COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION (COMMERCIAL COURT)
MRS JUSTICE GLOSTER DBE
CLAIM NO 2004 FOLIO 124 & CLAIM NO 2004 831
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e :
LORD NEUBERGER OF ABBOTSBURY
LORD JUSTICE LAWRENCE COLLINS
| MUNIB MASRI
|- and -
|(1) CONSOLIDATED CONTRACTORS INTERNATIONAL COMPANY SAL
(2) CONSOLIDATED CONTRACTORS (OIL & GAS) SAL
Mr Simon Salzedo and Mr Colin West (instructed by Simmons & Simmons) for the Respondent
Hearing dates : February 5 and 6, 2008
Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice Lawrence Collins:
II CCOG's interest in the Concession: the commercial situation
i) The Agreement for Petroleum Exploration and Production between the Yemeni Minister of Energy and Materials and Canadian OXY Offshore International Ltd (a Bermuda company) and CCIC dated 15 September 1986 (the "PSA"); this contains an arbitration clause providing for either an ICC arbitration in Paris or an ICSID arbitration in London (depending on Canadian ratification of the ICSID Convention): the tribunal is to apply principles of law common to the Yemen, Canada and Lebanon and, in the absence of such common principles, the principles of law normally recognised by nations in general, including the relevant rules of customary international law.
ii) The Masila Joint Operating Agreement between Canadian OXY Offshore International Ltd and CCIC dated 27 April 1987, as amended ("the JOA"). This contains provision for English law and London arbitration.
iii) An assignment from CCIC to CCOG dated 25 October 1992.
III The orders
"… all amounts due to [CCOG] from Nexen Marketing Singapore PTE Ltd ('Nexen Singapore') or any other entity to the extent that they relate to proceeds of sale of the oil from [the Concession] … to which [CCOG] is entitled pursuant to [the PSA, the JOA and the Assignment]… and any other broking, sales or other agreements to which [CCOG] is party regarding the sale of such oil (such amounts to be referred to as 'Oil Revenues')."
Affidavit of assets order
IV Receivership order and subject matter jurisdiction
Subject matter jurisdiction
"I think this argument confuses personal jurisdiction, i.e. who can be bought before the court, with subject matter jurisdiction, i.e. to what extent the court can claim to regulate the conduct of those persons. It does not follow from the fact that a person is within the jurisdiction and liable to be served that there is no territorial limit to the matters which a court may properly apply its own rules or the things which it can order such a person to do. … The content of the subpoena and order is to require the production by a non-party of documents outside the jurisdiction concerning business which it has transacted outside the jurisdiction. In principle and on authority it seems to me that the court should not impose such a requirement upon a foreigner, and, in particular, on a foreign bank. The principle is that a state should refrain from demanding obedience to its sovereign authority by foreigners in respect of their conduct out of the jurisdiction."
"The enforcement of the judgment in other countries, by attachment or like process, in respect of assets which are situated there is not affected by the order … the English court is not attempting in any way to interfere with or control the enforcement process in respect of those assets."
"It would be wrong for an English court, by making an order in respect of overseas assets against a defendant amenable to its jurisdiction, to impose or attempt to impose obligations on persons not before the court in respect of acts to be done by them abroad regarding property outside the jurisdiction. That, self-evidently, would be for the English court to claim an altogether exorbitant, extra-territorial jurisdiction."
