirection service in operation.
(5) The Defendant denied that mere handling of an unopened opaque envelope could constitute misuse (or conceivably give rise to any actionable damage) whether for misuse of private information (or under data protection law), having regard particularly to the threshold of seriousness for both causes of action.
(6) More generally, the Defendant denied the inferential case that any ABS had been opened by an unidentified third party. In each case, the ABS had been sent to an address at which the relevant Claimant had previously lived.
(7) In relation to the misuse of private information claim, the Defendant denied:
a) that each Claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Private Information (for example his/her name or the fact that s/he was a police officer);
b) that placing a piece of information, even if private, "at risk of being viewed by unknown third parties" would constitute actionable misuse;
c) that, subject to the outcome of the appeal to the Supreme Court in Lloyd -v- Google, the Claimants could advance any claim to "loss of control" damages; and
d) that, in any event, any of the Claimants had not demonstrated that they had actually suffered "loss of control" of the Personal Information, much of which would have been available in the public domain in any event.
(8) Further, in relation to the data protection claim, the Defendant:
a) denied that it was the data controller; and relied upon the agreement it had in place with Sussex Police under which the Defendant was identified as a data processor on behalf of Sussex Police, which was the data controller; and
b) admitted the various acts of alleged processing, including the sending of each ABS to an out-of-date address; this had been a mistake on the part of the Defendant which was "one-off and non-deliberate".
(3) Reply
(1) stated that they did not know what had happened to all the ABSs but alleged that they had been "put at significant risk of being opened and read by unknown third party recipients" and maintained that each Claimant had a claim for damages even if the relevant Claimant had ultimately received his/her ABS;
(2) contended that it was for the Defendant to prove that each ABS was not opened and read by unintended and unknown third-party recipients; and
(3) contended that the damage caused to each of them was not "trivial", but no further information was provided of the damage suffered by each Claimant.
(4) Further Information of the claims and Individual Schedules
(1) ultimately received the ABS;
(2) was advised that the ABS had been returned to the Defendant or Sussex Police;
(3) suffered any annoyance and/or distress and/or anxiety;
(4) has a medical condition caused (or exacerbated) by the mis-addressed ABS;
(5) suffered any other loss or damage; and/or
(6) is aware of any (mis)use of his/her personal data/private information or any other events linked to the mis-addressed ABS.
(1) stated that he had not received the ABS and had been notified by Sussex Police, on 4 October 2019, that the ABS had not been returned to the police or to the Defendant;
(2) contained details of the First Claimant's "annoyance… distress and/or anxiety" caused by the mis-addressing of the ABS, including the following:
"The Claimant has suffered and continues to suffer distress. The Claimant works in a highly sensitive area of policing… The Claimant has always been rigorous in his measures to ensure that he keeps his work life and private life separate. Only trusted friends and family members know the nature of his employment.
The ABS was posted to an address at which the Claimant had not lived for at least 10 years. That address is in the same neighbourhood in which the Claimant continues to life and the Claimant does not disclose the nature of his employment to his neighbours…
The Claimant felt compromised and vulnerable knowing that a document containing sensitive information about him, and the nature of his employment, had been sent to an address in his neighbourhood and that there was no knowing who now had that information and what they might do with it…
The Claimant was distressed about the potential consequences of the information falling into the hands ot someone on the other side of the law…
The Claimant was distressed because his family might be at risk…
The Claimant considers these risks to be remote, but it is precisely the type of risk that officers … are trained to identify and mitigate against yet, through no fault of the Claimant, the risks were live and real due to the breach…
The Claimant suffered and continues to suffer anxiety for the reasons explained… and with regard to the potential for other misuse of the data that was not protected such as the information being used to open bank accounts, apply for jobs or credit cards in the Claimant's name…
The Claimant can see no end to the annoyance, distress and anxiety that he suffers as the data that was not protected is not going to change and might be misused at any time."
E: Further claims
"… during the course of [the] exercise [to provided the Individual Schedules], it has become apparent that approximately 75 Claimants ("the Medical Claimants") require a medical examination by a psychologist. The data breach has caused the Medical Claimants to suffer to the extent that warrants the referral to a medical expert. We are in the process of making the necessary referral to experts for the Medical Claimants and will be in receipt of CPR Part 35 compliant medical reports in due course."
The Claimants' solicitors stated that, by their calculations, the limitation period for any personal injury claims, would expire on 30 August 2022. They sought the Defendant's agreement to a standstill agreement in respect of these further personal injury claims.
"You are no doubt aware that the Claimants have sought to manage this claim at proportionate cost throughout. The Claimants' stated intention throughout has been to have these claims managed by way of a mechanism akin to group litigation. We have maintained this to be the most proportionate way of managing the claim as a whole. To that end elements of individual work were deliberately restricted so as to keep costs to a minimum and to provide you with the necessary claim information in the form of Schedule of Information ("SOI"). This wouldn't have required a deep dive, and the associated cost, into detailed distress and medical information for each Claimant.
However, your client has disagreed with the Claimants' proposed mechanism throughout this claim. You sought individually particularised statements of case for each and every Claimant in this action and that is what the Master ordered. As part of that costly exercise, we have had to take full and complete instructions in order to answer the questions set by the Master, at your behest. Full and complete instructions from every Claimant have been taken. As a result of that exercise, it is clear that there is (sic) significant levels of aggravation amongst the Claimant cohort and must now be investigated.
The exercise that you have requested throughout this litigation has been completed and it has escalated costs and potentially damages significantly. You cannot reasonably now complain that these instructions should have been taken at the start of the claim when you do not like the results of your client's own submissions. Essentially, your client has made its bed and now it must lie in it.
Contrary to your point that we are only now asserting personal injury claims, we would ask you to re-read the Claimants' letter of claim dated 28 February 2020 in which it was stated... that '… it may be appropriate in certain individuals' cases to consider the psychological and psychiatric impact of the personal data breach'. Further, in … the Master Particulars of Claim it was stated that 'Further, certain of the Claimants have suffered an aggravation of pre-existing medical conditions and seek general damages as a result.'
Arguably, those Claimants now advancing 'medical claims' fall under that paragraph. However, it is only out of an abundance of caution and in circumstances where you may seek to argue otherwise and take a limitation point that we had hoped that the parties could co-operate in agreeing a standstill agreement. Such a course would further the parties' obligations to co-operate with each other, save costs and be in accordance with the overriding objective. However if, as it seems, you wish to take the point, we will have to act accordingly in order to protect the Claimants' position…
We will now start work to prepare to issue a further claim form for the medical Claimants with the associated cost of the Court fee…"
In a further letter, dated 19 August 2022, the Claimants' solicitors indicated that they intended to issue a protective Claim Form for the Medical Claimants (as previously described) "shortly".
