United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	APPLICANT NEITHER PRESENT NOR REPRESENTED


 


JUDGE PETER CLARK

1. The Appellant, Mr Cocker, who is disabled, commenced employment with the Respondent in April 1989. In 1990 he moved to the War Pensions Registry. In January 1991 he applied for the post of MOD Liaison Officer. That application was turned down on 12 June 1991.
2. On 27 August 1997 he presented an Originating Application to Manchester Industrial Tribunal complaining of breach of contract, Maladministration, UN Charter of Human Rights, breach of Equal Opportunities Act, Breach of Disability Discrimination Act.
3. The Respondent made application for all claims to be struck out under Rule 13(2)(d) of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure. That application came before a Chairman, Mr M L Creed, sitting alone on 3 February 1998. By a decision promulgated with summary reasons only on 11 February 1998 he struck out all the claims.
4. Mr Cocker took no action on that decision until 18 August 2000, some 2½ years later, when he wrote to the Registrar of the Employment Appeal Tribunal indicating his wish to appeal against the decision. He concluded:

"I request and require that this matter be reheard."

5. His grounds for requiring a re-hearing were first, that due to his disability he could hardly hear anything that was said at the tribunal and secondly that the Chairman had made a factual error in his reasons. No point of law was there raised.
6. He followed that letter with a standard form Notice of Appeal lodged on 29 August. Again the grounds of appeal, in our view, disclose no arguable point of law.
7. His employment having now terminated, he wished to revive his breach of contract claim which the tribunal, in February 1998, had no jurisdiction to hear, he then having been still in the Respondent's employment.
8. By letter dated 4 September 2000 the Deputy Registrar pointed out that under Rule 3(1) of the Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules the Notice of Appeal ought to be accompanied by the Employment Tribunal's Extended Written Reasons.
9. As a result, by a letter dated 18 September 2000 the Appellant applied to the Chairman for Extended Reasons. That application was refused by letter dated 26 September for the following reasons:

"1) The request is out of time.

2) It would be quite impossible to prepare extended reasons of this decision in the circumstances as the files are not retained for such a long time (two and a half years). The Chairman's notes were destroyed together with the file.

3) You have not given any reasons for the inordinate delay in requesting extended reasons."

10. As to point (2), by letter dated 30 November 2000 the Employment Tribunal administration confirmed that the file in this case had been destroyed.
11. Against that refusal the Appellant lodged a second appeal by Notice dated 3 October 2000. It is that appeal which is now before us.
12. The Appellant does not appear to prosecute his appeal on grounds of his disability. Accordingly we have decided the matter on the papers.
13. It is an important principle in the administration of justice that there should be finality in judicial proceedings. Consequently there are strict time limits for steps to be taken under the rules. Thus, a party has 14 days from the promulgation of an Employment Tribunal decision with summary reasons to apply for Extended Reasons with a view to appeal. Time for appealing is then 42 days from the date on which Extended Reasons are promulgated.
14. The Appellant gives no reasons, as the Chairman points out, for his 2½ year delay in applying for Extended Reasons. There are no grounds in law in our judgment for interfering with the Chairman's decision not to give Extended Reasons out of time in this case. His reasons for the refusal are in our view compelling.
15. Further, we have considered whether we should exercise our powers under Rule 39(2) of the Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules to permit the substantive appeal to proceed on the basis of summary reasons only. We shall not. The delay is quite unacceptable. The appeal discloses no arguable point of law.
16. In these circumstances the Appeal is dismissed.