Société Eram Shipping Co Ltd v Cie Internationale de Navigation  1 AC 260
"where it is clear or appears that the making of the order will not discharge the debt of the third party or garnishee to the judgment debtor according to the law which governs that debt. In practical terms it does not matter very much whether the House rules that the court has no jurisdiction to make an order in such a case or that the court has a discretion which should always be exercised against the making of an order in such a case. But the former seems to me the preferable analysis, since I would not accept that the court has power to make an order which, if made, would lack what has been legislatively stipulated to be a necessary consequence of such an order. I find myself in close agreement with the opinion of Hill J in Richardson v Richardson  P 228, subject only to the qualification (of little or no practical importance) that an order may be made relating to a chose in action sited abroad if it appears that by the law applicable in that situs the English order would be recognised as discharging pro tanto the liability of the third party to the judgment debtor. If (contrary to my opinion) the English court had jurisdiction to make an order in a case such as the present, the objections to its exercising a discretion to do so would be very strong on grounds of principle, comity and convenience: it is contrary in principle to compel a bank to pay out money owed by a customer if its liability to its customer is not reduced to the same extent; it is inconsistent with the comity owed to the Hong Kong court to purport to interfere with assets subject to its local jurisdiction; and the judgment creditor has a straightforward and readily available means of enforcing its judgment against the assets of the judgment debtors in Hong Kong."
"…The execution of a judgment is an exercise of sovereign authority. It is a seizure by the state of an asset of the judgment debtor to satisfy the creditor's claim. And it is a general principle of international law that one sovereign state should not trespass upon the authority of another, by attempting to seize assets situated within the jurisdiction of the foreign state or compelling its citizens to do acts within its boundaries.
 … [T] here are strong reasons of principle for not making a third party debt order in respect of a foreign debt. ...
 … The essence of such an order is that it is execution in rem against the property of the judgment debtor, against a res or chose in action which belongs to him and which is within the jurisdiction of the court making the order. … It is not a personal claim against the third party. The third party pays with his own money only in the same sense as a bank upon which a cheque has been drawn by a customer in credit pays with its own money. But the substance of the matter is that the judgment creditor is paid with the debtor's money, as the drawee of the cheque is paid with the customer's money.
 The discharge of the third party's indebtedness effected by rule 72.9(2) (formerly RSC Ord 49, r 8) is therefore an essential part of the execution. As Lord Blackburn said in London Corporation v London Joint Stock Bank (1881) 6 App Cas 393, 415, the garnishee, 'if he is to be obliged to pay the money, must be discharged from paying it to his creditor'. It is this which ensures that the creditor is paid with the debtor's money and not the third party's.
 The Court of Appeal rejected the suggestion that it was infringing the sovereignty of Hong Kong by saying that it was not ordering the bank to do anything in Hong Kong. All it had to do was to pay money in London. On this ground it distinguished cases like R v Grossman (1981) 73 Cr App R 302 and Mackinnon v Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette Securities Corpn  1 Ch 482 in which courts had refused to order banks to produce information about accounts held in foreign jurisdictions. But this distinction depends upon treating the third party debt order simply as an order against the bank instead of what it really is, namely, a process of execution by the attachment of property of the judgment debtor. Once the true nature of the order is understood, it becomes plain that an order in respect of a foreign debt is an attempt to levy execution on an asset in the foreign jurisdiction, which infringes the principle of international law applied in the Grossman and Mackinnon cases."
Gloster J's judgment and CCOG's argument
i) The appointment of a receiver was by way of equitable execution, and was a form of enforcement against foreign assets (namely debts payable abroad to a payee abroad (CCOG)).
ii) The receivership order amounts, in effect, to a seizure by a state of an asset of the judgment debtor because the judgment debtor is required on pain of contempt to transfer the asset to the receiver and through the receiver to the court, which will then inevitably pass it on to the judgment creditor. On receipt by the judgment creditor, at the latest, the judgment debtor's title will be transferred to the judgment creditor.
iii) If a receivership were granted in respect of the foreign assets of a foreign company, the English court would trespass on the authority of a foreign court by (in effect) attempting to seize (by the threat of contempt) assets within the jurisdiction of the foreign state, and by compelling its citizens to do acts within its boundaries.
iv) The fact that the order does not have a proprietary effect does not prevent the court lacking subject matter jurisdiction. In any event, to the extent that it is relevant, a receivership order does have a proprietary or quasi-proprietary effect. The judgment debtor, if he obeys, has to hand over his property; or to direct his debtors to hand over his property, to the receiver; and it will then find its way to the judgment creditor, via the receiver or the court, at which point the judgment debtor's title will (at the latest) be extinguished.
