At the Tribunal | |
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE LINDSAY (PRESIDENT)
MR R SANDERSON OBE
MR T C THOMAS CBE
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING EX PARTE
For the Appellant | MRS H ANIRAH (The Appellant in person) |
MR JUSTICE LINDSAY (PRESIDENT)
"A Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider the Applicant's complaint of unfair dismissal but has jurisdiction to consider her complaints of sex discrimination, race discrimination and disability discrimination."
and arrangements were made for a Merits Hearing dealing with such part of the case therefore that went forward.
"(i) the Applicant's claims of unlawful race, sex and disability discrimination in respect of dismissal fail and are dismissed;
(ii) the Applicant's claim of unlawful sex discrimination in respect of subjecting her to a detriment succeeds to the extend set out in para 6.1A(iii) and para 7 below;
(iii) the Applicant's claims of unlawful race and disability discrimination in respect of subjecting her to a detriment fail and are dismissed;"
Then there was a reference to there needing to be a remedies hearing if terms could not be agreed in respect, presumably, of the minor matter in which Mrs Anirah had succeeded.
"The chairman erred in law. My evidence not applied appropriately by the Tribunal. The other side used a lot of forged evidence not questioned at the hearing."
The Notice of Appeal was so vague that the Employment Appeal Tribunal asked for particulars of it on 25 January 2001. They did not come in in time. On 2 February the Employment Appeal Tribunal extended time for the particulars until 22 February 2001. On that day, Mrs Anirah gave the necessary particulars.
"She became dependent upon insulin to control her diabetes in 1996. She is prone to hypoglycaemic attacks ('hypos') when her blood sugar level drops without warning. In order to avoid hypos the Applicant requires to test her blood regularly during the day. If the Applicants' blood test shows that her blood sugar is low, she will "on the whole" avoid or recover within 20 minutes from a hypo by consuming sweet drinks or food and/or glucose tablets. The phrase in inverted commas is from a medical report from Simon Aylwin who was assisting in the Applicant's case at the Royal London Hospital. During a hypo her heart pounds, she has a tendency to panic and may become confused and forgetful."
Dr Aylwin's report does indeed use the expression "on the whole". He says:
"It is very important that members of your Company [it is a letter addressed to Asda] particularly the first aiders present should understand that symptoms of anxiety are part of the hypoglycaemic state and need to be treated immediately. On the whole when this occurs, the symptoms resolve within 20 minutes and normal activity can be resumed."
The company had good reason to believe that Mrs Anirah's medical condition had not explained or justified what they believed to have been a theft; it did not exculpate her. Mrs Anirah says that the Employment Tribunal misunderstood a document. What the Employment Tribunal took to be an agreed prescription as to how to deal with diabetes was in truth, she says, merely a complaint that she made. We have not seen the document and it is hard to form any view as to an arguable error of law when we have not seen the document.
"The Applicant felt that this was an attempt to displace her, but we do not accept that, because she stayed on in the position without any threat to her at that time. The Applicant complained that the borrowed manager gave orders and acted as if he were running the warehouse. Mr Ansell told us that had not been his intention and that he did not know about it. Had it happened, he would not have permitted it, because it could have undermined the Applicant. There was no contemporaneous complaint.
We have no reason to believe that that was not a permissible option open to the Tribunal on the evidence which it heard.
"They came [that is the company] to the conclusion that although she had felt unwell on the night of 3 July, that unwellness had not caused such anxiety and/or confusion that she put her health first and decided to hurry home, rather than sorting out matters in respect of the chicken pieces. In respect of all this we have found that:
- the Applicant put one bag of chicken pieces into an Asda shopping bag which she took,
- she put a box containing another bag of the chicken pieces in a deep freeze,
- she organised a lift home,
- she kept that lift waiting while she went shopping,
- she shopped in an unhurried fashion,
- after the incident she did not hurry home, but sought to persuade Mr Moore not to suspend her,
- she did not mention to anyone that night after the incident that she was unwell.
There was nothing in all this to suggest, then or now, that her conduct in respect of the chicken pieces was in any way affected by her medical condition or her disability or anything related to it. We are satisfied that in respect of this incident the Applicant's disability did not put her at a disadvantage in respect of the Respondent's disciplinary procedures, either at all or substantially (which we take to mean more than a minor or trivial disadvantage). In consequence, no duty to make reasonable adjustments arose."
