United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	THE APPELLANT IN PERSON


 


JUDGE WAKEFIELD

1. This is the Preliminary Hearing of an appeal by Mr Peter Metanie against the decision of an Employment Tribunal sitting at Brighton and given with extended reasons on 24 March 2003. By that decision, as relevant to this appeal, all outstanding claims made by the Applicant in two cases which had been consolidated were struck out under the provisions of Regulation 15(2)(d)-(e) of the Employment Tribunal (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2001.
2. The full history of the applications to strike out, were made by the First Respondent but in which the Second Respondent joined, is set out in considerable detail by the Employment Tribunal in paragraphs 3-25 of the extended reasons for the decision. It is not suggested in this appeal that this factual background has been inaccurately stated.
3. The Employment Tribunal, in the light of that factual history, then turned to consider their powers under Regulation 15 to strike out Originating Applications where such an Application was scandalous, misconceived or vexatious; where the conduct of a party had been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious or where there had been a want of prosecution.
4. By way of conclusion, the decision then deals first with delay and states at paragraph 33 of the decision the following:

"The Tribunal is satisfied on the evidence that the Applicant's conduct amounts to an inordinate and inexcusable delay and accepts the submissions made by the Respondent that the possibility of a fair hearing is substantially at risk."

Paragraph 35 of the decision deals with the question whether the conduct of the Applicant had been vexatious. The Tribunal said as regards that aspect:

"The Tribunal is satisfied that the manner in which the Applicant has conducted his case, even making allowance for the fact that he is a litigant in person and does not speak English as his first language is wholly unacceptable. The original Order with regard to further and better particulars was on 28 November 2000 and in spite of constant efforts on the part of the Tribunal adequate particulars have never been delivered. The Applicant seeks to use every procedural device available to him to increase the costs to the Respondents; these devices have been cross-applications of his own as well as applications to strike out the appearances, and two applications to the Employment Appeal Tribunal which have both been rejected, the latter with a substantial Order for costs. The Tribunal is satisfied that the Applicant's conduct is vexatious in this context."

5. Turning to Rule 15(2)(d) and as to the conduct of the Applicant, the Tribunal notes and concludes as regards the question of scandalous conduct the following in its paragraph 34:

"It has to be noticed that throughout these proceedings, allegations have been made against the integrity of most of the Chairmen who have been involved, as well as the advocates for the Respondents. The accusations have included political and financial corruption, as well as racial bias. One must accept that those who undertake advocacy, as well as those who sit in judgment must expect to have broad backs and to suffer some criticism, justified or unjustified from disappointed litigants, but in this case the attack has been unremitting and unjustified. It is recorded in the correspondence and in the notices of appeal. There are allegations of forgery against the Respondents, which although there are findings of fact to the contrary, have been repeated. In addressing the Tribunal, Mr Metanie denied saying that he had called the present Chairman a racist, but went on to say that although he had not said that, it was his perception that he was a racist. He went on to say that a solicitor's job is to make money but they should not use the power they have to promote judges and public servants. The Tribunal is satisfied that, within the terms set out at paragraph 27 of the judgment of Ward L.J. in Bennett v The London of Southwark, the Applicant's conduct amounts to scandalous."

6. On the question of whether the conduct of the proceedings had been unreasonable within the meaning of Rule 15(2)(d) the Tribunal said in its paragraph 36:

"Without rehearsing all of the above information, one should revert to the Applicant's letter to the Respondents dated 18 April 2001 where he put his claim at £120 million plus costs of £46,000 and to the request for £8,000.00, being the cost of supplying copy tapes. The whole tenor of the Applicant's conduct is, the Tribunal finds, wholly unreasonable."

7. Finally, in its paragraph 37, the Applicant's right to a fair trial under Article 6 is set out. The Employment Tribunal referred to the case of Bennett v The London Borough of Southwark again in this context and continued:

"If the Applicant's conduct is scandalous, vexatious or unreasonable and if there has been disproportionate delay, is striking out a proportionate response? The Tribunal has already indicated above its view that it is proportionate in the case of delay. The provisions of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights would appear to be met by the consideration of the proportionality of such a decision."

8. The Tribunal's overall conclusion in the light of those findings was that the extant Applications should be struck out. By his Notice of Appeal the Appellant, who has throughout acted in person, claims that the Employment Tribunal erred in law in the following ways:

"1. The Tribunal refused the Applicant his legal right to contest proceedings.

2. The Tribunal refused the Applicant a hearing on the merits of a case in breach of Article 6 of the European Convention for Human Rights that provides that in pursuance of his legal rights everyone is entitle to a fair hearing. No hearing to take place and no reasons given why.