v) A receivership order interferes with the rights inter se between a third party debtor of the judgment debtor and the judgment debtor and prevents the third party debtor obtaining a good discharge from the judgment debtor. The third party will be put in a quandary: he cannot pay his creditor, who is refusing to accept payment. This in itself amounts to an interference with his rights and obligations as against his creditor. Under the terms of this order, the judgment debtor is then required to provide "written confirmation" "of the receiver's rights under this order" to third parties "anywhere in the world". The third party may well then receive a letter from the judgment debtor saying "A receiver has been appointed by the English court to receive my assets". However, that letter will have been given under compulsion; and the judgment debtor is under no obligation to confirm anything more than what English law states – he is not required to confirm the position under any other law. In the circumstances, there is no guarantee whatsoever that under any appropriate local law, and in particular under the law where the debt is situated, in a jurisdiction where the receivership order has not yet (and may never be) recognized, that if the third party makes payment to the receiver, the applicable law will treat him as having received a good discharge from the judgment debtor.
"A judgment creditor normally obtains satisfaction of his judgment by execution at common law, using the writ of fieri facias, attachment of debts and, formerly, in the case of land, the writ of elegit. There were cases, however, where the creditor could not levy execution at law owing to the nature of the property, the principal case being where the property was merely equitable, such as an interest under a trust or an equity of redemption. Another example was a covenant of indemnity or other chose in action of which the debtor has the benefit, but which could not be reached by attachment. In order to meet this difficulty, the Court of Chancery evolved a process of execution by way of appointing a receiver of the equitable interest, and if necessary supplemented this by an injunction restraining the judgment debtor from disposing of his interest in the property. This process was not 'execution' in the ordinary sense of the word, but a form of equitable relief for cases where execution was not possible. The effect of such an appointment 'is that it does not create a charge on the property, but that it operates as an injunction against the judgment debtor receiving the income' or dealing with the property to the prejudice of the judgment creditor."
"Confusion of ideas has arisen from the use of the term 'equitable execution'. The expression tends to error. It has often been used by judges, and occurs in some orders, as a short expression indicating that the person who obtains the order gets the same benefit as he would have got from legal execution. But what he gets by the appointment of a receiver is not execution, but equitable relief, which is granted on the ground that there is no remedy by execution at law; it is a taking out of the way a hindrance which prevents execution at common law."
"It is well settled that the Court can appoint receivers over property out of the jurisdiction. This power, I apprehend, is based upon the doctrine that the Court acts in personam. The Court does not, and cannot attempt by its order to put its own officer in possession of foreign property, but it treats as guilty of contempt any party to the action in which the order is made who prevents the necessary steps being taken to enable its officer to take possession according to the laws of the foreign country."
"... the receiver is not put in possession of foreign property by the mere order of the Court. Something else has to be done, and until that has been done in accordance with the foreign law, any person, not a party to the suit, who takes proceedings in the foreign country is not guilty of a contempt either on the ground of interfering with the receiver's possession or otherwise."
"… I do not understand why the order that the assets vest in the receiver should only take effect if and when the order was recognised by the Luxembourg courts. True it is that C.M.I. is a Luxembourg company, but it is a party to the action and can properly be ordered to deal with its assets in accordance with the orders of this court, regardless of whether the order is recognized and enforced in Luxembourg. The only effect of non-recognition would be to remove one of the potential sanctions for disobedience."
"To regard the grant of a Mareva injunction not as a matter of territorial jurisdiction to be exercised court by court throughout the various countries of the world where it may be appropriate but as a matter of unlimited jurisdiction in personam of the English court over persons who have properly been made parties, under English procedure, to proceedings pending before the English court is consistent with the approach of the English court to the appointment of receivers of the British and foreign assets of English companies. The court has always been ready to appoint a receiver over the foreign as well as British assets of an English company, even though it has recognized that in relation to foreign assets the appointment may not prove effective without assistance from a foreign court: In re Maudslay, Sons & Field… Moreover where a foreign court of the country where the assets are situate refuses to recognise the receiver appointed by the English court, the English court will, in an appropriate case, do what it can to render the appointment effective by orders in personam against persons who are subject to the jurisdiction of the English court …"
V Personal jurisdiction to grant the orders and the exercise of discretion
A Gloster J's judgment and CCOG's argument
Gloster J's judgment
"For the purposes of this Regulation, a company or other legal person or association of natural or legal persons is domiciled at the place where it has its: (a) statutory seat, or (b) central administration, or (c) principal place of business."
