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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
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Roberts v Aldi Stores Ltd (Practice and Procedure : Admissibility of evidence) [2012] UKEAT 0224_11_2803 (28 March 2012)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2012/0224_11_2803.html
Cite as:
[2012] UKEAT 0224_11_2803,
[2012] UKEAT 224_11_2803
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Appeal No. UKEAT/0224/11/ZT
EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
FLEETBANK HOUSE, 2-6 SALISBURY SQUARE, LONDON EC4Y 8JX
At
the Tribunal
On
28 March 2012
Before
HIS
HONOUR JUDGE PETER CLARK
MR B BEYNON
MRS M V McARTHUR FCIPD
MR
S O ROBERTS APPELLANT
ALDI
STORES LTD RESPONDENT
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant
|
MR
S O ROBERTS
(The Appellant in Person)
|
For the Respondent
|
MR R HIGNETT
(of Counsel)
Instructed by:
Messrs Freeth
Cartwright LLP Solicitors
One Colton Square
Leicester
LE1 1QH
|
SUMMARY
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Admissibility of evidence
Bias, misconduct and procedural irregularity
Various complaints not determined by Employment Tribunal. Those
remaining remitted for hearing, subject to limitation issue. Admissibility of
without prejudice material also remitted for further consideration.
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER
CLARK
Introduction
1.
The parties to these proceedings before the Cardiff Employment Tribunal
are Mr Roberts, Claimant, and Aldi Stores Ltd, Respondent; we shall so
describe them. The Claimant was employed by the Respondent as manager of their
store at Llandrindod Wells from 3 July 2006 until his employment
terminated on 31 March 2010. By his form ET1 lodged on
28 June 2010 he complained of unfair dismissal, outstanding notice
and holiday pay, a failure to give written reasons for dismissal and various
complaints under the Working Time Regulations 1998
(WTR). The claims were resisted and came on for hearing before a Tribunal chaired
by Employment Judge John Thomas on 1 December 2010.
Having initially put the fact of dismissal in issue, by a letter dated
29 November 2010 the Respondent’s solicitors conceded that the
Claimant had been dismissed unfairly. On that footing the hearing proceeded to
determine only remedy for unfair dismissal. The Tribunal found by a Judgment
with Reasons promulgated on 10 February 2011 that the Claimant was
entitled to a basic award in the sum of £1,140 and a compensatory award of
£8,911, a total award of £10,051.
2.
Against that Judgment the Claimant brings this appeal. Following
earlier case management orders in this Appeal Tribunal the issues arising for
determination at this full hearing are (1) whether the Tribunal erred in
failing to adjudicate on the Claimant’s claims under WTR for pay in lieu of
notice, holiday pay and failure to give written reasons for dismissal (“the
other claims”); and (2) whether in assessing the compensatory award for unfair
dismissal the Tribunal was wrong (a) to admit into evidence a letter from the
Respondent dated 1 July 2010 headed “Without Prejudice” and (b) in
limiting lost earnings to a period ending on 1 July 2010 (“unfair
dismissal remedy”).
Unfair dismissal remedy
3.
Although the Respondent’s concession that the Claimant was unfairly
dismissed did not extend to the reason for dismissal, as a result of the
discussion before us it is clear that the statutory cap on the compensatory
award contained in section 124(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996
(ERA) applies in this case. The principal complaint raised by the Claimant in
this part of the appeal is that Employment Judge Thomas, sitting
alone in advance of the full hearing on 1 December 2010, was wrong to
rule in favour of the Respondent that the Respondent’s letter dated 1 July
should be admitted in evidence at the full hearing.
4.
The position is further complicated by the fact that that letter refers
to two earlier meetings held between the signatory, Mr Casey, the Regional
Managing Director, and the Claimant on 28 May and 11 June 2010.
Before us Mr Roberts initially contended that at the start of the
28 May meeting Mr Casey told him that everything that was said at the
meeting was without prejudice. After Mr Hignett referred us to the
minutes of that meeting Mr Roberts corrected himself, saying that comment
was made at the start of the 11 June meeting, which was not minuted.
Mr Hignett was unable to take instructions on that late assertion.
5.
Conversely, the minutes of the 28 March meeting, now agreed to have
been an open meeting, do not on their face appear to contain a firm offer to
the Claimant of alternative employment at the Respondent’s Brecon or Hereford stores. Since it was the Tribunal’s finding that the Claimant had unreasonably
refused an offer of re‑employment by the Respondent following his
dismissal that led to his loss of earnings claim being limited to
1 July 2010, the question as to whether an open offer was made
becomes critical. Mr Hignett submits that the notes of the meeting held
on 28 March were not comprehensive. He accepts, however, that the without
prejudice issue must return to the Employment Tribunal for reconsideration. We
agree, as does the Claimant. Applying ordinary principles, a meeting or letter
properly said to be without prejudice cannot be referred to at a trial absent
consent of the parties, and Mr Roberts did not give his consent to
privilege being waived.
The other claims
6.
It is common ground, and indeed apparent on the face of the record, that
the Tribunal did not adjudicate on the other claims. The Claimant says that he
did not abandon or withdraw those claims, contrary to the impression conveyed
in the Employment Judge’s comments to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, and
Mr Hignett does not contend that he did. It follows that those claims, in
so far as they remain extant, must now be determined by the ET. That said, we
should comment on the other claims in turn.
Claim 1: WTR
7.
The Claimant’s principal complaint is that he was required to work more
than 48 hours per week during September and October 2009, in particular
when a colleague was off sick. He did not raise below a claim specifically
under section 45A ERA, and on his factual case no such claim arises.
Further, any claim under section 101A ERA is subsumed in the Respondent’s
unfair dismissal concession. However, he does appear to raise claims under regulation 30(1)
WTR, which have not been determined. Those claims in turn are subject to a
limitation point taken by the Respondent under regulation 30(2); that
point now requires determination by the ET as a preliminary matter.
Claim 2: pay in lieu of notice
8.
Mr Roberts realistically accepts that in so far as the compensatory
award for unfair dismissal covers a period of loss during the notice period he
cannot recover the same amount twice.
Claim 3: holiday pay
9.
The parties agree, and we record, that the Claimant is owed one day’s
holiday pay.
Claim 4: written reasons for dismissal
10.
This claim is now conceded by the Respondent, and again we record that
the Claimant is entitled to an award of two weeks’ pay under section 93 ERA.
Disposal
11.
We shall allow this appeal and direct that the issues of unfair
dismissal remedy and the WTR complaints be remitted to a fresh ET for
rehearing. We further direct that in advance of the substantive hearing there
should be a PHR to determine (a) the without prejudice issue and (b) the
limitation issue in the WTR complaints.
12.
Finally, and for the avoidance of doubt, we record, and endorse, the
agreement between the parties that the reference to section 122(1) ERA in
paragraph 4 of the Tribunal’s Reasons is misplaced. No offer of
reinstatement bearing on the basic award arises in this case, and indeed a full
basic award was ordered. The issue under section 123 ERA is whether the
Claimant unreasonably refused an open offer of re‑employment such as to
amount to a failure to mitigate his loss, applying the principle set out in the
Judgment of Potter LJ in Wilding v British Telecommunications PLC
[2002] ICR 1079 at paragraph 37.