Then a little later the Tribunal says under the heading 'Dismissal: less favourable treatment for a reason related to a disability':
"We are not satisfied that the Applicant suffered less favourable treatment for a reason related to her disability (or at all) than she would have received had she not had the disability. On the basis of all the evidence, the Respondent was entitled to conclude that the disability was irrelevant and we so conclude."
We detect no error of law in that part of the case.
"She was told at a meeting on 12 May 1998, that she needed to wear business dress and that her choice of colours was inappropriate. Mr Ansell explained this to the Tribunal on the basis that working in the warehouse led clothes to become dusty and that the Applicant's clothes came to look 'tatty' or dirty. This, he considered, was inappropriate."
The Employment Tribunal heard the evidence and they felt unable to determine the issue one way or another. They say:
"We feel unable to determine this issue. …….We have considered whether our findings on other matters assist us in coming to a conclusion here and have determined that they do not do so sufficiently to enable us to determine the matter in the Applicant's favour on the balance of probabilities. "
The complaint that Mrs Anirah makes is this:
"In my view, I submit that a reasonable tribunal could have reached the decision that this is part of the harassment that I suffered if the Tribunal had investigated properly."
One notices there, 'I submit that a reasonable tribunal could have reached the decision'. It is no error of law to identify a case where the Tribunal could have reached a different conclusion. It is incumbent upon an Appellant who has to show to us an error of law that the Tribunal could properly have come to no other conclusion than the conclusion which Mrs Anirah insists upon. To say that the Tribunal could have concluded differently, is not to identify an error of law. Mrs Anirah says:
"From the evidence in the bundle, it shows clearly that Mr Ansell and Ms Stratford did not treat me in the same way as the other managers."
but that of itself is not actionable discrimination. What was the reason for the difference in the treatment? Mrs Anirah failed to satisfy the Employment Tribunal that the reasons for any differences that were proven were either race or sex or disability. We have no reason to think that the Tribunal was in error of law in ascribing other reasons to the differences between the way in which Mr Anirah was treated and the way in which her comparators were treated.
"She also asserted that Mr Ansell kept her at one meeting even though she asked on a couple of occasions to be allowed to leave because she needed to eat in order to avoid a hypo. She told us that when the meeting ended she was then unwell. The Tribunal is not satisfied that this incident occurred as described. We accept that the Applicant did on one occasion become so unwell at work that an ambulance was called for her, but we do not attribute this to Mr Ansell."
The complaint that Mrs Anirah makes is:
"The Tribunal did not examine me on this at all."
but it was for her Counsel to examine her. If she failed to give evidence on a particular point that is not the Employment Tribunal's fault, still less an error of law on the part of the Tribunal. Mrs Anirah says, in effect, that if the ambulance man had been called he would have been willing to give evidence on her side and that the ambulance man or men had indicated that if only they had been asked by the Tribunal itself to give evidence they would have done so. But what evidence is to be called on behalf of the Applicant is very much to be decided upon by the Applicant, especially when the Applicant appears by Counsel, and if no witness summons was issued to require the ambulance men to attend then they failed to attend and that is not an error of law on the Tribunal's part; indeed, it is not an error of law on anyone's part.
"It was only after the Tribunal's decision that I found out that the Tribunal still used in its decision what I said during the period of my hypo attack. Mrs Gay promised that I would be re-examined with regard to the point regarding my dropped performance with reference to Ms Sally Johnson's letter to me which the other side used against me but I was not given the chance to do so."
The case that is made in relation to the hypo attack is that a diabetic does not necessarily know when a hypo begins. Obviously there may well come a point, and there did here come a point, at which Mrs Anirah as a diabetic recognised that she was having a hypo and that she then indicated that was the case but no diabetic can be sure, says Mrs Anirah, of precisely when a hypo begins and it could well be, therefore, that she was giving evidence during a hypo at a stage that she had not recognised that she was suffering from a hypo and could have given evidence that was not what she would have wanted to say had she been in good health and she could therefore have misled her advisers and the Tribunal. That plainly is a medical possibility. One would expect that if a witness's or a party's answers began to go 'off the rails' so to speak, that experienced Counsel would notice that evidence was being given that did not do the witness or the party justice. There is no indication that anything of that nature occurred and it was, as I mentioned, Mrs Anirah herself who indicated that she was having a hypo. What then happened is dealt with at some length by the Chairman in her explanatory answer. She says this:
"At about 3.20pm on the second day of the hearing Mrs Anirah had given evidence in chief, cross-examination and re-examination and I was asking her questions on behalf of the Tribunal. After one answer she said words to the effect that she was in a hypo."