C Jurisdiction to make post-judgment ancillary orders
D Article 22(5)
The scope of Article 22(5)
The following courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of domicile: … in proceedings concerned with the enforcement of judgments, the courts of the Member State in which the judgment has been or is to be enforced
"Article 16(5) provides that the courts of the State in which a judgment has been or is to be enforced have exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerned with the enforcement of that judgment. What meaning is to be given to the expression "proceedings concerned with the enforcement of judgments"? It means those proceedings which can arise from 'recourse to force, constraint or distraint on movable property in order to ensure the effective implementation of judgments and authentic instruments [citing Braas, Précis de procedure civile, Vol 1, para 808]. Problems arising out of such proceedings come within the excusive jurisdiction of the courts for the place of enforcement."
Reichert v Dresdner Bank AG
"Les articles 16-5° [Brussels Convention] et 22-5° [Brussels I Regulation] reprennent un règle très généralement admise selon laquelle seuls les tribunaux de l'État du lieu d'exécution sont compétents pour des mesures d'exécution devant prendre place sur leur territoire. Cette compétence exclusive ne concerne que le contentieux de la réalisation de la mesure d'exécution, l'exécution proprement dite. En revanche, les art. 16-5° .. et 22-5° … ne s'appliquent pas pour déterminer la compétence d'une jurisdiction qui se contente d'autoriser ou d'ordonner une mesure d'exécution: une jurisdiction d'un État contractant peut autoriser une saise conservatoire de biens situés sur la territoire d'un autre État contractant."
" It is not correct to characterise the garnishee or third party debt order as a claim in personam made against the third party in England. It is enforcement of the judgment in rem against the debt, which in this case is situated in Switzerland. Article 16(5) therefore confers exclusive jurisdiction on Switzerland and it is understandable that UBS's Swiss law expert should have said that a Swiss court would regard the order as an infringement of its sovereignty. Indeed, the judgment of the Court of Appeal produces the extraordinary result that the courts of any member state in which UBS maintains a branch have exclusive jurisdiction under article 16(5) to make a garnishee or similar order in respect of a debt in Switzerland - a strange form of exclusivity."
Gloster J's exercise of discretion
VI Can a receiver be appointed by way of equitable execution over future debts?
Section 37(1) and the pre-1873 practice: the early authorities
"power, if it should think it just or convenient, to superadd to what would have been previously the remedy, a remedy by way of injunction, altering therefore not in any way the rights of parties so as to give a right to those who had no legal right before, but enabling the Court to modify the principle on which it had previously proceeded in granting injunctions, so that where there is a legal right the Court may, without being hampered by its old rules, grant an injunction where it is just or convenient to do so for the purpose of protecting or asserting the legal rights of the parties. That, in my opinion, is the real meaning of this section. In my opinion, all that was done by this section was to give to the High Court power to give a remedy which formerly would not have been given in that particular case, but still only a remedy in defence of or to enforce rights which according to law were previously existing and capable of being enforced …"
Receivership and future debts
The older authorities
"The common law writs of execution did not extend to future income. The garnishee process did not reach it; nor was the statutory process of charging orders applicable to wages or other remuneration for personal services. … The judgment creditor here has a legal right to be paid his debt, but not out of the future earnings of his debtor; and the Court of Chancery had no jurisdiction to prevent him from earning his living or from receiving his earnings, unless he had himself assigned or charged them. … If the earnings could have been reached under a writ of sequestration, a receiver might have been appointed …but a writ of sequestration was never issued before the Judicature Acts in order to attach a man's personal earnings.
