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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
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A & J Menswear (Retail) Ltd v Jacobs (Unlawful Deduction from Wages : no sub-topic) [2011] UKEAT 0375_11_3011 (30 November 2011)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2011/0375_11_3011.html
Cite as:
[2011] UKEAT 375_11_3011,
[2011] UKEAT 0375_11_3011
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Appeal No. UKEAT/0375/11/DA
EMPLOYMENT APPEAL
TRIBUNAL
FLEETBANK HOUSE, 2-6 SALISBURY SQUARE, LONDON, EC4Y 8JX
At the Tribunal
On 30
November 2011
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER
CLARK
(SITTING ALONE)
A
& J MENSWEAR (RETAIL) LTD APPELLANT
MRS
M G JACOBS RESPONDENT
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant
|
Written
Submissions
|
For the Respondent
|
MRS M G JACOBS
(The Respondent in
Person)
|
SUMMARY
UNLAWFUL DEDUCTION FROM WAGES
CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT
Notice and pay in lieu
Damages for breach of contract
Whether Employment Judge entitled to conclude (a) that wages had
not been paid, unlawfully and (b) that Claimant gave 1 month’s notice of
termination during which period she ought to have been paid. Held: on material
before him, Employment Judge reached permissible conclusions. Appeal
dismissed.
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER CLARK
Introduction
1.
This is the full hearing of an appeal by A & J Menswear (Retail)
Ltd, the Respondent before the Truro Employment Tribunal, against a Judgment of
Employment Judge Griffiths, sitting alone on
4 February 2011, which awarded the Claimant, Mrs Jacobs, the sum
of £1,267.50 gross in unpaid wages. That Judgment, with Reasons, was
promulgated on 9 February. Today the Appellant, the Respondent below,
does not appear, but relies on written representations. Mrs Jacobs has
appeared in person.
2.
The judge’s Reasons are so economical that I should set them out in
full:
“1. The
claimant resigned her employment on 30th July 2010 on 1 months notice
expiring on 30th August 2010.
2. She
was instructed on 15th July 2010 not to return to work “until further
notice” pending the completion of an investigation.
3. No
notice of the respondent’s requirement for her to return to work was given at
or after her notice of resignation.
4. She
is, therefore entitled to be paid for the period from 15th July to
30th August 2010.”
3.
The judge found that the Claimant’s wages amounted to £195 per week
gross. By way of background, the Claimant was employed by the Respondent as assistant
manager of their Newquay store. She suffered a bereavement in the family which
led to her going to South Africa to attend the funeral of a cousin, to whom she
was particularly attached. I have seen correspondence sent by the Respondent
to the Claimant, and which the Claimant tells me today was before the
Employment Tribunal.
4.
On 30 June 2010, the Respondent wrote to her home address,
contending that she had taken unauthorised leave from 27 June. On
8 July she was asked to contact the human resources department on her
return. The Claimant tells me that on 15 July she telephoned an HR
advisor, Kay Warren, at the Respondent’s head office and was advised not
to return to work pending completion of a disciplinary investigation. On
19 July, she was called to an investigation meeting. That meeting was
then postponed until 30 July. On that day she attended a meeting,
following which she sent a letter of resignation, dated 30 July, which ended:
“I [the Claimant] hereby give notice to terminate my employment with [the
Respondent]”.
5.
In their written skeleton argument the Respondent challenges first the
judge’s finding that the Claimant was instructed on 15 July not to return
to work until further notice (see Reasons, paragraph 2). That seems to me to
be a finding of fact with which I cannot interfere on appeal, and the Claimant
has confirmed the nature of the evidence she gave below, as to her conversation
with Kay Warren on 15 July. The Claimant was treated as still
employed during July; even if she was implicitly suspended. Such suspension
must be on pay absent a clear contractual term providing for suspension without
pay, and none has been put before me. I therefore reject that first challenge.
6.
Secondly I look at the August period. The letter of 30 July itself
specifies no termination date for her notice. However, Mrs Jacobs tells
me that under the terms of her contract of employment, after 13 weeks’ service
(and she had completed more than 13 weeks) employees were required to give one
month’s notice of termination. I have also considered the correspondence after
30 June. Letters were sent by the Respondent on 4, 17 and
31 August. The Claimant did not respond.
7.
However, those letters were concerned with a question as to whether or
not she wished to pursue a grievance. I also note that she was asked to return
the keys to the Respondent’s shop premises in Newquay. Mrs Jacobs tells
me today that, in fact, those keys were collected by the new assistant manager
from Mrs Jacob’s new employment, in fact, working in a restaurant at which
she had worked part time prior to these events in July and August 2010.
8.
What she tells me today (and there are no representatives here from the Respondent)
is that had she been asked to work out her notice, she would have done so. I
am therefore not in a position to find on appeal that she was not ready and
willing to work for the Respondent during the August period (see Miles v Wakefield [1987] ICR 368). As to whether or not she gave one month’s notice,
although her letter was silent on the point, it seems to me that the Employment
Judge was entitled to infer that the reference to notice in her letter was a
reference to the contractual notice and the Respondent was aware of her
contractual obligation to give one month’s notice.
9.
In these circumstances, I am not persuaded by the Respondent’s written
submissions that the judge erred in law (and appeals to the EAT are on points
of law only) in finding that she was entitled to payment for the month of
August as well as the final two weeks in July. It follows that this appeal
fails and is dismissed.