F: Application for summary judgment/striking out
(1) Dismissal Application
(1) In relation to the data protection claims:
a) damages cannot be awarded for 'loss of control' of data without proof of material damage or distress; and
b) in respect of some of the claims, no pleaded case of actionable damage having been suffered has been advanced.
(2) In relation to the claims for misuse of private information there was no misuse or misuse for which the Defendant could be liable.
(3) In relation to the claims generally:
a) the Claimants had not suffered damage or distress above a de minimis level or such as to cross the applicable level of seriousness; and/or
b) the claims constitute an abuse of the court's process under the principles established in Jameel -v- Dow Jones & Co Inc [2005] QB 946.
"SUSSEX POLICE PENSION ANNUAL BENEFIT STATEMENT
A Benefit Statement is attached showing the details that we hold about you and the pension benefits you are accruing under the Police Pension as at [date]. If the information we hold about you is wrong, this could affect the way we calculate your pension when you come to claim it.
Action for You
Please read the enclosed notes and check carefully that the details on the Benefit Statement are correct as far as you can tell. You need to:
- tell us of any mistakes; please send an email to us at the above address. Revised Benefit Statements will not be issued to reflect amendments to address, National Insurance number, title, marital status or spelling errors. These amendments will be reflected in your next Annual Benefit Statement. Where it is necessary to re-issue a statement we will endeavour to send this to you within 8 weeks of your email.
- ask us if you are unsure about any of the details; experience has shown that it is better to put things right now rather than waiting until retirement. If you have any queries or are not sure about what some of the details contained on the Benefit Statement mean, please contact us using the above email address;
- keep the Benefit Statement; including any details or comments that you have made on it or have attached to it until you reach retirement (or leave the Scheme).
Action for us
As pension scheme administrators, we want to maintain your records properly and ensure that we calculate your pension correctly. If you find any errors in the Benefit Statement, we will correct them. We will send you a Benefit Statement annually so that you can see how your pension benefits are growing and to check the details we hold."
The detailed pension information, which contained the bulk of the information in respect of which the Claimants maintain a claim for misuse of private information and/or data protection was found in an enclosure. Mr Sharland KC argued that a person, who opened the ABS by mistake, would have immediately appreciated (a) the broad nature of the document before s/he reached any of the personal data of the relevant Claimant, and, more importantly (b) that it was not meant for him/her.
(1) 101 of the ABSs were returned to the Defendant unopened (Mr Campbell KC suggested that the correct figure was 99), with confirmation being provided of the return to the officer concerned either by direct communication or via the relevant Claimant's solicitor.
(2) 74 of the ABSs were successfully retrieved by the relevant Claimant.
(3) 1 Claimant believed, but is not certain, that he received the ABS, unopened, at his home address.
(4) 1 Claimant states that he received his ABS which, to the best of his knowledge, had been reposted to him at his correct address.
(5) Only 14 Claimants pleaded a positive case – beyond the purely inferential case (see [33] above) – that the envelope containing his/her ABS was opened by a third party. Of those 14 instances,
a) in each case, the ABS was handed back to the relevant Claimant;
b) in 11 cases, the ABS is said to have been opened by a relative before being passed on to the relevant Claimant;
c) in 1 case the ABS is said to have been received by another police officer; and
d) in 2 cases, it is alleged that the ABS was opened or read by someone other than a family member or colleague.
(1) 14th Claimant (Tim Rush): Mr Rush received the mis-posted ABS in December 2019. It had been opened. The address to which the ABS was sent was that of the his estranged parents. Mr Rush complains that it was of "major concern" that the personal information in the ABS should have been seen by his parents and possibly other family members. He suffered anxiety and also feared misuse of the personal information in the ABS, although he was not aware of (and did not allege) any further misuse. No other claim for loss or damage.
(2) 75th Claimant (Samantha Kembery): Ms Kembery's ABS was posted to her mother's address and opened by her brother, who has the same first initial and surname as the Claimant. It was then returned to Ms Kembery by the her mother. Ms Kembery states that she suffered distress. At the time of the ABS being sent to the wrong address, she was not on good terms with her brother. She was concerned and worried about potential misuse her personal information, such as opening financial accounts or obtaining personal loans. Ms Kembery stated that she was anxious about ongoing potential misuse of her personal information. Although she did not anticipate this had happened, there was nothing to stop her brother from copying her private information for future use. She took steps to change the passwords for online accounts. Ms Kembery claims for general distress and for exacerbation of symptoms of post-natal depression. She is unaware of any further unauthorised use of her information.
(3) 109th Claimant (Gemma Holley): Ms Holley's ABS was sent to her parents' address and was opened by her mother. She states that she would "very much have preferred not to be placed in that position". Although she had a good relationship with her parents, she would not have chosen to share confidential information regarding "her pension, earnings etc." with them. Ms Holley stated that she had been caused "annoyance" and "anxiety", but would not describe the emotion as "distress". The feeling of anxiety has lessened over time. She lost confidence in the Defendant's ability to manage her pension. Ms Holley is unaware of any further unauthorised use of her information.
(4) 111th Claimant (Adam Richardson): Mr Richardson's ABS was sent to his parents' address and opened by his father in error. His parents notified him of the error and Mr Richardson collected the ABS soon afterwards. He describes his emotions as "annoyance", "minor anxiety" and feeling "baffled and frustrated". He claimed that he suffered "distress" and was worried about whether other documentation meant for him had been sent to an incorrect address. Mr Richardson is unaware of any further unauthorised use of his information.
(5) 155th Claimant (Chris Pipkin): Mr Pipkin's ABS was sent to a property belonging to his family. It was opened, he believes, to see whether it contained anything of importance. Mr Pipkin was contacted by his family. He does not say so in terms, but it would appear that he was then able to retrieve the ABS. Mr Pipkin complains of feeling "extremely annoyed and irritated" that the ABS had been sent to the wrong address and distressed that such an important document went astray. He is unaware of any further unauthorised use of his information.
(6) 200th Claimant (Chris Lane): Mr Lane simply states that "Through his own efforts, [I] was able to retrieve the mis-posted ABS. The ABS had been opened." He explains that he had to contact "strangers" and ask them whether they had some post that should have come to him. The householders admitted that they had opened the ABS. They agreed to forward it to Mr Lane. He describes the sending of the ABS to an out-of-date address as a "catastrophic mistake". Mr Lane states that he has been caused annoyance, distress, and anxiety, particularly in relation to the safety of his family. This anxiety has lessened over time. He is unaware of any further unauthorised use of his information.