In [Manchester and Liverpool District Banking Co (1888) 22 QBD 173] an order for a receiver was discharged, because there was no difficulty in enforcing payment of a judgment by the ordinary legal methods. In this case there is such a difficulty; but it does not arise from any impediment which the old Court of Chancery had jurisdiction to remove. The difficulty arises from the fact that future earnings are not by law attachable by any process of execution direct or indirect."
"We have simply to deal with a case in which an ordinary judgment creditor sought the aid of a Court of Equity to enforce his judgment against property not capable of being reached by any common law process. The only cases of this kind in which Courts of Equity have interfered were cases in which the judgment debtor had an equitable interest in property which could be reached at law, if he had had the legal interest in it, instead of an equitable interest only."
"I do not think that a receiver appointed at the instance of a judgment creditor is entitled to carry on the business of the debtor, or to take the profits derived from it, though he may be entitled to prevent the debtor or any one else from carrying on business on the debtor's premises."
"If the patentee should in the future think proper to employ his patent, which he is not bound to do, the proceeds will be future earnings of which the judgment creditors cannot have a receiver."
"If there may be such moneys at any time, it is clear that the Court is not obliged to wait till they are actually being paid before appointing a receiver, if it has power to appoint one. It is true that in general it would not appoint a receiver without a probability that the appointment would be effectual and useful. But in the present case it is clearly desirable that the receiver should be appointed as soon as possible in order that nothing may escape him; and, as I have said, the justice of the case is so strongly on the side of helping the judgment creditors that we ought not to allow such a matter of discretion to interfere with our giving them all the assistance we can."
Receivership and rights of indemnity
"The appointment of a receiver by way, as it is traditionally called, of equitable execution is a form of equitable relief to enforce payment of a judgment debt which the court may grant in the special circumstances of a particular case if, as in the present case, the recovery of the judgment debt by the more usual processes of execution or attachment of debts is not practicable. The remedy is, however, discretionary and it is plain that the court would not appoint a receiver if the court were satisfied that the appointment would be fruitless because there was nothing for the receiver to get in."
Soinco v Novokuznetsk Aluminium
"Such future debts would not, when the order was made, be amenable to execution by garnishee proceedings since such proceedings are inapplicable to future debts because the Court of Chancery would not before 1873 give equitable relief to assist execution in a case where there was no property of a kind which could at the time be made subject to execution by legal process."
"it is well settled that [section 37(1) and its predecessors] did not introduce an unlimited power: see in particular North London Railway Co v Great Northern Railway Co (1883) 11 QBD 30 and Morgan v Hart  2 KB 183 ... [I]f and insofar as it had already been laid down that there was no power to appoint a receiver or to grant an injunction in a given situation, then the statute provided no new source of jurisdiction to alter the existing state of the authorities."
"For my part I do not accept that the pre-Judicature Act practices of the Court of Chancery or any other court still rule us from their graves. In any event, that decision relates to equitable execution of a judgment and is not a matter with which we are concerned. As I see the matter the jurisdiction, as a jurisdiction, is quite general and, in terms, unlimited. Nevertheless it has to be exercised judicially and with due regard to authorities which are binding upon this court."
Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury:
Lord Justice Ward:
A Order for the appointment of a receiver
 ... Mr Lee Manning … be and hereby is appointed to receive all amounts due to the fifth defendant, Consolidated Contractors (Oil and Gas) Company SAL ("CC (Oil and Gas)") from Nexen Marketing Singapore PTE Ltd. ("Nexen Singapore") or any other entity to the extent that they relate to proceeds of the sale of the oil from the concession known as Block 14 (or the Masila Block), Yemen, to which CC (Oil and Gas) is entitled pursuant to the Agreement for Petroleum Exploration and Production between the Minister of Energy and Minerals and Canadian OXY Offshore International Limited and Consolidated Contractors International Company SAL dated 15 September 1986 (the "PSA") and/or the Masila Joint Operating Agreement between Canadian OXY Offshore International Limited and Consolidated Contractors International Company SAL dated 27 April 1987, as amended, and an assignment between Consolidated Contractors International Company SAL and Consolidated Contractors (Oil and Gas) Company SAL dated 25 October 1992 and/or any further broking, sales or other agreements to which CC (Oil and Gas) is party regarding the sale of such oil (such amounts to be referred to as "Oil Revenues").
