United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MS L BROOKES (of Counsel) Appearing under the Employment Law Appeal Advice Scheme


 


JUDGE COLLINS CBE

1. We are grateful to Ms Brookes of ELAAS who has represented the Appellant today. This is the preliminary hearing of an appeal against the decision of an Employment Tribunal sitting at Stratford, whose extended reasons were promulgated on 21 June 2000.
2. The Appellant had claimed in her Originating Application that she had been constructively dismissed on 26 November 1999. On that day, she wrote a letter resigning her position as a nurse with the Respondents, and the reason she gave in her Originating Application for resignation was that she had had a meeting on 25 November which was:

"nothing more than a continuance of the harassment and verbal abuse by the General Manager who shouted at me. I don't believe that I should have been subjected to this kind of intimidation."

3. The Tribunal held that the Appellant had not been constructively dismissed. They found that there was no breach of contract which arose from the Respondents' attempt to alter the rota under which the Appellant worked. They thought that it would have been a breach of contract if they had arbitrarily altered the dates without consultation, but there clearly was consultation. Although letters dated 13 September and 22 September 1999 were not before the Tribunal, (and the fact that they were not before the Tribunal is one of the grounds of appeal) we have looked at them. Those letters show that there was discussion about the question of the change of rota, and in any event, they were at least two months before the date of alleged dismissal and do not, in our judgment, appear to have contributed directly towards it.
4. As an additional ground, the Tribunal held that although the meeting on 25 November may have been handled more sensitively by Mr Stagg, the General Manager, his conduct was not unreasonable, inappropriate, or unprofessional, and we do not think it amounts any where near to a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence.
5. It is true that the Tribunal had before them the statement of Mrs Hinds which was critical of the conduct of the Appellant at the meeting on 25 November. In the absence of agreement from the Appellant, that statement should not have been before the Tribunal, unless Mrs Hinds was present for cross-examination. However, first, the Tribunal do not indicate in their reasons that they placed any weight on the evidence of Mrs Hinds, and secondly, the question of whether or not there was a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence in the way that Mr Stagg handled the meeting on 25 November, is a matter which concentrates on his behaviour, not on the question of whether the behaviour of the Appellant could be criticised. The Tribunal's findings about his behaviour were findings of fact, behind which it is not possible for us to go.
6. This Tribunal is restricted to hearing appeals on points of law; we discern no point of law in the grounds which have been pleaded or argued before us, and accordingly, we are bound to dismiss this appeal.