United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	The Appellant in person


 


HIS HONOUR JUDGE PROPHET

1. This is a preliminary hearing of an appeal by Mrs McDonald in respect of a Decision by an Employment Tribunal sitting at London Central on 6 and 7 June 2002, under the Chairmanship of Mr Purse by which Mrs McDonald's complaint that she was unfairly dismissed by the Respondent Trust, and also some other claims, failed. That judgment was promulgated on 4 July 2002. Mrs McDonald was an Applicant in person at the Employment Tribunal and she appears also in person before this Appeal Tribunal today.
2. The grounds upon which Mrs McDonald submitted a Notice of Appeal are set out under two main headings, but subsequently, there has been some attempt by Mrs McDonald to refine those grounds and they can now be stated under three headings.
3. First, that there were alleged defects by the Tribunal in following the Rules of Procedure in that she was not thereby allowed to present her case properly, with the consequence that she did not receive a fair hearing. She has expanded on this matter in her Skeleton Argument. However, having heard Mrs McDonald this morning, we are all satisfied that that complaint is not well founded. Although she was understandably in some difficulty, not being represented before the Employment Tribunal, the Employment Tribunal did give her a fair hearing.
4. Their conclusion that she resigned from her employment, and that that resignation did not amount to a constructive dismissal under the law, cannot be disturbed. We can understand, however, and have some sympathy with her in that as a professional person she wanted to provide her services in the best possible way, and what had happened to her was not enabling her to do that.
5. Her second ground of appeal is that her entitlement to a statutory redundancy payment was overturned by the Tribunal's Decision. That, however, is simply not correct. The Tribunal was concerned only with constructive dismissal on the basis of her own allegations that she had resigned. The Tribunal's conclusion on that matter was not directed at any way to any obligation which the employers may have felt they had in respect of a redundancy payment, which was clearly based upon the proposition that they were not wishing to renew her fixed term contract of employment after the end of October 2001.
6. The third ground of appeal is in respect of her holiday entitlement. It is accepted that there was no provision in her contract of employment for annual holidays. What she says, however, is that she ought to have received some entitlement under the Working Time Regulations notwithstanding that she worked outside Great Britain. We have had a look at that matter, and it appears to us that there is an arguable point which she has raised in this respect.
7. The Working Time Regulations apply to Great Britain only, and the question arises as to whether that is contrary to Council Directive 93/104/EC which provides in the preamble to that Directive that every worker in the European Community shall have a right to annual paid leave. There appears, on our brief look at the matter that there is no provision for derogation in respect of that entitlement, and the question must arise as to whether the Working Time Regulations correctly apply the requirements of the Council Directive. That matter, we feel, should proceed to a full Tribunal on the basis that there is an arguable point of law arising on that matter.
8. That is sufficient to allow the case to proceed to a full hearing, but we must emphasise that we find nothing on the first two points, which have been raised by Mrs McDonald, which would justify the matter going forward to a full hearing. The full hearing, therefore, is limited solely to the issue of the holiday entitlement. Whether that matter, bearing in mind the likely consequence of how much money would be involved, would justify the parties going to the expense of attending at a full Tribunal, or whether it could be a matter sorted out by mediation, we leave to the respective parties.
9. A transcript of this judgment will be sent to both sides. That full hearing, should it take place, will be a Category C matter, half a day, with Skeleton Arguments to be produced within fourteen days prior to the date of the hearing.