 That the receiver be entitled to do the following:
(b) to bring, defend, continue or compromise any proceedings or any other action in any jurisdiction as he may think fit, acting on behalf of CC (Oil & Gas) as receiver, whether using his own name and/or the name of CC (Oil and Gas), in order to collect, gather in and/or recover the Oil Revenues, provided, however, that in the case of proceedings brought in a jurisdiction outside England and Wales, such right is subject to the receiver's right to bring such proceedings as receiver being (i) admitted by the defendant to the proceedings or (ii) recognised by the Court of the legal system of the jurisdiction where the proceedings are brought before they are commenced or (iii) raised formally by the receiver as an issue in the proceedings at his first opportunity to do so.
 That from the date hereof until further order, CC (Oil and Gas) and its directors or officers including Fouad Asfour and Samir Nayef Khoury, shall co-operate with the receiver in the following ways:
(a) Providing within a reasonable time such information and documents falling within the following categories as the receiver may reasonably require:
(i) the whereabouts at any time of the Oil Revenues or any assets representing the proceeds of the same;
(ii) the arrangements, whether contractual or based on instructions given from time to time, in place at any time for the sale of the oil referred to in paragraph 1 above and realisation of the proceeds of the same;
(iii) the identities of (and any other details concerning) all entities involved in the sale of the said oil and realisation of the proceeds of the same;
(iv) the amounts due to CC (Oil and Gas) in respect of the Oil Revenues from time to time.
(b) Providing within a reasonable time such written confirmation to third parties anywhere in the world as the receiver may reasonably require of the receiver's rights under this order to act on behalf of CC (Oil and Gas) for the purpose of carrying out his functions as set out above, and of his rights under this order to receive the Oil Revenues in that capacity, and providing to the receiver copies of such confirmations.
(c) Within three days of making any agreement for the sale of oil, or any sale of oil, providing to the receiver the following information in relation to such an agreement or sale, namely:
i. If it is in writing, a copy of any such agreement. If it is not in writing, a written description of its terms and conditions.
ii. The identity of the purchaser under such agreement or sale including the purchaser's name, registered office address and contact details of the office of the purchaser involved in the purchase.
iii. If an agent acted for CC (Oil and Gas) in making such agreement or sale, the agent's name, registered office address and the address and telephone and fax numbers (if any) of the office of the agent involved in the making of such agreement or sale.
iv. The details of the bank account to which any monies due to CC (Oil & Gas) SAL have been or are to be remitted in connection with such agreement or sale, including the name of the bank, the address of its branch involved, the name of the account and the number of the account.
Persons outside England and Wales
 Except as provided in paragraph  below, the terms of this order do not affect or concern anyone outside the jurisdiction of this Court.
 The terms of this order will affect the following persons in a country or state outside the jurisdiction of this Court:
(A) the Defendant or its officer or agent appointed by power of attorney
(B) any person who –
(1) is subject to the jurisdiction of this court;
(2) has been given written notice of this order at his residence or place of business within the jurisdiction of this court; and
(3) is able to prevent acts or omissions outside the jurisdiction of this court which constitute or assist in a breach of the terms of this order; and
(C) any other person, only to the extent that this order is declared enforceable by or is enforced by a court in that country or state.
 Nothing in this order shall, in respect of assets located outside England and Wales, prevent any third party from complying with –
(A) what it reasonably believes to be its obligations, contractual or otherwise, under the laws and obligations of the country or state in which those assets are situated or under the proper law of any contract between itself and the Defendants; and
(B) any orders of the courts of that country or state, provided that reasonable notice of any application for such an order is given to the Claimant's solicitors.
