At the Tribunal | |
Before
MISS RECORDER SLADE QC
MRS T A MARSLAND
MRS D M PALMER
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT ON REVIEW
UNDER RULE 33(1)
"…advise The Employment Appeal Tribunal to formally review its Order of 14 March 2001, and proceed to dismiss the Appeal."
The High Commission, whilst asserting that there has been no submission to the jurisdiction of the Courts of the United Kingdom in these proceedings, contended that current appeal 'is clearly unrelated to the pending decision in Fogarty' since the claim in these proceedings is based on alleged breach of contract whereas the claim in Fogarty was based on a potential claim for sex discrimination.
"by virtue of its sovereign status as copiously provided for under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961 as well as under section 1 subsections 1 & 2; section 4 subsection 2(b); section 16 subsection 1(a) and section 22 of the State Immunity Act 1978; the Employment [Appeal] Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to allow the appeal of Mrs Onwuemene to proceed to a full hearing more so when the High Commission has not at any stage submitted to the jurisdiction of the Employment Appeal Tribunal."
The High Commission stated:
"By writing in these observable terms it was to so invite the Employment Appeal Tribunal, of its own initiative, to review the case and the decisions made in the light of the maintained claim in Law as to State Immunity."
"This is not a situation that properly engages the EAT's jurisdiction to review (Rule 33). The Appellant would submit that the course proposed by the High Commission is inappropriate, in the light of the approach to rule 33 set out in Blockleys plc v Miller [1992] ICR 749, where Wood J emphasised that the jurisdiction was not to be exercised to permit rehearing."
Further they stated that the arguments put forward by the High Commission may properly be received in the appeal without there being a submission to jurisdiction.
"The Appeal Tribunal may, either of its own motion or on application, review any order made by it and may, on such review, revoke or vary that order on the grounds that-
the order was wrongly made as the result of an error on the part of the Tribunal or its staff; a party did not receive proper notice of the proceedings leading to the order; or the interests of justice require such review."
"Accepting, as we do, the submissions of Mr Sedley on this point, we construe rule 26(1)(a) of the Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules 1980, as covering the situation where some alteration is necessary to the form of the order made as a result of the judgment and rule 26(1)(c) as being of limited scope intended to repair an error in jurisdiction or a defect in the process of the appeal, or the conduct or procedural unfairness-the absence of due process -the technical correctness of the decision. It is not to allow cases to be re-argued and re-heard."
Morison J in Digital Equipment Ltd v Clements (No 2) [1997] ICR 237 referred to Blockeys in observing at p240B:
"The appeal tribunal has no power to hear an appeal against its own decision, and should not purport to do so."
Whilst he stated at p240B-C:
"Where a decision can be said to have been reached per incuriam, then it might be appropriate to review it rather than require the parties to proceed by way of appeal to the Court of Appeal"
In the absence of argument on the matter at p240D he cautioned:
"…we would not wish this case to be taken as any kind of authority on the jurisdiction issue."
"Review by the Employment Appeal Tribunal of its own motion under Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules 1993 Rule 33(1) of its Order of 14 March 2001."