(7) 247th Claimant (Adam Parris): Mr Parris states only that he received the ABS in an opened condition. He was, he said, aware that the person living at the address to which his ABS was sent "had links with criminal activity which added an extra level of distress and worry". As a result, Mr Parris claims to have suffered distress, annoyance and anxiety. He is unaware of any further unauthorised use of his information.
(8) 253rd Claimant (Claire Richardson): Ms Richardson's ABS had been opened by her parents and returned to her. She said that she was not close to her parents and was "mortified" that they had opened it and "become aware of her financial situation and future pension". Ms Richardson was annoyed that the ABS had been sent to her parents' address, when she had moved out over 21 years ago. She has had no relationship with her parents since she left home aged 18. Ms Richardson reported experiencing anxiety, "strong feelings of distress and was completely mortified". She is unaware of any further unauthorised use of her information.
(9) 258th Claimant (Charlotte Grant): Ms Grant's ABS was sent to the address of a family member where it had been opened. She states that her family told her that they had not looked at its contents, but the Claimant says that she "remains unsure whether a family member accessed and viewed her data". She complains about annoyance and anger at the negligent handling of her data and was distressed about the potential repercussions. Ms Grant felt anxious about potential identity theft and changed the passwords to her online accounts. She is unaware of any further unauthorised use of her information.
(10) 307th Claimant (Mario Ciaramella): Mr Ciaramella's father was approached by a current resident of his parents' former address. That person passed the opened ABS to the Mr Ciaramella's father stating that it had been opened in error. He then passed it on to Mr Ciaramella. He states that he is annoyed that the ABS was sent to an address that he ceased living at for more than 13 years. He also claims to have been caused distress arising from his not knowing the current residents of his parents' former home and the fact that he could not rule out the possibility that they may have copied information from his ABS "for future use or dissemination." Mr Ciaramella has suffered anxiety arising from his fear of identity theft (and also changed his online passwords) and the impact that it might have on his career progression. He is unaware of any further unauthorised use of his information.
(11) 342nd Claimant (Naomi O'Keeffe): Ms O'Keeffe did receive her ABS after it had been sent to her parents' address. Her parents passed it on to her. They had opened it as they thought it was junk mail. Ms O'Keeffe reports that she continues to suffer considerable annoyance as a result of the ABS being sent to an address at which she had not lived for 14 years. She complains of "minor distress" as she would not have discussed the contents of the ABS with her parents, and she was distressed that such information had been shared with them without her permission. She has not experienced any anxiety. Ms O'Keeffe is unaware of any further unauthorised use of her information.
(12) 359th Claimant (Paul Fielder): Mr Fielder's ABS was sent to his parents' home address and was opened in error by his father, who shares the same first initial as him. Mr Fielder's father advised him of the error and passed the ABS on to him. Mr Fielder reported feelings of "considerable annoyance" that his ABS had been sent to an address he had not lived at for more than 13 years. He was also caused distress through worry that other items of correspondence might similarly have gone astray. He was also concerned that the information within the ABS could be used to identify him, his family or his current home, "allowing him to be targeted due to his work and involvement with the [Police]" and that the information "could be misused at any time in the future". Mr Fielder also reported feelings of anxiety from being a victim of possible identity fraud. He is unaware of any further unauthorised use of his information.
(13) 386th Claimant (Toby Young): Mr Young's ABS was sent to his mother's home. It was passed on to him by his mother. She had opened it in error believing it to be addressed to her. Mr Young reported that he had suffered "considerable annoyance" at the fact that the ABS had been sent to an address he had not occupied for at least 17 years. He is concerned as to whether there have been other letters that have gone astray. Mr Young complains of "minor distress". He would not have discussed his pension (or its value) with his mother, and he was distressed that "the Defendant's negligence lead (sic) to her being made aware of such information." He reported suffering "minor anxiety" caused by the Defendant's "mismanagement of his personal data". He is unaware of any further unauthorised use of his information.
(14) 472nd Claimant (Elizabeth Hawkins): Ms Hawkins received her ABS from another serving police officer. She received an email from the police officer which advised her that she received Ms Hawkins' ABS in the same envelope as her own. The police officer sent it on to her a few days later. Ms Hawkins reports feeling "extreme annoyance" at the Defendant's failure in its duty of care towards her. She says that she has been caused distress arising from the number of inquiries that she had made with the Defendant and believes that other documents may have been "misplaced by the Defendant". She believes that the Defendant cannot be trusted to deliver future mail correctly or to handle her pension. Ms Hawkins is unaware of any further unauthorised use of her information.
(1) All Claimants have advanced a claim that annoyance and irritation was caused by the mis-addressed ABS.
(2) 35 Claimants plead that they (a) would not describe the feelings they suffered as "distress"; (b) did not suffer distress; (c) consider "distress" to be too strong a word to describe the impact on them or say that they are too resilient to have suffered "distress"; or (d) suffered "stress" rather than "distress".
(3) 15 Claimants claim that their reactions were "mild", "minor" or "temporary".
As to the 35 Claimants identified by Mr Sharland KC, Mr Campbell KC submits that they all suffered non-material damage, akin to distress, and that the Defendant's complaint is one of semantics that has no substance.
(2) Striking Out Application
(1) at that hearing, the Court would re-consider the Second Anonymity Order; and
(2) the Claimants' solicitors must file and serve a witness statement explaining why the Second Claim had been issued (rather than an application made to amend the First Claim) by 24 January 2023.
My reasons for making these orders were stated in the Order as follows:
"The Court has already made an Order directing the reconsideration of the Anonymity Order in the Main Claim. Although the Order of 21 December 2022 properly held the ring in respect of the anonymity of the Claimants in this claim pro tem, the issue of anonymity will be considered at the [hearing on 27-28 February 2023].
I do not presently understand why this further claim has been issued. It risks complicating (and therefore obstructing) the just disposal of the Claimants' claims and has already generated satellite applications that the Court will need now to resolve. I have therefore directed the service of a witness statement by the Claimants' solicitors to explain."
"The Claimants' primary position is that these 42 Claimants [in the Second Claim] are entitled to pursue claims for damages for personal injury as part of the [First Claim]. If the Court agrees, or that is now accepted by the Defendant, then the Claimants would be content for the [Second Claim] to be stayed. However, if the Court concludes that these Claimants are not entitled to claim damages for personal injury as part of the [First Claim], then the Claimants would wish to pursue the [Second Claim] and the Defendant's application to strike out the [Second Claim] would need to be determined…"
(3) Application by the Claimants in the Second Claim
(1) the Particulars of Claim in the Second Claim had been served in time; or, alternatively,
(2) time for service of the Particulars of Claim (and particulars required by §4.1 CPR PD 16) be extended to 24 January 2023; and
(3) time for service of the particulars required by §4.2 CPR PD 16 be extended.
