United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	No appearance or representation by or on behalf of the Appellant


 


MR RECORDER UNDERHILLQC

1. The Appellant, Mr Akram, appeals against a decision of an Employment Appeal Tribunal in Leeds on 23 May 2000 dismissing all his then outstanding claims, which at that point constituted claims for unfair dismissal, racial discrimination and claims under Sections 100(1)(c)(ii) and 152(1)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 .
2. Mr Akram has written to the Tribunal by faxed letter dated 23 January 2001 asking to be excused from attending this morning, on various grounds. He does not ask for an adjournment, but he asks the Tribunal to treat his letter as written submissions, which we are content to do.
3. We should also record that Mr Akram has written letters to the Registrar dated 26 August 2000, 14 November 2000 and 8 December 2000, raising various matters which he was told that he should pursue, if he wished, at this hearing.
4. Both the Notice of Appeal and the letter of 23 January 2001 contain a number of extraneous matters, but we have done our best to identify the specific grounds of appeal which he wishes to raise. The Notice of Appeal is in very general terms, but we must assume that the specific points which he wishes to make are contained in the letter of 23 January 2001.
5. We will accordingly go through this letter briefly, erring on the side of comprehensiveness, so that Mr Akram can be satisfied that all his points have been considered as far as possible. The first point which he raises, which is also raised in one of his letters to the Registrar, is at page 2 of the letter of 23 January, where he complains that the Employment Tribunal has:

"denied me the minutes of the hearing, even while requested".

This is apparently a reference to a request for Chairman's Notes made directly to the Employment Tribunal. We have no details of this request, but such notes would, of course, only be supplied by order of this Tribunal on cause shown. As will appear, we can see no grounds for making such an Order ourselves.

6. Secondly, on the same page, he complains:

"At the directions hearing, in Leeds, my statutory rights were struck out thereby making all following procedures void".

This is a reference to a directions hearing which took place on 25 January 2000, before the Regional Chairman. There were before the Tribunal, apparently, two forms of IT1 in similar terms. The first identified the Applicant's complaints as:

"Equal pay, discrimination, unfair dismissal, union member - closed shop, harassment, kidnap, equal opportunity, race relations, health and safety activities, statutory rights not given - not working extra hours."

And the second form referred to:

"Civil rights, unfair dismissal, discrimination, health and safety, equal pay, working hours, gross misconduct, kidnap, harassment and bullying, others"

7. The Regional Chairman struck out most of those heads, including the heads "statutory rights" to which Mr Akram now refers. It is, of course, too late to appeal against that Order; but in any event it was plainly right, since the heading "statutory rights" was too vague to indicate any particular claim, and those particular claims which the Applicant did identify were allowed to proceed.
8. Thirdly, on the same page of the letter of 23 January, he refers to what he alleges was "unfair conduct" at the directions hearing in that he was not given access to a copy of the rules which were being considered by the Chairman and the Respondent's representative. It is again too late for any complaint to be raised about that.
9. Fourthly, still on the second page of the letter of 23 January, Mr Akram complains that at the hearing proper, that is to say the substantive hearing:

"No signed witness statements were given to me, as had been promised by the solicitors. Also the three important witnesses were not present. Moreover, the signature of the production managers wife was not verified."

And he goes on to explain why he regarded it as important that the documents be signed.

10. The Tribunal, in paragraphs 2 - 8 of its Reasons explains very clearly the course of events at the hearing and, in particular, that the Respondent's witness statements were admitted as evidence without the witnesses having to be called because Mr Akram had made it clear that he did not wish to cross-examine them. We are not in a position to say whether the witness statements were signed, but there is no rule that they need to be, and if the Appellant had wished to challenge the authenticity of any of them, he could have done so at the hearing.
11. Fifthly, on the third page of the letter, he challenges the findings of fact by the Tribunal. There is no reason given for believing that the findings made were based on any error of law.
12. Sixthly, on the fourth page of the letter, he states that he is now suffering from hearing loss and says that this is the result of breach of statutory duty by the company. No such claim was raised in the Tribunal, even if it would have fallen within any aspect of the Tribunal's jurisdiction, and it cannot now be raised in this Tribunal.
13. Seventhly, at the top of the fifth page of the letter, he asks that his trade union be joined in proceedings because he wishes to pursue a claim against them that they have not looked after his interests properly, in accordance with their rules. Such an action was not within the jurisdiction of the Employment Tribunal, and there is no basis on which this Tribunal could join the trade union in these proceedings.
14. The remainder of the letter seeks to challenge other findings of fact made by the Tribunal, but there is no ground shown for treating those as in any way wrong in law. The various letters which the Appellant wrote to the Tribunal mostly raised points with which we have already dealt; but so that there is no doubt about the matter, we will briefly deal with them.
15. In his letter of 26 August 2000 he asked this Tribunal to grant him

" interim relief, over the health and safety matter"

It does not appear to us that any application for interim relief was ever made to the Employment Tribunal, but in any event, there is no ground shown why any such Order should be made by this Tribunal.

16. On the second page of the same letter, he complains that the Employment Tribunal did not allow him to question the Managing Director of the Respondent company by fax. He complains that an adjournment could have been ordered, if the Managing Director was not available, though it is unclear whether he says that he asked for one. If an application either to question the Managing Director by fax or for an adjournment was indeed made - as to which we are unclear - it was, in any view, clearly within the Tribunal's discretion to refuse any such Order.
17. In his letter of 14 November 2000, he asks whether:

"I can apply again on a new IT1, that the data protection act, the working time act and the Health and Safety Act was not being complied with."

None of those matters was raised before the Employment Tribunal, and it must be a matter for the Appellant if he wishes to start any fresh proceedings.

18. That, we believe, deals, perhaps in unnecessary length, with all the points which the Appellant put before us in any of his correspondence. The only other point which we would wish to make is that the Employment Tribunal's reasons were conspicuously careful, full and fair. We accordingly dismiss this appeal.