Appeal No. UKEATPA/0775/11/SM
EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
FLEETBANK HOUSE, 2-6 SALISBURY SQUARE, LONDON EC4Y 8JX
At
the Tribunal
On
17 April 2012
Before
HIS
HONOUR JUDGE McMULLEN QC
(SITTING ALONE)
MS
M POPA APPELLANT
(1)
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP
(2) CREDIT SUISSE
SECURITIES (EUROPE) LTD
(3) UNION BANK OF
SWITZERLAND AG RESPONDENTS
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
APPEAL FROM REGISTRAR’S ORDER
SUMMARY
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Time for appealing
There was no basis for allowing an extension of 17 days to
register a Notice of Appeal.
HIS HONOUR JUDGE McMULLEN
QC
1.
This is an appeal from the decision of the Registrar given on
23 November 2011 not to allow the registration of a Notice of
Appeal. I will refer to the parties as the Claimant and the Respondents, who
are PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP; Credit Suisse Ltd, represented by Lewis Silkin,
who attend today in the form of Mr Russell Brimelow and have made some
written submissions; and UBS AG, who are represented in writing by Berwin
Leighton Paisner.
Introduction
2.
The appeal itself is an appeal by the Claimant in those would‑be
proceedings against a decision of Employment Judge Laidler, who decided on
29 March 2011 that the administration of the ET, having received a claim
form from the Claimant, would return it, “as it is not clear what claims with
[sic] the jurisdiction of the Employment Tribunal you are making”. The
Claimant objected to that and made an appeal; the appeal was 17 days out of
time, according to the Registrar. She considered submissions from the parties
and decided not to exercise discretion. The Claimant appeals against that. An
appeal against the Registrar is to a single Judge; here I make my own decision.
This is a hearing.
The legislation
3.
The relevant provisions of law and practice are set out in my Judgment
in Muschett v London Borough of Hounslow
[2009] ICR 424. Since then, the Court of Appeal has decided Jurkowska v Hlmad Ltd
[2008] EWCA Civ 231, and, for further reference, please see my Judgments in Westmoreland v Renault UK Ltd
UKEATPA/1571/08, and in Harper v Hopkins [2010] EWCA Civ 1246, where the Court of Appeal approved my approach to Registrar appeals.
The Court of Appeal in Miller v Lambeth Primary Care Trust
[2011] EWCA Civ 722, approved my account of the difficulties faced by the EAT
by those Appellants, of whom there are hundreds, who fail to take the most
elementary steps to lodge an appeal. Further, the Court of appeal has approved
my approach in Zinda v The Governing Body of Barn Hill Community High and
Ors [2011] EWCA Civ 690.
Procedural background and the appeal
4.
The Registrar said the appeal was 17 days out of time; there is no
dispute about that. The Claimant is in Romania; she declines to come. She
herself acknowledges that this is an oral hearing, and she is making, as she is
entitled to do, written submissions. I conduct a hearing on the basis of the
material that is before me, and as is clear from Muschett,
frequently live evidence is adduced. Today the Claimant has produced, in
addition to her 50‑page Notice of Appeal, a 10‑page submission,
which I have read most carefully. The Practice Direction and the Rules
together require all the documents to be served within time.
5.
The Registrar decided that she would not exercise discretion in the
Claimant’s favour, and she said this:
“The appellant applies for an extension of time in which to
appeal a refusal to accept a claim in the employment tribunal promulgated on
the 26th March 2011. The final date for appeal was the 10th May 2011.
The appeal was received on the 27th May 2011. The appellant
claims that she sent an email to the EAT stating that she wished to appeal this
decision. She did send an email at some stage on the 10th May
stating that she intended to appeal and that she would send one on the 12th May 2011.
She was advised of Paragraph 3.5 of the EAT Practice Direction 2008 on the
11th May. In any event, no right to appeal may be reserved.
An appeal is either in time or it is not. […]
Many appellants act for themselves without legal advice yet they
manage to file their appeals in time. The appellant was familiar with the
process and had access to the internet, her preferred method of communication,
so it is irrelevant whether she was in Romania or the UK. It is also irrelevant that she suffered intermittent computer failure as access to the
internet can be gained on other computers. There is no evidence of a large
scale conspiracy involving many parties including the Royal Family to defraud
the appellant. Although the appellant claims to be disabled, she does not
specify the form of her disability and it does not seem to prevent her from
engaging in multiple strands of litigation in many courts including the Court
of Appeal. In this instance she has attempted to make claims against parties
who have never been her employer. It is clear from the appellant’s frequent
correspondence and the allegations contained therein that she has no realistic
grasp of the employment tribunal’s remit.”