(1) the MPoC in the First Claim was sufficient to encompass the claims for personal injury now the subject of the Second Claim (i.e. that the Second Claim was unnecessary); alternatively
(2) the MPoC in the First Claim could be amended to permit the Claimants in the Second Claim to advance their claims for personal injury in the First Claim; alternatively
(3) the MPoC in the First Claim and the Individual Schedules are sufficient by way of particulars for the Second Claim; alternatively,
(4) the Court should grant to the Claimants in the Second Claim an extension of time for service of the Particulars of Claim in the Second Claim, and (to the extent necessary) also grant their application for relief from sanctions in respect of the late service of the Particulars of Claim in the Second Claim.
G: Events following hearing on 27-28 February 2023
(1) Anonymity Orders discharged
(2) Further Applications and evidence in respect of other derogations from open justice
(1) imposing temporary restrictions on third-party access to the Individual Schedules without the permission of the Court;
(2) directing any Claimant who wished to maintain such restrictions to file an Application, supported by evidence, by 4.30pm on 5 May 2023; and
(3) requiring those Claimants who wished his/her address to continue to be withheld from the Claim Form and other documents to be filed with the Court to file an Application, supported by evidence, by 5 May 2023.
(1) those who maintained that an order should be made maintaining that their address should be withheld from the Claim Form and other documents to be filed with the Court; and
(2) those who sought an order restricting non-party access to their Individual Schedules (see [39] above) ("a 5.4C Order").
A very large number of Claimants were included in both categories.
"… to assist the Court and by way of overview, the following features concerning the current position of the Claimants are common to many of the statements:
(a) Many Claimants refer to receiving guidance or recommendations from the Force to prevent their home addresses being identified, and all Claimants outline the various measures they take to retain the confidentiality of their home addresses. Examples of such steps taken by some Claimants include:
(i) Using their maiden name at work;
(ii) Moving to a different area to that in which they police;
(iii) Removing their details from the electoral roll; and
(iv) Not having a social media presence.
(b) Almost all Claimants refer to the current very high anti-police sentiment amongst the public, noting that violence against police officers is on the rise.
(c) The vast majority of Claimants refer to encountering dangerous individuals due to the nature of their role. A significant number refer to receiving threats in the course of their duties and/or being aware of threats made to colleagues. Several note that such threats are less worrying whilst their home address is not publicly identifiable.
In addition, the statements refer to the potential consequences to Claimants of not being granted the order sought. Some of these potential consequences are outlined below:
(a) Relocation: Some Claimants detail that they would be forced to move homes were their address and details in the schedule to become accessible to the public (see for example the [exhibited] statement at pp.25-29). Other Claimants note that, where credible threats have previously been identified to officers' home addresses, the Force has acted to place markers on their address or even re-locate them.
(b) Barrier to justice: A high number of Claimants state that they would consider discontinuing their claims should their address and schedules be compromised, in order to protect their personal safety.
(c) Injury: Those Claimants seeking damages for personal injury in this claim have opined that non-protection of their addresses and schedules may exacerbate and/or revive their injuries.
(d) Professional restrictions/interference: Several Claimants note that disclosure would prevent them from moving into more sensitive areas of policing. Others currently working in such sensitive areas worry about being taken off active duty, or moved to an alternative unit, thereby undermining operations.
(e) Career progression: Some Claimants have raised the issue that by reason of having to make their addresses or Claimant Schedules accessible, that would either deter them from applying for sensitive roles or may mean that any application might be declined, thus frustrating their ability to progress within the Force."
"This advice is given to ensure that members of the public cannot identify officers outside of work and so that officers can preserve the confidentiality of their addresses. Unfortunately, there are people who would seek to do harm to police officers and indeed their families. Someone who has been arrested by an officer, or who has come into contact with them, may seek a confrontation. It is one thing when this happens at a police station, but another if it happens at the home address of the officer where their family resides…"
(3) Application to amend the MPoC in the First Claim to advance the personal injury claims
H: Legal principles
(1) Striking out
"2.1 Statements of case should be confined to the information necessary to inform the other party of the nature of the case that they have to meet. Such information should be set out concisely and in a manner proportionate to the subject matter of the claim…
2.2 A claimant must in the particulars of claim give full details of the facts and matters on which they rely in support of any claim for damages.
…
8.1 In a claim for misuse of private information, the claimant must specify in the particulars of claim … the use … of the information by the defendant which the claimant claims was … a misuse…"
(2) Summary Judgment
(1) The burden of proof is on the applicant for summary judgment.
(2) The court must consider whether the claimant has a 'realistic' as opposed to a 'fanciful' prospect of success: Swain -v- Hillman [2001] 1 All ER 91.
(3) The criterion 'real' within CPR 24.2 (a) is not one of probability, it is the absence of reality: Lord Hobhouse in Three Rivers DC -v- Bank of England (No.3) [2003] 2 AC 1 [158].
(4) At the same time, a 'realistic' claim is one that carries some degree of conviction. This means a claim that is more than merely arguable: ED & F Man Liquid Products -v- Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472 [8].
(5) The court must be astute to avoid the perils of a mini-trial but is not precluded from analysing the statements made by the party resisting the application for summary judgment and weighing them against contemporaneous documents (ibid).
(6) However disputed facts must generally be assumed in the claimant's favour: James-Bowen -v- Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2015] EWHC 1249 [3].
(7) An application for summary judgment is not appropriate to resolve a complex question of law and fact, the determination of which necessitates a trial of the issue having regard to all the evidence: Apovdedo NV -v- Collins [2008] EWHC 775 (Ch).
(8) If there is a short point of law or construction and, the court is satisfied that it has before it all the evidence necessary for the proper determination of the question and that the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it in argument, it should grasp the nettle and decide it: ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd -v- TTE Training Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 725.
(9) However, in reaching its conclusion the court must take into account not only the evidence actually placed before it on the application for summary judgment, but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial. The court should hesitate about making a final decision without a trial, even where there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the application, where reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to, or alter, the evidence available to a trial judge and so affect the outcome of the case: Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust -v- Hammond (No.5) [2001] EWCA Civ 550; Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd -v- Bolton Pharmaceutical Co 100 Ltd [2007] FSR 63.
(10) The same point applies to an extent to difficult questions of law, particularly those in developing areas, which tend to be better decided against actual rather than assumed facts: TFL Management Services -v- Lloyds TSB Bank [2014] 1 WLR 2006 [27].
(3) Misuse of private information
"… may include unintentional use, but it still requires a 'use': that is, a positive action. In the language of Article 8 ECHR (the basis for the MPI tort), there must be an 'interference' by the defendant, which falls to be justified."
