United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	The Appellant in person
For the Respondent	The Respondent in person


 


JUDGE D PUGSLEY

1. In this case, Mr Ramanlal, quite understandably, feels very upset. He believes that the Tribunal case against him was wrongly decided. We have tried, we suspect in vain, to point out to him that we as an Employment Appeal Tribunal, can only intervene on issues of law.
2. This matter came before the Employment Appeal Tribunal on 21 September of this year. At that stage Mr Ramanlal had the benefit of the assistance of Mr Waithe, a member of the Bar, who was appearing under the Employment Law Appeal Advice Scheme. In a very comprehensive judgment, Mr Recorder Langstaff QC who was sitting with Ms Corby and Mr Parker CBE, carefully considered the issues that were raised in the grounds of appeal.
3. It is pertinent to note that Mr Waithe put forward the Applicant's case on a limited number of bases, and we noted at paragraph 4 of the judgment that it was said by Mr Recorder Langstaff, referring to the Applicant, Mr Ramanlal:

"He has also had the good sense to agree that Mr Waithe should put forward his appeal upon a limited number of bases."

It is unnecessary for us to deal with those matters in which the Employment Appeal Tribunal found, at the preliminary hearing, that the appeal should be dismissed.

4. There was one issue and one issue alone that that Tribunal said should come before this Tribunal. The issue was that upon a strict reading of the Rules there was no entitlement by the first Respondent to take any part in the proceedings as a Respondent, because there had been no application for an extension of time to file his Notice of Appearance, pursuant to Rule 34 and 15 of the Employment Tribunals Rules.
5. It was argued that by 3(2) of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure that:

"(2) A respondent who has not entered an appearance shall not be entitled to take any part in the proceedings"

in respect of those matters as set out. What was urged on the Applicant's behalf was that unless a Tribunal exercises its discretion, or unless it is implied from the circumstances that it had done so, the first Respondent should not have been permitted to take part in the hearing, save as a witness for the second Respondent. The Tribunal said that they were:

"reluctantly driven in the absence of clear authority shown to us bearing upon the issue"

to think that there is here an issue which can only be resolved in a full hearing. They noted they did so without enthusiasm and they did not wish to give Mr Ramanlal any great optimism that at the conclusion of the Tribunal hearing the matter would necessarily be an advantage to him, but they did think that this was an arguable point.

6. They then considered various other matters which they said had no substance, and they came to this conclusion at paragraph 13:

"It follows that we are bound to dismiss the appeal in so far as it relates to the second Respondent and to dismiss the appeal against the first Respondent save only in respect of one matter namely the procedural and technical issue as to what rule 3 of the Employment Tribunal Rules 1993 properly required of this Tribunal, and whether that Tribunal properly dealt with its procedure in the light of that rule."

It identified that as the sole issue. The Applicant has not put before us any Skeleton Argument but Mr Ramanlal has vented his great concern at the way in which he believes it is wrong that he should be limited to only that one ground of appeal.

7. Mr Seth has provided a bundle of documents. That bundle of documents shows that on 19 November Mrs Patel wrote to the Tribunal at Croydon:

"With reference to our telephone conversation earlier in the week I am writing to advise you that Mr P Sheth is out of the country until the 2^nd week of January 2000.

On return he will respond to your correspondence."

Then came the following reply:

"Thank you for your letter of 19 November 1999 which was referred to a Chairman of the Tribunals.

The Chairman has granted the Respondent an extension of time until 24 January 2000 to enter a Notice of Appearance."

8. Turning now to the Notice of Appearance, which is set out in the Employment Appeal Tribunal papers, that shows that that Notice of Appearance was in fact received by the Tribunal on a fax on 24 January 2000 at 14.21 and the originator of that ground was the firm of solicitors, "Mehta & Co Solicitors".
9. We are bound to say that it seems that, unfortunately, the Tribunal did not have drawn to its attention the letter which extended the time for filing the Notice of Appearance. The whole factual basis upon which the appeal was allowed has been undermined by the subsequent production of that letter.
10. In these circumstances, we consider we have no option but to dismiss this appeal. We make no criticism of the Applicant. It is shown in the bundle of documents that he received a copy of that letter, but it is probably the case that he did not fully understand or appreciate the point that was being made on his behalf at the preliminary hearing
11. Sadly, because we realise that it is a matter of great distress to him, it simply is not open to us to hear arguments on the factual basis on which the Tribunal reached its Decision. In those circumstances we do not feel we have any alternative but to dismiss this appeal.