United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR K FARROW (Friend/Representative)
For the Respondent	MR M BISHOP (of Counsel) The Treasury Solicitor Queen Anne Chambers 28 The Broadway London SW1H 9JS


 


HIS HONOUR JUDGE D M LEVY QC

1. The Appellant in this appeal began unpaid work in the Liverpool Prison within the Roman Catholic Chaplaincy Department in 1996. In the spring of 1997, she became a lay minister in the Chaplaincy Team and received thereafter some payment for her work. By an application dated 6 October 1997, she complained that she had been the subject of sex discrimination and victimisation equally. The complaints came before a Tribunal sitting in Liverpool on 6 January 2000. The decision was promulgated on 22 February 2000. The unanimous decision of the Tribunal was that the Respondent unlawfully discriminated against the Applicant on the grounds of her sex and the matter would be re-listed for consideration of remedy.
2. However, the Tribunal's holding was not satisfactory to the Appellant. By a Notice of Appeal, received on 4 April 2000, she made complaints about the findings below. There was a Preliminary Hearing of her appeal before a Tribunal headed by Mr Commissioner Howell QC on 23 October 2000. The Appellant had the benefit of Mr Thomas Linden of Counsel appearing for her. On that occasion the Tribunal was not persuaded by certain of the grounds of appeal which were in the Notice of Appeal but permitted two grounds of appeal to come to a Full Hearing. Mr Linden helpfully prepared an Amended Notice of Appeal which was received on 8 November 2000 which identified those grounds, namely whether the suspension of the Appellant on 8 August 1997 was a discriminatory act within the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. On this issue the Tribunal had held against the Appellant, and secondly, whether the reason for her dismissal might have been, not as found by the Tribunal, but unconsciously taken on the grounds of her sex and/or by reason of the fact that she had made complaints of sex discrimination.
3. It does not appear from the Extended Reasons who appeared for the parties below. We are told by the representatives who appear on this appeal today that they appeared below.
4. The first of the two grounds of appeal which were allowed to go forward was the suspension of the Appellant. Mr Bishop, counsel for the Respondent, has taken us carefully through the reasons and showed that there were findings of fact made as to the reasons for suspension. The issue was, had there been personal abuse of the Appellant by another person working at the prison? The Tribunal, finding that there had been discrimination on another ground, did not accept the Appellant's evidence the she had been abused by another. Indeed, they rejected that evidence.
5. With those findings of fact drawn to our attention, notwithstanding the eloquence which Mr Linden had used in the Ex Parte hearing, we are satisfied that the decision of the Tribunal on suspension was right. They were entitled, having heard the evidence, to come to the conclusion that there was no sexual discrimination involved in it. In that regard Mr Bishop has taken us to the decision of Meek v City of Birmingham District Council, and taken us to the well known passage in Bingham LJ's judgment giving the opinion, which the Master of the Rolls and Ralph Gibson LJ agreed:

"It has on a number of occasions been made plain that the decision of an Industrial Tribunal is not required to be an elaborate formalistic product of refined legal draftsmanship, but it must contain an outline of the story which has given rise to the complaint and a summary of the Tribunal's basic factual conclusions and a statement of the reasons which have led them to reach the conclusion which they do on those basic facts. The parties are entitled to be told why they have won or lost. There should be sufficient account of the facts and of the reasoning to enable the EAT or, on further appeal, this court to see whether any question of law arises; and it is highly desirable that the decision of an Industrial Tribunal should give guidance both to employers and trade unions as to practices which should or should not be adopted."

It seems to us on the first point of appeal that there are clear and good reasons given by the Tribunal on the position as to the Appellant's suspension.

6. The second ground arises from a paragraph in the Extended Reasons where, having rejected the Appellant's suggestion that the reason for termination was either her sex or that she had complained about discrimination, the Tribunal said this in paragraphs 37 and 38:

"We believe that there was another reason for Mr Abbott's action. It was quite clear Father Burns and Miss Chilton could not work satisfactorily together. One of them would have to go. Miss Chilton was a part-time worker and Father Burns was the full-time Chaplain. Regardless of the sex of either, there was only one obvious choice.

In other words, whilst we do not accept that the financial situation dictated the removal of Miss Chilton nor do we infer that the reason was related to her sex. It is not necessary for us to declare what the reason actually was but we think the overwhelming likelihood was simple incompatibility."

The finding of incompatibility was apparently a conclusion made by the Tribunal without hearing submissions from those representing the parties. The point taken on the Notice of Appeal was that within the four corners of the decision itself there is no analysis as to whether there could have been unintentional discrimination. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the decision set out the relevant passages of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 - Section 1 in paragraph 5 and Section 4 in paragraph 6. Although there is no reference to the Nagarajan v London Regional Transport [1999] IRLR 572 case, we do not think that that means that the decision is wrong.

7. In our judgment, looking at the four corners of the decision, the Tribunal had well in mind the provisions of the Act. Despite Mr Farrow's helpful and well presented submissions attempting to persuade us otherwise, we are not satisfied that they in any way misinterpreted the Act. In the circumstances the two grounds which were allowed to come forward to appeal, fail. We therefore dismiss this appeal. We thank both representatives for their assistance.