[46] I was taken to two more recent cases where the reasoning in Warren was applied in dismissing MPI claims: Stadler -v- Currys Group Ltd [2022] EWHC 160 (QB), and Underwood -v- Bounty UK Ltd [2022] EWHC 888 (QB) at [52]. In each case, the court did not accept the submission that a defendant who did things which enabled access to information by an unauthorised person in any true sense amounted to the defendant itself misusing the information within the tort.
[47] On the assumption that Warren correctly identified the principles, the claimants' original case plainly fell foul of the principles. It expressly alleged breach of a security duty as the basis for the alleged misuse of private information. The RAPOC is an attempt to work around the reasoning in Warren. I accept the defendant's submission that it fails to do so.
…
[49] To summarise, I do not consider that element (3) of an MPI claim [whether the conduct complained of by the claimant a misuse by the defendant of the information] can be established merely on the basis of prior conduct of the defendant of this type. That is because, as in Warren, that conduct is not a misuse of information by the defendant. The misuse is later by the criminal actors. Creating a situation of vulnerability (and thus enabling a fraud) is simply not a misuse of information within the tort. That the Claimants' case is one of wrong through creation of a vulnerability is clear from the very first paragraph of the RAPOC: it is pleaded that they are "victims of a series of significant failures by the defendant to put in place, in particular, appropriate security measures to prevent unauthorised access to and/or use of data and information held on its IT estate, including its IT infrastructure, systems and/or databases". The emphasis on "enabling" misuse by others underlines that this is not in reality a proper claim of misuse of information by the defendant.
"In passing the Smart TV to a third party the defendant was not making use of the data or information that is the subject of this claim. In fact, there is no evidence that the defendant had any actual knowledge of the information in question or made use of it. It follows that there cannot have been any unauthorised use (or misuse) of the information by the defendant. It would be artificial to characterise the disposal of the Smart TV as a misuse of the information itself. At best, it could be said that in failing to wipe the device, the defendant was responsible for breaching a duty of data security, but this is insufficient on the facts of this case to make out claims for either BOC or MOPI."
"As a general rule, when a letter is addressed to a particular person, the writer is not responsible except for a publication to that person. However, if in the circumstances of the case the writer knows that the letter will be opened and read by some person other than the person to whom he addresses it, he will be liable for the publication to that person. As it was put by Swinfen Eady LJ in Huth -v- Huth [1915] 3 KB 32, 43 if:
'a person sends a letter to, say, a merchant at his office, knowing that the merchant has a staff of clerks who in the ordinary course of business open all letters sent to the merchant's office, that would clearly be a publication if the letter were opened and perused by a clerk in that way, even although that letter were most carefully sealed.'
By analogy with the cases in the next paragraph, it is submitted that the true rule is that the defendant will be liable if he has reason to know that the letter may be opened in the ordinary course of business by someone other than the addressee and, probably in modern business conditions, such knowledge will generally be imputed to him, unless the letter carries some clear indication (e.g. by being marked 'personal' or 'private and confidential') to show that this should not take place. There may also be cases in which the defendant has reason to know that a letter sent to a private address may be opened by someone other than the addressee, though in practice this may be less likely than in the case of a letter sent to a business address. Such a case might arise, e.g. if the writer knew that the addressee was illiterate or blind.
In Theaker -v- Richardson [1962] 1 WLR 151, where the defendant put a letter intended for the plaintiff into an envelope similar to one which would contain an election address and delivered it by hand and the plaintiff's husband picked it up and opened it, there was evidence on which the jury could find, as they did, that the defendant anticipated that someone other than the plaintiff might open and read the letter, and that it was a natural and probable consequence of the defendant's act that the plaintiff's husband would open and read it. There was accordingly held to have been publication. The appearance of the communication is significant in this case: it should certainly not be taken as supporting the view that one must assume that spouses open each other's letters. On the other hand in Huth -v- Huth, where the defendant sent through the post in an unclosed envelope a written communication defamatory of the plaintiff which was taken out and read by the plaintiff's butler out of curiosity, the Court of Appeal held that there was no evidence of publication, for there was no evidence that, to the defendant's knowledge, the letter would in the ordinary course be likely to be opened by the butler, or by any other person at the plaintiff's house, before it was delivered to her."
"It is not necessary in all cases to prove that the libellous matter was actually seen and read by some identified third party. If it is a matter of reasonable inference that this happened, a prima facie case of publication will be established. Thus, proof that a libellous letter was sent through the post is prima facie evidence of publication to the person to whom it was addressed… There is no presumption that a letter in an unsealed envelope will be read by anyone other than the addressee: Huth -v- Huth. It is always open to a claimant to seek to prove that in the particular case it was a natural and probable consequence of sending the letter, sealed or unsealed, that it would be opened and read by a third party: see Theaker -v- Richardson. Or that the defendant knew that a letter addressed to the claimant was likely to be opened by his clerk or secretary, and that is what happened: Gomersall -v- Davies (1898) 14 TLR 430."
[100] The measure of damages for wrongful invasion of privacy was considered in depth in Gulati… by Mann J and by the Court of Appeal. The eight test claimants in that case were individuals in the public eye whose mobile phones were hacked by newspapers, leading in some instances to the publication of articles containing information obtained by this means. The newspapers admitted liability for breach of privacy but disputed the amount of damages. Their main argument of principle was that (in the absence of material damage) all that could be compensated for was distress caused by their unlawful activities: see [2016] FSR 12 [108]. The judge rejected that argument. He said, at [111], that he did not see why "distress (or some similar emotion), which would admittedly be a likely consequence of an invasion of privacy, should be the only touchstone for damages". In his view: "While the law is used to awarding damages for injured feelings, there is no reason in principle … why it should not also make an award to reflect infringements of the right itself, if the situation warrants it."
[101] The judge referred to cases in which damages have been awarded to very young children (only ten months or one year old) for misuse of private information by publishing photographs of them even though, because of their age, they could not have suffered any distress: see AAA -v- Associated Newspapers Ltd [2013] EMLR 2; and Weller -v- Associated Newspapers Ltd [2014] EMLR 24. He concluded, at [144]:
"I shall therefore approach the consideration of quantum in this case on the footing that compensation can be given for things other than distress, and in particular can be given for the commission of the wrong itself so far as that commission impacts on the values protected by the right."
Later in the judgment, at [168], the judge referred back to his finding that:
"the damages should compensate not merely for distress … but should also compensate (if appropriate) for the loss of privacy or autonomy as such arising out [of] the infringement by hacking (or other mechanism) as such."
[102] The Court of Appeal affirmed this decision: [2017] QB 149. Arden LJ (with whom Rafferty and Kitchin LJJ agreed) held, at [45], that:
"the judge was correct to conclude that the power of the court to grant general damages was not limited to distress and could be exercised to compensate the claimants also for the misuse of their private information. The essential principle is that, by misusing their private information, MGN deprived the claimants of their right to control the use of private information."
