Appeal No. UKEAT/0110/11/DA
EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS
At
the Tribunal
On
27 July 2011
Before
HIS
HONOUR JUDGE RICHARDSON
MR M CLANCY
MR T MOTTURE
MR
D R GOSNOLD APPELLANT
BA
SECURITY LTD RESPONDENT
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
SUMMARY
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Bias, misconduct and procedural
irregularity
UNFAIR DISMISSAL – Dismissal/ambiguous resignation
The Employment Tribunal erred in law in determining that the
Claimant was not dismissed when (1) dismissal was admitted by the Respondent
and (2) no opportunity was afforded to the Claimant to make submissions on the
question before the Tribunal determined it adversely to him. Moreover on the
facts the Respondent had correctly admitted dismissal.
HIS HONOUR JUDGE RICHARDSON
1.
This is an appeal by Mr Dean Gosnold (“the Claimant”) against a judgment
of the Employment Tribunal sitting in Bedford (Employment Judge Moore
presiding) dated 9 December 2010. By its judgment the Tribunal held that the
Claimant was not dismissed from his employment with BA Security Limited (“the
Respondent”). All his claims depended on establishing that he was dismissed,
so they were all unsuccessful.
The background facts
2.
The Respondent carried on business in the installation and servicing of
security alarms. The Claimant was employed as a service engineer. He was one
of three employees in the service department. By 2009 he suffered from a heart
condition which left him short of breath, tired and weak. It was not in
dispute that he was a disabled person for the purposes of the Disability
Discrimination Act 1995. He was effectively incapable of physical work.
3.
On about 29 July the Respondent’s Mr Hussain wrote the Claimant the following
letter.
“Over the past year, as a result of the economic climate and
subsequent liquidation of BA Security Systems Ltd the company has suffered
financially. Therefore, it is with deepest regret that I have to make you
redundant as from 1st July 2009.
Regardless of the effort directed in relation to generating a
greater level of work there has been a significant decline in the number of
alarm systems we have been employed to install and therefore a decrease in the
need for a Service Engineer.
I have discussed alternative employment in the form of employing
you in the Sales Department at our meeting on 3rd July 2009; this job would potentially pay a similar salary, with the same hours and location
that you currently work at. However, you did express that you feel this is not
an appropriate job for your skill set.
As a company, we are not currently in a position to pay you the
maximum redundancy payment. However, I have enclosed a cheque for £1597.87
(one month’s salary) and if at any point the workload relating to the
maintenance of alarm systems increases we will not hesitate in contacting you.”
The Tribunal proceedings and hearing
4.
The Claimant brought proceedings claiming unfair dismissal, a redundancy
payment, disability discrimination and notice pay. He gave the date of
dismissal as 3 July which (it will be noted) was mentioned in Mr Hussain’s
letter as the date of a meeting between them. In the details of his complaint
he said that on 3 July Mr Hussain met him and told him that the Respondent had
no option but to make him redundant.
5.
In its response form, signed by Mr Hussain, the Respondent admitted both
the fact and date of dismissal. In a list of issues prepared for the hearing
by counsel for the Respondent there was no suggestion of any issue relating to
dismissal: the list of issues pre-supposed that there was a dismissal.
6.
The Claimant and Mr Hussain both made statements for the Tribunal
hearing. The Claimant’s statement adhered to the account given in the claim
form – saying that he was told on 3 July that the Respondent would have to let
him go. Mr Hussain’s statement was equivocal. It certainly did not deny that
the Claimant was redundant, but said that the Claimant had refused an offer of
alternative employment. He accepted that he wrote the letter dated 29 July,
saying that “it was the Claimant’s suggestion he should leave and he asked me
to prepare a letter for him to take to the DSS”. He said that he repeated the
offer of alternative employment and confirmed that if work picked up they could
consider re-employment.
7.
At the hearing both the Claimant and the Respondent gave evidence. The
Respondent did not apply to amend the response form. The Respondent presented
its case first, which is the normal course where dismissal is admitted but not
where dismissal has to be proved by a claimant. Both parties were represented
by counsel. It is common ground that neither made submissions to the Tribunal
on the issue of dismissal. Nor did the Tribunal invite such submissions.
The Tribunal’s reasons
8.
The hearing took place on 17 and 18 June 2010. Owing to the ill health of a Tribunal member the Tribunal did not meet to discuss its findings until 21
October. The reserved judgment was handed down on 9 December.
9.
The Tribunal found that the Claimant was not dismissed. It found that
there was a conflict of evidence as to what occurred both on 3 July and 29
July. It will suffice to set out paragraphs 11 and 12 of its reasons.