3. There was no evidence that the Applicant had caused scandal(s), acted unreasonable or was vexatious (acted without legal right). At no time any scandal was caused by the Applicant in the proceedings and those scandalized persons lodged any complaints.

4. The possibility that the Tribunal's members were incompetent to deal with such applications.

5. The Tribunal was biased towards the legal business trade because is part of it and it benefits from extensive legal privileges.

6. The Chairman refused to answer and debarred the Applicant from questioning Tribunal members in relation to their interests in the outcome of the case. The Chairman said 'I am putting the questions here and not you!' The Chairman believes because of his salary and huge other benefits and privileges that he is some sort of GOD.

7. The Tribunal acted in express breach of case-law reports it had in front of it including Carla Bennet v The London Borough of Southwark interpreting the case as giving a political system (English legal system) a right to be self proclaimed victim, witness, judge and jury in its own cause at the same in the same case. Mr Davey, the chairman, is crying his tears on the shoulders of Mr Brook and Mr Jones, advocates for respondents. He does not deny that his wages and promotion it depends almost exclusively on references lodged with the Lord Chancellor by members of the Bar council (like Mr Brook) or Law Society (like Mr Jones), both advocates for respondents."

Finally the Notice of Appeal says the Tribunal "allowed a party, Pertemps to take part in proceedings although it never contested the proceedings and it failed to file an appearance notice IT3 in breach of Employment Tribunal rules."

9. As to grounds 5 and 6 of that Notice of Appeal and the allegations of bias, the Appellant has filed an Affidavit in which he sets out the bases of that claim. He says:

"At the hearing that took place in Brighton the Appellant questioned the Chairman Mr Davey in respect of his private interests in the businesses of other parties and their advocates.

Mr Davey replied that he would have declared his interests if he had any.

The Appellant said that may have an interest in both parties, and their advocates, businesses because he, members of his family, members of his profession or his auditors/superiors, may have or would receive money or services for which he may otherwise have to pay for, from them.

He did not address Appellant's allegations and refused to say where are his interests publicly recorded.

He debarred the Appellant from questioning the same issues with the two other members of the Tribunal and questioning their competence saying: 'I put the questions here!'

When determining the issues (the lodging of an proper Skeleton Argument) he grossly influenced their decision, due to his private interests in other parties (and their advocated) businesses."

10. The Appellant has told us today in the course of his oral argument that he considered that the hearing at Brighton was a set up: that he had no opportunity to put his case and that he did not have the opportunity properly to consider the skeleton argument and authorities put forward on behalf of the Respondents. Those are not specifically grounds of appeal but we deal with them and we are not satisfied that he has made out any such case. He was given due notice of the nature of the hearing, being an application to strike out his claims. He had the opportunity to put in a skeleton argument in advance and did not do so. He was given time to consider the skeleton argument of the Respondents and their authorities and did not ask for any further time.
11. For the purposes of this appeal the Appellant was required to produce the bundle for the Tribunal. He was required to produce a skeleton argument. He was sent a letter dated 12 September 2003 in which this Tribunal told him that in default of his producing bundles they had done so. He was asked to produce copies of the Originating Applications and Notices of Appearance which this Tribunal did not have. He failed to produce a skeleton argument. He failed until this morning to produce copies of the Originating Applications but he has in the course of his argument produced one copy of each of his Originating Applications. Those appear to be applications dated 30 August 2000 and 7 December 2000 in the first of which there were complaints of breach of contract and race discrimination and in the second of which there were complaints of unfair dismissal, race discrimination and wrongful dismissal.
12. The Employment Tribunal decision with which we are today concerned was dealing with all outstanding claims under both those applications. The first point made by the Appellant in argument before us today is that the Second Respondent should not have been permitted to join in the strike out application since no Notices of Appearance had been served in respect of either of his Applications. This appears to be factually incorrect. The extended reasons at paragraph 3 refer to the fact that Appearances have been lodged to the first Application but not to the second because the Respondents contend that they have been seeking to clarify the basis of the Applicant's claim with no success and we note from paragraph 33 of the reasons that:

"The further and better particulars which were originally the subject of the Direction Orders have still never been delivered and, therefore, the Respondents have not been able to lodge Appearances, obtain statements and prepare their case."

13. We are therefore satisfied that it was quite right for this Employment Tribunal to permit the Second Respondent to join in these applications to strike out. We are entirely satisfied having regard to each of the matters raised in the Notice of Appeal that there is no arguable case to be made in support. The Employment Tribunal in the passages to which I have already referred correctly identified the issues which arose on the application to strike out. They correctly stated the relevant law and proper matters to be taken into account in the exercise of their discretion. They then exercised the discretion on more than sufficient grounds. This appeal cannot succeed and it is dismissed.