Appeal No. UKEAT/0304/11/LA
EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA
EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS
At the Tribunal
On 21 October 2011
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER CLARK
SIR ALISTAIR GRAHAM KBE
MR R LYONS
PROFESSOR
J RADFORD APPELLANT
TEESIDE
UNIVERSITY RESPONDENT
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
SUMMARY
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Review
Review application dismissed by Employment Judge alone under
Employment Tribunal rule 35(3). Claimant’s representative misled Employment
Tribunal and Claimant and prevented her from making, or having made on her
behalf, a renewed adjournment application whilst she was un-contactable abroad
(see Marsden). Appeal allowed; remitted to fresh Employment
Tribunal for review hearing.
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER CLARK
Introduction
1.
This is an appeal by the Claimant, Professor Radford, before the
Newcastle Employment Tribunal against the Judgment of
Employment Judge Pitt, promulgated with Reasons on
1 April 2011 (the review decision) summarily rejecting her
application for review by a full Tribunal chaired by that Employment Judge of
their Judgment, following a hearing held on 24 January, promulgated with
Reasons on 22 February 2011 (the substantive Judgment), dismissing
her various claims brought against the Respondent, Teesside University.
Background
2.
The Claimant was employed by the Respondent as Professor in Criminology
and Women’s Studies. On 14 December 2009, she presented complaints
of constructive unfair dismissal, age discrimination and sexual orientation
discrimination. The claims were resisted.
3.
The matter came on for substantive hearing on 24 January, listed
for four days. From 17 June 2010 the Claimant had been represented
by Mr Lee Cuttle of the Legal Bureau on the instructions of her trade
union. His precise professional standing is unclear. It seems that he took
himself off the record without informing the Claimant, then on a holiday in Cuba booked in August 2010, shortly before the hearing fixed for 24 January.
Neither the Claimant nor Mr Cuttle attended that hearing. The Respondent
was present, ready to defend the claim, represented by Mr Collins.
4.
In the absence of the Claimant and her representative the Tribunal was
invited to, and did, consider its options under ET rule 27(5). They decided to
dismiss the claims rather than to adjourn the hearing. At paragraph 11 they
said:
“11. In the circumstances the Tribunal concluded
as follows: we know that as of 24 December and therefore on
11 January 2011 that the Claimant was aware that
28 January 2011 was listed for a final Hearing of the claim. We
presume she was aware of the postponement request. The Tribunal have tried to
contact the Claimant via her home telephone number this morning and there has
been no answer to that call. In the circumstances the Tribunal have concluded
the most likely scenario is that she has gone on holiday to Cuba in the full
knowledge that today’s date is set for a Hearing and not knowing whether the
postponement would be granted or not. We conclude that she was not entitled to
assume she can go on holiday.”
5.
In a separate Judgment that day the Tribunal ordered the Legal Bureau to
pay the Respondent’s costs in the sum of £52,386.35 by way of a wasted costs
order.
6.
Now acting alone, the Claimant made her review application by a letter
dated 6 March 2011. Relying on the grounds listed at ET rule
34(3)(b)(c)(d) and (e) she gave this account. On 25 August 2010 she
had emailed Mr Cuttle stating that she had booked her holiday in Cuba from 10 January until 2 February 2011. It appears from a transcript of
a telephone message left by Mr Cuttle (which the Claimant says she did not
receive while she was in Cuba, but upon her return to the UK on 2 February) that that email was “missed”. On 24 December she spoke to
Mr Cuttle on the phone, learning for the first time that the Tribunal hearing
was listed for 24 January. Her account of that conversation, in her
review application, was as follows:
“He said that he had just heard that the case was now in Newcastle on January 24th having been moved from Thornaby (or vice versa). I said
that it couldn’t be because I was in Cuba, as he knew from me back in August.
He seemed put out at first and I think he might have sworn under his breath,
but he quickly became professional again and his words to me were “Don’t worry,
it will be all right. I’ll get the date changed and be in touch”.
I asked him to e-mail me because I couldn’t hear him very well
in the shop, but he repeated loudly that he would get the date changed and for
me to have a good holiday and not to worry.”