Arden LJ justified this conclusion, at [46], on the basis that:
"Privacy is a fundamental right. The reasons for having the right are no doubt manifold. Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead put it very succinctly in Campbell -v- MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 [12]: '[Privacy] lies at the heart of liberty in a modern state. A proper degree of privacy is essential for the well-being and development of an individual.'"
[103] The Court of Appeal in Gulati rejected a submission, also rejected by the judge, that granting damages for the fact of intrusion into a person's privacy independently of any distress caused is inconsistent with the holding of this court in R (WL (Congo)) -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] 1 AC 245 [97]-[100], that vindicatory damages are not available as a remedy for violation of a private right. As Arden LJ pointed out at [48], no question arose of awarding vindicatory damages of the kind referred to in WL (Congo), which have been awarded in some constitutional cases appealed to the Privy Council "to reflect the sense of public outrage, emphasise the importance of the constitutional right and the gravity of the breach, and deter further breaches": see WL (Congo) [98]; Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago -v- Ramanoop [2006] 1 AC 328 [19]. Rather, the purpose of the relevant part of the awards made in Gulati was "to compensate for the loss or diminution of a right to control formerly private information".
[104] Mann J's reference to "loss of privacy or autonomy" and the Court of Appeal's explanation that the claimants could be compensated for misuse of their private information itself because they were deprived of "their right to control [its] use" convey the point that English common law now recognises as a fundamental aspect of personal autonomy a person's freedom to choose and right to control whether and when others have access to his or her private affairs…
(4) Data protection
(a) 'Damage' in data protection cases
(b) Threshold of seriousness
[77] Since what the Directive purports to protect is privacy rather than economic rights, it would be strange if the Directive could not compensate those individuals whose data privacy had been invaded by a data controller so as to cause them emotional distress (but not pecuniary damage). It is the distressing invasion of privacy which must be taken to be the primary form of damage (commonly referred to in the European context as "moral damage") and the data subject should have an effective remedy in respect of that damage. Furthermore, it is irrational to treat EU data protection law as permitting a more restrictive approach to the recovery of damages than is available under article 8 of the Convention. It is irrational because, as we have seen at [56] and [57] above, the object of the Directive is to ensure that data-processing systems protect and respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals "notably the right to privacy, which is recognized both in article 8 of the [Convention] and in the general principles of Community law". The enforcement of privacy rights under article 8 of the Convention has always permitted recovery of non-pecuniary loss.
[78] Additionally, article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ("the Charter") makes specific provision for the protection of the fundamental right to the protection of personal data: "everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her". It would be strange if that fundamental right could be breached with relative impunity by a data controller, save in those rare cases where the data subject had suffered pecuniary loss as a result of the breach. It is most unlikely that the Member States intended such a result.
[79] In short, article 23 of the Directive does not distinguish between pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. There is no linguistic reason to interpret the word "damage" in article 23 as being restricted to pecuniary damage. More importantly, for the reasons we have given such a restrictive interpretation would substantially undermine the objective of the Directive which is to protect the right to privacy of individuals with respect to the processing of their personal data.
[80] [Counsel for the claimants] submits that "damage" for the purpose of article 23 extends to non-pecuniary loss (such as distress) where privacy rights under article 8 of the Convention are engaged, but not otherwise. In other words, he accepts that article 23 does not require compensation for non-pecuniary loss unless a data subject has suffered a violation of his rights under article 8 of the Convention.
[81] In view of our conclusions as to the unrestricted meaning of "damage" in article 23, it necessarily follows that we are unable to accept this submission. But we add the following points. First, [the claimants'] analysis presupposes a two-tier approach to enforcement of rights under the DPA, with a claim for compensation only being available in cases which meet the article 8 seriousness threshold. But the Directive does not distinguish between different categories of data breach (i.e. those which technically engage article 8 rights and those which do not). It is true that the object of the Directive is to protect the right to privacy, but it does not follow that the plain language of article 23 ("damage as a result of an unlawful processing operation or of any act incompatible with the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive") should not be given its natural and ordinary meaning. In many cases the resultant damage will be an invasion of privacy which meets the threshold of seriousness required by article 8 of the Convention. But in some cases it will not. There is nothing in the language of article 23 which indicates an intention to restrict the right to compensation to the former. In short, the Directive does not in terms incorporate the article 8 mechanism for protecting article 8 privacy rights, although in practice application of the data protection legislation may achieve the same results.
[82] Secondly, it is in any event unnecessary in practice to distinguish between cases which reach the article 8 threshold of seriousness and those which do not. If a case is not serious in terms of its privacy implications, then that by itself is likely to rule out any question of recovery of compensation for mere distress.
"On the claimant's own case there is a threshold of seriousness which must be crossed before a breach of the DPA 1998 will give rise to an entitlement to compensation under section 13. I cannot see that the facts which the claimant aims to prove in each individual case are sufficient to surmount this threshold. If (contrary to the conclusion I have reached) those facts disclose 'damage' within the meaning of section 13 at all, I think it impossible to characterise such damage as more than trivial. What gives the appearance of substance to the claim is the allegation that Google secretly tracked the internet activity of millions of Apple iPhone users for several months and used the data obtained for commercial purposes. But on analysis the claimant is seeking to recover damages without attempting to prove that this allegation is true in the case of any individual for whom damages are claimed. Without proof of some unlawful processing of an individual's personal data beyond the bare minimum required to bring them within the definition of the represented class, a claim on behalf of that individual has no prospect of meeting the threshold for an award of damages."
(c) The ECJ decision in UI -v- Österreichische Post AG
(1) since Article 82 of the GDPR made the existence of "damage" which had been "suffered" a condition of the right to compensation, a mere infringement of the provisions of the GDPR would not be sufficient on its own to confer a right to compensation on the data subject: [32]-[33], [36], [42]; and
(2) that it would be contrary to the broad concept of "damage" in Article 82 – and undermine consistency in approach in member states – if the concept of "non-material damage" were subject to a threshold of seriousness: [45]-[51].
(5) Jameel abuse of process
(1) The Court has jurisdiction to stay or strike out a claim where no real or substantial wrong has been committed and litigating the claim will yield no tangible or legitimate benefit to the claimant proportionate to the likely costs and use of court procedures: in other words, "the game is not worth the candle": Jameel [69]-[70] per Lord Phillips MR and Schellenberg -v- BBC [2000] EMLR 296, 319 per Eady J. The jurisdiction is useful where a claim "is obviously pointless or wasteful": Vidal-Hall -v- Google Inc [2016] QB 1003 [136].
