United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	NO APPEARANCE OR REPRESENTATION BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
For the Respondent	NO APPEARANCE OR REPRESENTATION BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT


 


JUDGE PETER CLARK

1. The Applicant, Mrs Edwards, was employed by the Respondent, a firm of Chartered Accounts employing about 12 staff, from May 1999 until her resignation in June 2000. She held the position of Accounts clerk/Administrator.
2. Following her resignation she presented an Originating Application to the Manchester Employment Tribunal on 10 August 2000 complaining of constructive dismissal. Sexual harassment; that is unfair dismissal and unlawful sex discrimination. She has been represented since the commencement of proceedings by Professional Personnel Management Consultants (PPMC). The claim is resisted. The Respondent is not professionally represented. Mr Eric Langer, the principal of the Respondent firm, is conducting his own case.
3. On 8 November 2000 a directions hearing took place before a Chairman, Mr D A Leahy, sitting alone. On that occasion the Appellant was represented by Mr Gary Armstrong of PPMC.
4. We see from the Minute of Order signed by the Chairman and dated 27 November 2000 that he took the view that the Applicant's case was inadequately pleaded, notwithstanding further and better particulars of the Originating Application, which are before us and were served on 4 November 2000. He directed that 2 preliminary issues be heard on 5 February 2001 (misstated as 5 January 2001 in the minute of order); they were, first whether the Applicant had sufficient continuous service to found a complaint of unfair dismissal; secondly whether the Applicant's allegations of sex discrimination were time-barred.
5. For the purpose of those preliminary questions, and any subsequent substantive hearing, the Chairman gave certain directions, in particular:

(1) there should be discovery of documents in terms set out at paragraph 3 of the Minute

(2) the Applicant should within 28 days serve her full and complete witness statement, typed and with numbered paragraphs on the Respondent; the Applicant to provide witness statements of any further witnesses she intended to call within 28 days thereafter. The Respondent was ordered to disclose his witness statement and that of his wife (who was employed in the business) within 56 days of 8 November 2000, dealing with both preliminary issues. Further witness statements of those he intends to call at the full hearing are to be served 14 days after determination of preliminary issues. The full hearing was fixed for 9-10 April 2001.

6. By a Notice of Appeal served on 2 December 2000 the Applicant appeals against the Chairman's order requiring her to serve her witness statement before the Respondent has to serve his and that of his wife. This is the hearing of that appeal. Neither party has attended before us, but each has submitted written submissions which we have considered.
7. Directions hearing are becoming increasingly common in the Employment Tribunal system. They are important for sensible case management; Chairmen, like Judges in the Civil Justice system post – Lord Woolf's reforms, are required to take a more pro-active role in case preparation.
8. We have no general power of review of Orders made by Employment Tribunal Chairman. Our jurisdiction is limited to correcting errors of law. That means, in practice, interfering only with directions which can properly be described as Wednesbury unreasonable. See Carter v Credit Change Ltd [1979] ICR 908, 918, approving Bastick v James Lane Turf Accountants [1979] ICR 778.
9. In the present case the Chairman was entitled to take the view, despite 2 attempts, that the Applicant had not adequately, through her representative, pleaded her case. He determined that the proper course was for her to set out her case in the form of a witness statement which the Respondent could then respond similarly. We can see nothing exceptionable about that course, let alone finding it perverse in the Wednesbury sense.
10. In these circumstances we can see no grounds in law for interfering with the direction given.
11. We should add that we have noted the Applicant's representative's complaint of 'bias', the Chairman's comments thereon dated 10 January 2001 and the Applicant's representative's written response thereto. We see nothing in that inparticularised complaint and suggest that the Applicant's representative's efforts would be better directed to preparing the Applicant's case on the preliminary and substantive issues in this matter, rather than pursuing an interlocutory appeal which we regard as wholly devoid of merit. The appeal is dismissed.