United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	NO APPEARANCE OR REPRESENTATION BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT


 


JUDGE PETER CLARK

1. Scope, formerly the Spastics Society, is a charity part of whose function is placing disabled people in work. Scope employed the Appellant, Karen Wright, from 1988 until her dismissal in May 1999. She was placed with a 'host employer' Bri-Tone, formerly Blue Bay Ltd, a small firm manufacturing cosmetics on Merseyside. She worked as a packer on the production line. She was sponsored by Scope having been found to be educationally sub- normal. She was 21 years old when she started work at Blue Bay.
2. From and since about 1994 her eyesight has deteriorated significantly. She has undergone medical treatment, including the removal of cataracts from both eyes. She also suffered from a detached retina in early 1999.
3. On 7 May 1999 the directors of Bri-Tone met with Scope's employment officer, Julie Harrison. They felt unable to continue to find work for the Appellant due to her eye problems, which meant that she could not maintain an acceptable level of production, was responsible for breakages, needed disproportionate supervision and was a safety risk to herself and other employees. Mrs Harrison then spoke with the Appellant.
4. Mrs Harrison made enquiries, including the possibility of alternative work elsewhere and returned to the factory on 17 May 1999. As a result of further conversation with the directors and the Appellant the Appellant was dismissed by Scope with pay in lieu of notice, as she preferred to.working out her notice.
5. On 20 July 1999 she presented claims of disability discrimination and unfair dismissal to the Liverpool Employment Tribunal. Those complaints were heard by an Employment Tribunal chaired by Mr D Reed on 11 February 2000. By a decision with extended reasons dated 22 February 2000 both complaints were dismissed. Against that decision the Appellant now appeals.
6. The Appellant does not appear and is not represented before us today. However, she has consulted solicitors, Tickle Hall Cross who have submitted detailed written submissions on her behalf. We have also been provided with a copy of a witness statement of Mrs Harrison which was before the Employment Tribunal.
7. The appeal is put on the basis of perversity. It is said that as to the claim of unfair dismissal the Employment Tribunal erred in 2 respects; first lack of consultation with the Appellant by Scope before her dismissal; secondly, in failing to operate a fair dismissal procedure or to give the Appellant the opportunity to appeal against the dismissal decision. As to the claim of disability discrimination it is submitted that the Employment Tribunal reached a perverse conclusion in finding that the Respondents had carried out such adjustments as were reasonable to justify their discrimination against her on the grounds of her disability.
8. Perversity is not a general catch-all, permitting Appellants effectively to challenge an Employment Tribunal's findings of fact. What is required is for the Appellant to show that no reasonable Employment Tribunal, properly directing themselves as to the law could reach the conclusions reached by this Employment Tribunal.
9. Our powers are limited to correcting errors of law. We can only interfere with an Employment Tribunal decision which is "irrational", "offends reasons", is "plainly wrong" is "an impermissible option" or any of the other epithets collected by Mummery J in Stewart v Cleveland Guest (Eng) Ltd (1994) IRLR 440, 443.
10. We have carefully considered the findings of the Employment Tribunal based, we think, on their acceptance of the evidence of Mrs Harrison. Having done so we conclude:

(1) that the Employment Tribunal was entitled to find that, although not perfect, there was adequate consultation with the Appellant by Mrs Harrison before dismissal

(2) that under the procedure followed by Mrs Harrison the Appellant was made aware that her employment was in jeopardy and she was given a proper opportunity to make representations. Indeed, at the second meeting held on 17 May 1999 the Appellant conceded that her eyesight was not good enough to allow her to perform her job properly. That matter was in dispute below, but the Employment Tribunal resolved that factual issue in favour of the Respondent (reasons, paragraph 8). The appeal point, now raised by the Appellant's solicitors as something of an afterthought, does not appear to have been taken below.

(3) there was ample evidence before the Employment Tribunal from Mrs Harison showing the adjustments which had been made over a period of years by Bri-Tone to accommodate the Appellant's deteriorating eyesight. It was open to the Employment Tribunal to conclude that it was not reasonable to expect any further adjustments to be made and therefore to find that the discrimination was justified.

11. In these circumstances we are not persuaded, at this Preliminary Hearing stage, that the Appeal raises any arguable point of law. Consequently, it must be dismissed.