(2) Nevertheless, striking out is a draconian power and it should only be used in exceptional cases: Stelios Haji-Ioannou -v- Dixon [2009] EWHC 178 (QB) [30].
(3) It is not appropriate to carry out a detailed assessment of the merits of the claim. Unless obvious that it has very little prospect of success, the claim should be taken at face value: Ansari -v- Knowles [2014] EWCA Civ 1448 [17] per Moore-Bick LJ and [27] per Vos LJ.
(4) The Court should only conclude that continued litigation of the claim would be disproportionate to what could legitimately be achieved where it is impossible "to fashion any procedure by which that claim can be adjudicated in a proportionate way": Ames –v- Spamhaus Project Ltd [2015] 1 WLR 3409 [33]-[36] citing Sullivan –v- Bristol Film Studios Ltd [2012] EMLR 27 [29]-[32].
[44] At the heart of any assessment of whether a claim is Jameel abusive is an assessment of two things: (1) what is the value of what is legitimately sought to be obtained by the proceedings; and (2) what is the likely cost of achieving it?
[45] But it is clear from Sullivan that this cannot be a mechanical assessment. The Court cannot strike out a claim for £50 debt simply because, assessed against the costs of the claim, it is not 'worth' pursuing. Inherent in the value of any legitimate claim is the right to have a legal wrong redressed. The value of vindicating legal rights – as part of the rule of law – goes beyond the worth of the claim. The fair resolution of legal disputes benefits not only the individual litigants but society as a whole.
[175] … [P]roceedings may also be abusive if, even though they raise an arguable cause of action, they are (objectively) pointless and wasteful, in the sense that the benefits to the claimants from success were likely to be extremely modest and the costs to the defendants in defending the claims wholly disproportionate to that benefit (see AB -v- John Wyeth & Brother (No.4) [1994] PIQR 109, 114-115; and Jameel [69]). In Jameel it was held that the benefit attainable by a claimant was of small value and the costs of the litigation would be out of all proportion to what could be achieved, such that "the game [was] not worth the candle" (see [70]). There, at [54], Lord Phillips MR cited with approval the formulation of Eady J in Schellenberg -v- British Broadcasting Corporation [2000] EMLR 296 [57]. The question in each case was whether:
"… there is any realistic prospect of a trial yielding any tangible or legitimate advantage such as to outweigh the disadvantages for the parties in terms of expense, and the wider public in terms of court resources."
The point being captured was that, while the court must provide a remedy in a case that requires one, the process of the court should not be used in a case where the need has gone away (see Cammish -v- Hughes [2013] EMLR 13 [55]-[56]). We would add that although in the same passage Lord Phillips referred to the concern of the court to "ensure that judicial and court resources are appropriately and proportionately used", the fact that proceedings may place a very heavy burden on the court's resources cannot constitute a ground of abuse by itself.
[176] Where multiple claims are brought by different claimants who do not stand in materially the same position, it is necessary to consider the question of abuse by reference to claims individually (or by relevant claimant category). Abusive factors applicable only to one claimant do not render another co-claimant's claim abusive. We treat it as axiomatic that a claim brought by one claimant, which is not itself abusive, cannot become abusive merely because other claimants have chosen to bring abusive claims. The claimants should be in no different position, so far as an abuse argument is concerned, from that if each had brought separate proceedings, whether or not other claimants also brought proceedings. An individual approach is required. The court must be satisfied in relation to every claim, having regard to any differences between claimants or categories of claimant, that it is abusive and a strike-out or stay appropriate.
[177] A finding of abuse of process does not lead automatically to a striking out of the claim. The court then retains a discretion as to the appropriate response, which must always be proportionate (see for example Cable -v- Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd [2020] 4 WLR 110 [63]-[64]).
[178] Finally, but importantly for present purposes, litigants should not be deprived of their claims without scrupulous examination of all the circumstances and unless the abuse has been sufficiently clearly established: "the court cannot be affronted if the case has not been satisfactorily proved" (see Alpha Rocks Solicitors -v- Alade [2015] 1 WLR 4535 [24]; Hunter -v- Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529; Summers -v- Fairclough Homes Ltd [2012] 1 WLR 2004 [48]). Thus it has been stated repeatedly that it is only in "clear and obvious" cases that it will be appropriate to strike out proceedings as an abuse of process so as to prevent a claimant from bringing an apparently proper cause of action to trial (see for example Wallis -v- Valentine [2003] EMLR 8 [31], approving the dicta of Simon Brown LJ in Broxton -v- McCelland [1995] EMLR 485, 497-498); JSC BTA Bank -v- Ablyazov [2011] 1 WLR 2996 [10]; Optaglio Ltd -v- Tethal [2015] EWCA Civ 1002 [63]).
(6) Anonymity and derogations from open justice
(1) the full name of each party: §2.4; and
(2) an address (including the postcode) "at which the claimant lives or carries on business, even if the claimant's address for service is the business address of their solicitor": §2.1.
(1) Open justice is a fundamental principle. The general rule is that hearings are carried out in, and judgments and orders are, public: see Article 6.1 of the Convention, CPR 39.2 and Scott -v- Scott [1913] AC 417.
(2) Derogations from this general principle can only be justified in exceptional circumstances, when they are strictly necessary as measures to secure the proper administration of justice. They are wholly exceptional: R -v- Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies, Ex p New Cross Building Society [1984] QB 227, 235; Donald -v- Ntuli [2011] 1 WLR 294 [52]–[53]. Derogations should, where justified, be no more than strictly necessary to achieve their purpose.
(3) The grant of derogations is not a question of discretion. It is a matter of obligation, and the court is under a duty to either grant the derogation or refuse it when it has applied the relevant test: M -v- W [2010] EWHC 2457 (QB) [34].
(4) There is no general exception to open justice where privacy or confidentiality is in issue.
(5) The burden of establishing any derogation from the general principle lies on the person seeking it. It must be established by clear and cogent evidence: Scott -v- Scott [1913] AC 417, 438–439, 463, 477; Lord Browne of Madingley -v- Associated Newspapers Ltd [2008] QB 103 [2]-[3]; Secretary of State for the Home Department -v- AP (No.2) [2010] 1 WLR 1652 [7]; Gray -v- W [2010] EWHC 2367 (QB) at [6]-[8]; and JIH -v- News Group Newspapers Ltd (Practice Note) [2011] 1 WLR 1645 [21].
(6) When considering the imposition of any derogation from open justice, the court will have regard to the respective and sometimes competing Convention rights of the parties as well as the general public interest in open justice and in the public reporting of court proceedings. It will also adopt procedures which seek to ensure that any ultimate vindication of article 8 of the Convention, where that is engaged, is not undermined by the way in which the court has processed an interim application. On the other hand, the principle of open justice requires that any restrictions are the least that can be imposed consistent with the protection to which the party relying on their article 8 Convention right is entitled. The proper approach is set out in JIH [21].