It is worth noticing there that in the ordinary way one would have expected the Tribunal's questions to be relatively limited. There had already been evidence in chief, cross-examination and re-examination. Once Mrs Anirah had indicated that she was in a hypo, the Chairman continues to explain that the Tribunal recognised that the situation was serious. The Chairman says:
"I asked what we could do and offered to leave the room if it were easier for Mrs Anirah to remain where she was. My recollection is that everyone present was prepared to be guided by Mrs Anirah's response here. We thought that she might not be able to move and we were ready simply to walk out. Mrs Anirah indicated that she wanted to leave the room and this is what in fact happened."
The Tribunal then broke off for about 40 minutes. Mrs Anirah's Counsel came back and reported about the low blood sugar level probably coming up. The Chairman said:
"We considered what was appropriate to do with the remainder of the day and determined in fairness to Mrs Anirah simply to finish her evidence formally if and when she felt well enough to return."
Then the Chairman says:
"The Tribunal resumed at 4.05pm. In enquired of Mrs Anirah how she felt and she replied that she was okay.
I informed Mrs Anirah that we had finished questioning her so far as the Tribunal was concerned, but asked whether there was anything that she wanted to do or to explain because of the condition in which she had been at the end of the period when I had asked her questions. Mrs Anirah told me that she was not sure what she had said in answer to the last few questions.
I therefore read back to her the notes which I had made over the last five minutes of the hearing before the adjournment. I looked towards both representatives and their instructing solicitors, who had been taking notes of the evidence, and nodded in agreement with what I read. Mrs Anirah indicated she did not disagree.
Mrs Anirah then said that she wanted to be reminded of the questions which I had asked about feeding the chicken to the birds. I explained the questions, which had been put just before those which I had read back to her. [So at that point one is going back further than 5 minutes] They included asking Mrs Anirah how she explained the two different accounts which we had recorded about her intended use of the chicken. After I had explained the questions Mrs Anirah said: "That is not what I meant to say". I pointed out that I had not read what she said, because I had only repeated the questions (as she had asked). In fact she had not at the time provided any answer. I then invited her to answer the question, putting it to her again.
Mrs Anirah then gave an answer to the question, which repeated one of the two versions that she had previously given, namely that she took the chicken because the children were going to the farm, but which did not explain why she had previously given two different accounts.
Thereafter I ascertained whether either representative had any further questions. This was an opportunity for Ms Moore [that is Mrs Anirah's Counsel] to re-examine further if she felt it appropriate. Neither Counsel had any questions and we adjourned for the day.
It follows that Mrs Anirah is correct in saying that she wanted to be asked again. She was asked again. Neither before or after the hypo was she able to answer the point that was troubling the Tribunal. I believe that this is the issue about which she is complaining here, but on the basis of the full description of what occurred at the Tribunal hearing, I deny that anything unfair or untoward occurred. Mrs Anirah was given every opportunity to explain herself. It was her inability to do so (either before or after the hypo) which the Tribunal recorded in its findings of fact at (xl) on page 14 of the extended reasons."
We cannot see there any indication of injustice or of bias against Mrs Anirah. There seems to have been a thoughtful recognition of the fact that it might well have been the case that for a while before she indicated that she was suffering a hypo she might have not been doing herself justice, but the technique used seems adequate to explore whether that was the case and how best to correct it. As the Chairman indicated, at the end there was a further opportunity for Ms Moore to re-examine further if she felt it appropriate and nothing further was done.
"The Tribunal reached their decision by using evidence that was not true."
Unhappily, it can, of course, occur at an Employment Tribunal, just as it can occur at any Court or Tribunal, that the Tribunal or Court is sometimes itself deceived. It can be misinformed. It can transpire from later evidence that it has been misinformed. We are not for a moment saying that that is what happened here. It is a risk that can be avoided as far as possible by a careful analysis of what evidence is given. The Tribunal here seems to have embarked upon and to have succeeded in completing a careful analysis of the evidence that was given. If the Tribunal did use evidence that was not true, that would not of itself represent an error of law. It is not suggested that the Tribunal knew that it was receiving false evidence or that the only decision that any Tribunal could have reached was that the evidence was untrue. Accordingly, that particular complaint represents no error of law. Mrs Anirah at several points argues that the documentary evidence points to conclusions other than those reached by the Tribunal itself but that, of course, occurs time after time. The Tribunal hears oral evidence as well as looking at the documents and quite often the ultimate result is more impressed by what has been said orally than what was put in writing. Here the Tribunal heard evidence over a long period.