“11. Conclusions. It is made clear from the Claim form and the
Claimant’s closing submissions that the Claims of unfair dismissal and the
claim of disability discrimination run in parallel in that both are dependant
upon a finding of dismissal. Similarly the Claims for a redundancy payment and
notice pay are dependant upon their being a termination of the contract of
employment by the employer. The burden of proving dismissal falls on the
Claimant’s shoulders in respect of all of these claims. The Case presented by
the Claimant and pursued by him was that there was an unambiguous and express
dismissal on the 3rd July 2009. We have preferred the evidence of
the Respondent as to the exchange between the parties and the Claimant has not
discharged the burden upon him to prove dismissal on that date. Indeed the words
used by the Claimant that he might as well leave and that Mr Hussain would not
see him again might well be taken to be unambiguous words of resignation.
Ordinarily this is conclusive of the matter and there is no need for any
analysis of the surrounding circumstances (Southern v Franks Charlesley
& Co (1981) IRLR 278 CA). It is trite law that an exception to this
rule arises in circumstances where an employer knows or ought to know that the
words used should not be taken seriously. We have of course heard evidence
from the parties and have noted that compared to Mr Hussain the Claimant is the
more strident of the two and that contrary to his assertion that BA Security
was his life he had left and rejoined on occasions in the past. In any event
whether or not he had grounds for so doing Mr Hussain did not take him at his
word on that occasion or act to the Claimant’s detriment. He appears to have
continued to pay him. We have referred to the fact that the evidence of the
meeting on the 29th July is incomplete but it seems probable that by
this date (or if not the 30th July) that Mr Hussain achieved
certainty that the Claimant’s employment had ended.
12. We have considered at some length the evidential position
surrounding the meeting of the 29th July 2009 and indeed have even
reflected again during the course of our discussion whether to recall the
parties to address the matter further. On a balance of probabilities we have
concluded that the Claimant sought a letter from Mr Hussain in order to claim state
benefit and Mr Hussain succumbed to the request. We have noted that this
capable of explaining why the evidence on this episode is not clear of readily
forthcoming. Whereas the terms of the letter and the circumstances of its
creation have the potential to be of concern to the relevant authorities they
are not matters which we could properly explore with either participant without
giving the warning against self incrimination. It follows therefore that we
cannot be certain that a further effort would be productive. Essentially it is
for the parties to adduce such evidence as they feel they need and it is not
for us to enter the forum ourselves. Accordingly we have concluded that it
would not be appropriate for us to initiate a further exploration of the point
and we must make what we can of the evidence before us.”
The appeal
10.
On behalf of the Claimant Mr Allsop submits that the Tribunal
misdirected itself in considering the issue of dismissal at all, since it was
admitted in the response form and in the list of issues, and the Respondent
never resiled from that position. Moreover he submits that the judgment is
vitiated by procedural irregularity since the Claimant was afforded no
opportunity to make submissions on this issue. He further submits that the
Tribunal was perverse to find that there was no dismissal.
11.
On behalf of the Respondent Ms Iyer submits that that the judgment can
be upheld. She argues that it was a finding of fact open to the Tribunal; that
its judgment was careful and thoughtful, not meeting the Appeal Tribunal’s
strict test of perversity; that the witnesses gave evidence concerning the
issue; and that the issue of dismissal was not an entirely new issue, but a
prime issue in the proceedings. If there was a misdirection, she submits that
the decision was unarguably right and can be upheld for that reason.
Alternatively she submits that the matter should be returned to the same
Tribunal.
12.
There is in truth no answer to this appeal. Dismissal was not an issue
in the proceedings. Nothing could be clearer from the response form and the
list of issues which Ms Iyer helpfully prepared. Moreover the Tribunal ought
not to have raised and considered the issue of its own motion without giving
the Claimant an opportunity to address it. We suspect that the delay of 4
months between the hearing and the chambers discussion has much to do with the
Tribunal overlooking points which, we are sure, they would not normally
overlook.
13.
We would add that in our view the Respondent was quite right to admit
dismissal in the response form, and the Respondent’s counsel was equally right
to produce a list of issues which presupposed dismissal. In this case it was
not in dispute that the contract of employment had terminated. The question
was: who really terminated it? It is plain that Mr Hussain told the Claimant
that he was redundant: the only question was whether he would take alternative
employment doing a quite different job which he did not wish to undertake.
Even the Claimant bowed to the inevitable and accepted that he was to be made
redundant, it does not follow that he was really the person terminating the
contract of employment. It does not follow that because he wanted Mr Hussain
to write a letter so that he could claim benefits he thereby in some way
invited the termination of his employment. The practical reality is that it
was Mr Hussain who terminated the contract of employment.
14.
It follows that the appeal will be allowed and we will substitute a
finding that the Claimant was dismissed. The Tribunal did not make findings as
to the real issues between the parties, and it would be unsatisfactory to
require it to do so now. The matter will be remitted to be heard by a freshly
constituted Tribunal.