(7) Derogations from the principle of open justice cannot be granted by consent of the parties. Such orders affect the Article 10 Convention rights of the public at large. Parties cannot waive or give up the rights of the public.
"Restrictions on open justice to protect the legitimate interests of others raise more difficult issues. The starting point is the recognition that open justice (and probably of greater practical significance, the privilege that attaches to media reports of proceedings in open court) will frequently lead to some interference with the legitimate interests of parties and witnesses. Media reports of proceedings in open court can have an adverse impact on the rights and interests of others, but, ordinarily, 'the collateral impact that this process has on those affected is part of the price to be paid for open justice and the freedom of the press to report fairly and accurately on judicial proceedings held in public': Khuja -v- Times Newspapers Ltd [2019] AC 161 [34(2)] per Lord Sumption."
"There might exist a very small number of people whose attitude towards MPs (and those who work for them) is so hostile that they might conceivably be moved to offer some threat of physical violence to them, but this risk is remote. The Claimants have not put forward any credible and specific evidence that one or more Claimants is at particular risk of any such threat. The civil justice system and the principles of open justice cannot be calibrated upon the risk of irrational actions of a handful of people engaging in what would be likely to amount to criminal behaviour. If it did, most litigation in this country would have to be conducted behind closed doors and under a cloak of almost total anonymity. As a democracy, we put our faith and confidence in our belief that people will abide by the law. We deal with those who do not, not by cowering in the shadows, but by taking action against them as and when required."
This principle was recently endorsed by Swift J in R (IAB) -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWHC 2930 (Admin) [28]-[29] (affirmed on appeal: [2024] EWCA Civ 66).
"(1) The starting point is the common law principle of open justice, authoritatively expounded in Scott -v- Scott and subsequent authorities at the highest level. The judge was right to begin here. The summary of the common law principles which he adopted from the argument of Mr Bentham is not materially different from the summary in the Judicial College Guide, approved in R (Rai) -v- Winchester Crown Court [2021] EMLR 21.
(2) The general principles that (a) justice is administered in public and (b) everything said in court is reportable both encompass the mention of names. As a rule, '[t]he public has a right to know, not only what is going on in our courts, but also who the principal actors are': R (C) -v- Secretary of State for Justice [2016] 1 WLR 444 [36] (Baroness Hale). In this case, it is clear that but for the claimant's late request for a derogation from these principles the NCA would have named him in open court. Its decision to do otherwise was a purely executive act which has no bearing on the propriety of the judge's decisions to grant and then lift anonymity. Those were decisions about what the law required. It would have been irrelevant if the NCA had consented to an anonymity order, as parties cannot waive or give up the rights of the public: see the Practice Guidance [16].
(3) When considering the application for derogation in this case the judge was right to identify and apply a test of necessity. Under the common law as it existed prior to the entry into force of the Human Rights Act 1998, anonymity could only be justified where this was strictly necessary 'in the interests of justice': see Khuja [14]. This was and remains an exception of narrow scope: see the tests cited in Clifford -v-Millicom [2023] ICR 663 [31]-[32]. It has never been suggested that this case meets that standard. The claimant's case rests on the common law privacy right derived from Article 8, to which the Supreme Court referred in Khuja. But in that context too the applicant for anonymity has to show that this is necessary in pursuit of the legitimate aim on which he relies.
(4) The threshold question is whether the measure in question – here, allowing the disclosure of the claimant's name and consequent publicity – would amount to an interference with the claimant's right to respect for his private and family life. This requires proof that the effects would attain a 'certain level of seriousness': ZXC -v- Bloomberg LP [2022] AC 1158 [55], Javadov -v- Westminster Magistrates' Court [2022] 1 WLR 1952 [39]…
(5) The next stage is the balancing exercise. Both the judge's decisions expressly turned on whether it was 'necessary and proportionate' to grant anonymity. That language clearly reflects a Convention analysis and the balancing process which the judge was required to undertake. The question implicit in the judge's reasoning process is whether the consequences of disclosure would be so serious an interference with the claimant's rights that it was necessary and proportionate to interfere with the ordinary rule of open justice. It is clear enough, in my view, that he was engaging in a process of evaluating the claimant's case against the weighty imperatives of open justice.
(6) It is in that context that the judge rightly addressed the question of whether the claimant had adduced 'clear and cogent evidence'. He was considering whether it had been shown that the balance fell in favour of anonymity. The cases all show that this question is not to be answered on the basis of 'rival generalities' but instead by a close examination of the weight to be given to the specific rights that are at stake on the facts of the case. That is why 'clear and cogent evidence' is needed. This requirement reflects both the older common law authorities and the more modern cases. In Scott -v- Scott at p.438 Viscount Haldane held that the court had no power to depart from open justice 'unless it be strictly necessary'; the applicant 'must make out his case strictly, and bring it up to the standard which the underlying principle requires'. Rai is authority that the same is true of a case that relies on Article 8. The Practice Guidance is to the same effect and cites many modern authorities in support of that proposition. These include JIH -v- News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] 1 WLR 1645 where, in an often-cited passage, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury said at [22]:
'Where, as here, the basis for any claimed restriction ultimately rests on a judicial assessment, it is therefore essential that (a) the judge is first satisfied that the facts and circumstances of the case are sufficiently strong to justify encroaching on the open justice rule …' …"
I: Anonymity Application and other derogations from open justice
(1) Submissions
(a) Claimants
(b) Defendant
(1) In the witness statement that supported the original application to the Master, Mr Hayes stated: "The application is brought by the 474 individuals listed… who have all provided instructions… to bring a claim against the Defendant and make this application." That is to be contrasted with the position, as it later emerged, that instructions had only been taken from some of the Claimants which necessitated a substantial further exercise to be undertaken, ultimately leading to the Anonymity Application being abandoned by all but 9 Claimants.
(2) The Defendant raised concerns about the original grant of the Anonymity Order by letter dated 14 May 2021.
(3) In the underlying claims, the Claimants do not contend that their addresses are confidential or private information.
(2) Decision
J. Dismissal Application
(1) Submissions
(a) Defendant
(b) Claimants
(2) Decision
K. Conclusion and next steps
(1) save for the 14 claims identified in [61] above, the remaining claims will be struck out or dismissed;
(2) the Anonymity Application is granted in respect of the 9 Claimants who pursued it;
(3) the Claimants' Application for the Court to continue to withhold their addresses from documents available to third parties from the Court record pursuant to CPR 5.4C(1) is granted; and
(4) the Claimants' Application for a 5.4C Order is refused.