6.
She then cited the Judgment of Rimer LJ in Jurkowska,
who said this:
“Litigants are not entitled to expect rules of practice to be re‑written
so as to accommodate their own negligence, idleness or incompetence.”
7.
The Registrar dealt with the issues, which are the same as those before
me, as to exercising discretion in the Claimant’s favour. The Registrar
decided the matters set out above did not excuse the lateness. The Claimant is
most exercised about the use of that phrase from Rimer LJ. I have some
sympathy with her, because this case is not the result of negligence, idleness
or incompetence and the use of that phrase has caused grave offence to the
Claimant. She says the Registrar has treated her in an appalling and despicable
manner in this rejection letter. The Registrar was, however, applying the
leading authority.
8.
The Claimant acknowledges in her written material to me that the
Registrar has considered the issues that were put before her: the Claimant’s
relocation to Romania, computer breakdowns, and, now, sabotaging events in the
Claimant’s life. These include a neighbour jumping out of a window and causing
the Claimant to consider suicide. These are the main points of the argument. With
respect, they come nowhere near an excuse for failing to lodge the Notice of
Appeal in time. The Claimant is verbose and carries on unremitting
correspondence with the various jurisdictions with which she is engaged. An
account of her original foray into the Tribunal system is given by
Employment Judge Laidler in her Judgment sent to the parties on
20 May 2010 striking out the Claimant’s claims.
9.
In short, I have done what the Claimant has asked me to do. She has
extensively cited the authorities that are in the Registrar’s Judgment. She
has appealed for leniency, indicating what she thinks is more leniency in the
Court of Appeal than in the EAT, and points out that she is self-represented.
I bear all that in mind, and her view that what is going on here is a
masquerade.
10.
As she says in paragraph 19 of her submission, the EAT is concerned
with the reasons for which an extension of time should be allowed. There then
follows what I can only describe as gibberish. I can translate the Latin, and
get the gist of the Romanian, but the content of the English immediately
following this is an account of what I divine to be the Claimant’s willingness
to marry Prince William or Prince Harry, citing a claim for compensation, from
Buckingham Palace, or it may be from UBS – the matter is not clear to me – for
$3 billion.
11.
I have not gained much assistance from the remainder of this ten‑page
submission. The Registrar, in my judgment, was correct not to exercise
discretion. I have looked at the matter entirely afresh in the light of the
material put before me, but the rules are clear; the Claimant knows them,
because she is an experienced litigator, and failed to carry out the simple
rules.
12.
In their responses to this appeal Credit Suisse and UBS have asked me to
look at the merits of the case; so does the Claimant. It is unusual to do so,
but in a case which has no merit at all, there is no point in breathing life
into it (see the Judgment of Sir Christopher Staughton in Aziz v Bethnal Green City Challenge Co Ltd
[2000] IRLR 111). The issue in this case is whether the Judge was correct to
refuse to accept – that is, to allow her to the seat of justice – the claim
that the Claimant made, because it was not clear. I do not form the view that
the appeal has no merit at all. It has to be borne in mind that there has been
no consideration of issues in the case – essentially “acceptance” is an
administrative act carried out by a Judge. Judge Laidler decided that the
claim was not clear, and the Claimant is right to point out there are no
reasons for this.
13.
However, a cursory look at the claim indicates to me that the Claimant
was making claims of disability discrimination at least arising in the course
of employment. True it is there is a good deal of unnecessary, irrelevant and
confusing material, but I do not consider it can be said, as the Respondents
urge me to decide, that there is no merit whatsoever in the Claimant’s claim.
That means that I resort to the usual position on appeals, which is to assume
that the appeal itself has some merit. So in a sense I accept the Claimant’s
case that this was an appeal that could not be thrown out on the grounds that
it had no merit. I make no decision on the basis of Sir Christopher Staughton’s
invitation.
Conclusion
14.
I would like to thank very much Mr Brimelow for coming. The appeal
is dismissed.