United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR IAN ANDERSON (Representative)
For the Respondents	NO APPEARANCE BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS


 


JUDGE PETER CLARK:

1. The appellant, Miss Scott presented an Originating Application to the London (South) Employment Tribunal on 12th September 2000. She described herself as a black female of Caribbean origin who had worked for the respondent, Nacro, for some 15 years and remains employed by that organisation.
2. In that Originating Application the appellant set out complaints of race, sex and disability discrimination and a number of other matters. I shall refer to that as the 'first complaint'.
3. There is in the bundle before me a Notice of Appearance dated 9th October 2000. As to when that document was lodged with the Employment Tribunal., in the absence of any representation before me today from the respondent, I am unable to say with any certainty.
4. What is clear is that on 30th October 2000 the tribunal notified the parties that this case would be heard substantively on one day, 31st January 2001.
5. On 9th November 2000 a letter was sent to the parties fixing an interlocutory directions hearing for 2nd January 2001.
6. On 28th November 2000 the respondent's solicitors wrote to the tribunal pointing out that they had received a Notice of Hearing for the substantive disposal of the case on 31st January 2001 and they enquired whether that was an oversight bearing in mind that an interlocutory hearing was listed for Tuesday, 2nd January 2001 and that at that hearing one of the matters to be considered by the Chairman was how long the case was likely to last and to give directions as to the date and length of the hearing. They conclude by reserving their position as to an application for a postponement of the substantive hearing fixed for 31st January if no error had been made.
7. On 6th December 2000 a Chairman, Mr Booth, directed that the hearing fixed for 31st January 2001 be vacated without, I am told by Mr Anderson, who appears on behalf of the appellant before me today, any prior reference to the appellant or Mr Anderson her named representative.
8. On 18th December 2000 the appellant lodged a second Originating Application. The directions hearing duly took place before another Chairman, Mr R Peters on 2nd January 2001. I am told by Mr Anderson that it lasted for 4½ hours. Both parties were represented on that occasion.
9. As a result of that hearing Mr Peters issued a minute of the directions which he gave on that occasion, dated 9th January 2001. I see from that minute, which is attached to the respondent's answer to this appeal, that the various particulars of complaint made by the appellant in her two Originating Applications were scheduled. The first schedule contains 11 complaints of direct unlawful sex discrimination; secondly, there are 13 complaints of victimisation under the Sex Discrimination Act; further, there are three complaints of direct race discrimination and complaints of unlawful disability discrimination. Finally, there is a complaint of action short of dismissal for health and safety reasons contrary to s. 44 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 and a complaint that the respondent, as a public authority, has breached s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
10. I pause to say that plainly those various matters, in respect of which I am told the appellant will be calling four witnesses, will if the respondent maintains its resistance to the claims, not be completed within one day at a substantive hearing.
11. In addition, the Chairman directed that the two Originating Applications be combined and heard together and he gave directions for medical evidence in connection with the disability discrimination complaint. The appellant is to provide a medical report, on which she intends to rely, to the respondent not later than 2nd March 2001 and within 21 days of receipt of such report the respondent is to advise the appellant and the tribunal whether or not there will be an issue as to whether she is a disabled person within the meaning of s.1 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. The proceedings are to be held in abeyance pending the appellant submitting to a medical examination on behalf of the respondent if that is requested. There are also directions dealing with the filing of an amended Notice of Appearance.
12. Again, I pause to observe that by the directions hearing on 2nd January the respondent had been treated as having entered a Notice of Appearance.
13. The Chairman also gave directions that once the various orders had been complied with the parties were to liase in order to determine whether further directions were necessary for the disposal of the case, in particular whether any preliminary issue needed to be determined and the time estimate for the length of any hearing.
14. On 17th January 2001 the appellant entered a Notice of Appeal. The appeal is against the decision of the Mr Booth to vacate the hearing date fixed for 31st January back on 6th December 2000.
15. In support of the appeal Mr Anderson submits that Mr Booth fell into error by not first seeking the views of the appellant or her representative before ordering that the date for the substantive hearing be vacated.
16. As to that, it seems clear to me, particularly with the advantage of hindsight following the directions hearing before Mr Peters, that there is no prospect of this matter being completed within one day.
17. Mr Anderson has submitted that the hearing should go ahead on 31st January on the assumption that the appellant is disabled so that the tribunal can on that occasion hear her complaint and, if it finds it substantiated, then put over the preliminary question as to whether or not the appellant is indeed disabled.
18. I reject that submission both as a matter of practicality and bearing in mind that my jurisdiction is limited to correcting errors of law. It seems to me from the way this case has progressed that it is manifestly unsuitable for listing on one day to deal with all substantive matters, bearing in mind the directions that have been given for the final disposal of this case, and the number of issues which are raised within it. I can see no error of law on the part of the Chairman in ordering that the date be vacated, bearing in mind that it is necessary for the appellant to show that in reaching that conclusion the Chairman was acting in a way that is Wednesbury unreasonable. That is to say, he has failed to take into account a relevant factor, taken into account irrelevant factors or has otherwise reached a conclusion which no reasonable Chairman properly directing himself could have reached.
19. In these circumstances, this appeal must be dismissed.