7.
Mr Cuttle did apply for a postponement on that day. On
4 January he was asked by the Tribunal for further information about the
Claimant’s holiday booking. He did not provide that information until
12 January. By then the Claimant had left for Cuba. The postponement
application was then refused. He did not succeed in conveying this development
to the Claimant, whom he asked to return in a message left on her phone. He
then, unilaterally, withdrew from the case.
8.
In her review decision Reasons, the judge said at paragraph 6:
“6. Under Rule 34(3)(c); although the decision was made in the
absence of the claimant it was her decision not to be present. The claimant
relies on the fact she was of the opinion that her legal advisors were dealing
with the matter. In her correspondence she says that Mr Cuttle told her
not to worry he would get the date changed and that she should have a good
holiday. This is a clear indication that the Tribunal on 28th January
[24 January] were correct in their assumption that the timing of the
applications was critical and that the Legal Bureau deliberately failed to
provide the Tribunal with the relevant information until after the Claimant had
left for her holiday. Whilst the Tribunal understand that the claimant was
relying on her representatives it was still her decision to go on holiday and
not attend the Hearing, I am not satisfied this is a sufficient explanation for
her failure and (sic) postpone a 5 day hearing. I take account here of the
fact that on the day of the Hearing the Tribunal did not have before it an
application to postpone; that having been dealt with prior to the Hearing; nor
any explanation from the Claimant or her legal advisors as to her absence.”
9.
And at paragraph 8, in considering the interests of justice ground under
rule 34(3)(e) the judge observed that the Claimant’s representative “clearly
sought to mislead the Tribunal”.
The appeal
10.
In advancing the appeal Ms Ling submits that the facts of this
case, as advanced by the Claimant in her review application, which
Mr Collins accepts was the basis on which that application should
initially be considered by the judge alone, are exceptional. Her
representative misled the Tribunal (see Newcastle Upon Tyne City Council v Marsden [2010] ICR 743). He had assured her that he would
get the hearing date changed and she left for her holiday confident that that
would be the case. He then withdrew, leaving her without representation in her
absence and thus deprived her of the opportunity to renew her postponement
application through him, on 24 January. In these circumstances, it
cannot be said that the review application did not fall at least within rule
35(3)(e) and could not be said that there was no reasonable prospect of the
substantive Judgment being varied or revoked.
11.
Mr Collins accepts that the Employment Judge was required to accept
the Claimant’s account at face value, otherwise a review hearing before the
full Tribunal would be necessary. However, he contends that the judge’s review
decision fell within her wide discretion granted by rule 35(3).
12.
We prefer the submissions of Ms Ling. Although at paragraph 6 the
judge records the Claimant’s account of her telephone conversation with
Mr Cuttle on 24 December, she does not appear to recognise the difference
between that firm assurance by Mr Cuttle that the hearing would be
postponed and the supposition made by the full Tribunal at paragraph 11 of
their substantive decision, to which we have referred.
13.
It seems to us that had the judge had the advantage of considering the
guidance given more generally by Underhill P in Marsden,
not referred to in the Respondent’s letter of opposition to the review
application, nor in the judge’s Reasons, she would inevitably have concluded
that the review application required determination by the full Tribunal.
Disposal
14.
In these circumstances we shall allow this appeal. Ms Ling urges
us to exercise our powers under section 35(1) of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996
and effectively carry out the review and revoke the Tribunal’s substantive
Judgment. Mr Collins, on the other hand, submits that such a course would
be inappropriate. He ought to be given the opportunity to explore with the
Claimant in cross-examination at a full review hearing the precise
circumstances surrounding her understanding of the position during the relevant
period, although he does not challenge her account as a matter of credibility.
We agree with Mr Collins. However we think that the review hearing should
be conducted by a fresh Tribunal appointed by the Regional Employment Judge.
15.
Accordingly the appeal is allowed and the Claimant’s review application
is remitted for hearing by a fresh, full Employment Tribunal, other that which
sat on 24 January this year.