 Nothing in this order shall, in respect of assets located outside England and Wales, require the Defendants and/or their directors to disobey the order of any court of competent jurisdiction in relation to such assets.
B Freezing order
 Until further order Consolidated Contractors (Oil and Gas) Company SAL (the Fifth Defendant) must not assign any of its rights in the Concession pursuant to the Concession Agreements to any other person or entity or otherwise dispose of or diminish the value of such rights without the consent of the Claimant expressed to be pursuant to this provision and given in writing by his solicitor or the permission of the court. Save as provided below, any sales of, or dispositions of the interest of Consolidated Contractors (Oil and Gas) Company SAL pursuant to the Concession Agreements in, oil shall constitute a disposition or diminution in the value of the said rights within the meaning of this paragraph.
 This Order shall not prevent Consolidated Contractors (Oil and Gas) Company SAL from selling oil in the ordinary course of business for its market value. For this purpose, an agreement for the sale of oil is not made in the ordinary course of business if:
(i) it provides for delivery more than three months after (a) the date of such agreement, or (b) the due date for payment for such oil; or
(ii) it is made with an affiliate of Consolidated Contractors (Oil and Gas) Company SAL for which purpose the term "affiliate" means any company or other legal entity directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by Consolidated Contractors (Oil & Gas) or under the same control as CC (Oil & Gas). In this definition "control" is to be construed in accordance with section 840 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988.
 Persons outside England and Wales
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) below, the terms of this order do not affect or concern anyone outside the jurisdiction of this court.
(2) The terms of this order will affect the following persons in a country or state outside the jurisdiction of this court –
(a) the Fifth Defendant or its officer or agent appointed by power of attorney;
(b) any person who –
(i) is subject to the jurisdiction of this court;
(ii) has been given written notice of this order at his residence or place of business within the jurisdiction of this court; and
(iii) is able to prevent acts or omissions outside the jurisdiction of this court which constitute or assist in a breach of the terms of this order; and
(c) any other person, only to the extent that this order is declared enforceable by or is enforced by a court in that country or state.
 Assets located outside England and Wales
Nothing in this order shall, in respect of assets located outside England and Wales, prevent any third party from complying with –
(1) what it reasonably believes to be its obligations, contractual or otherwise, under the laws and obligations of the country or state in which those assets are situated or under the proper law of any contract between itself and the Defendants or either of them; and
(2) any orders of the courts of that country or state, provided that reasonable notice of any application for such an order is given to the Claimant's solicitors.
C Order for affidavit of assets
 Consolidated Contractors International Company SAL and Consolidated Contractors (Oil and Gas) Company SAL (the Judgment Debtors) be and hereby are ordered to serve by 21 January 2008 affidavits identifying each and every asset owned by either or both of them the value of which is equal to or greater that US$1,000,000.
 Consolidated Contractors International Company SAL and Consolidated Contractors (Oil and Gas) Company SAL (the Judgment Debtors) be and hereby are ordered to serve by 4 February 2008 affidavits identifying each and every asset owned by either or both of them the value of which is equal to or greater than US$500,000, save that the affidavits need not include any assets identified in any affidavits served pursuant to paragraph 2 above.
 Consolidated Contractors International Company SAL and Consolidated Contractors (Oil and Gas) Company SAL (the Judgment Debtors) be and hereby are ordered to serve by 25 February 2008 affidavits identifying each and every asset owned by either or both of them the value of which is equal to or greater than US$100,000, save that the affidavits need not include any assets identified in any affidavits served pursuant to paragraph 2 or 3 above.Addendum to judgments of April 7, 2008 Section V(C) of the judgment of Lawrence Collins LJ (paras 92-107) does not deal with the separate position of CCIC. Since it was common ground that CCIC (unlike CCOG) had a domicile in Greece, the effect of the reasoning in section V(C) is that the English court had jurisdiction to make the affidavit of assets order against CCIC for the reasons given in paragraphs 94 to 107.