United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	Mr Masayuki Negishi Free Representation Unit Peer House 4th Floor 8-14 Verulam Street London WC1X 8LZ
For the Respondent	No appearance or representation by or on behalf of the Respondent


 


JUDGE PETER CLARK

1. This is an appeal against a decision of Mr G Hollow, sitting alone at the Reading Employment Tribunal on 19 January 2001, in relation to the Applicant, Mr Young's, complaint of breach of contract on the part of his former employer, Reading Borough Council. The dispute related to the terms of a reference which was provided by the Council to a potential future employer of Mr Young.
2. Yesterday, the parties reached agreement for the disposal of this appeal. The draft Order placed before us is in the following terms:

"UPON THE APPLICATION of the Appellant and the Respondent by letter dated 9^th July 2002

AND UPON the Respondent conceding liability

AND BY CONSENT

AND UPON consideration of the aforesaid application

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

(a) That the appeal be allowed.

(b) That the Respondent do pay to the Appellant the sum of £5 in damages in full and final settlement of any and all claims arising out of the termination of his employment with the Respondent, such payment to be made within 24 days from the date of this order.

(c) No order as to costs."

3. In accordance with paragraph 13 of our Practice Direction, because the draft order involved an appeal against a decision of the Employment Tribunal being allowed by consent, the matter has come before a full division today to determine whether there is a good reason for making the order which the parties agree should be made.
4. Mr Negishi appears on behalf of the Appellant today and has explained to us that even if the appeal succeeded, and the matter was remitted to an Employment Tribunal for determination of compensation arising out of the breach of contract alleged, the damages would be nominal, and there would be a costs risk to his client.
5. On this basis it seems to us eminently sensible to endorse the form of consent order to which we have referred. This does not reflect on the Chairman's Decision so much as the practicalities of the future conduct of this litigation.
6. In these circumstances, we shall make the order as asked.