United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellants	MR M LAMBE (Representative) Messrs Whittles Pearl Assurance House 23 Princess Street Albert Square Manchester M2 4ER


 


JUDGE CLARK

1. This appeal comes before a 2 member Court in the following circumstances. The case was originally listed for ex parte preliminary hearing before a different division today. This division originally consisted of myself, Mr Crosby and Lord Gladwin. Having completed our list we offered to take this case.
2. It then emerged that it involved members and officials of GMB Union, of which Lord Gladwin is a retired official. In all the circumstances it did not appear right for him to sit on this case. Accordingly we invited the parties, the Respondent having an observer from the EEF present, to consent to the matter being heard by myself and Mr Crosby only under Section 28(3) of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996. That consent was given, in writing, on behalf of both parties. We thus proceeded to hear the case.
3. The Appellant's are 4 out of 7 applicants before the Manchester Employment Tribunal. We shall confine ourselves to the cases of those 4 Appellants.
4. Each was employed by the Respondent at their Bolton factory. Each was dismissed by reason of redundancy. Each brought a complaint of unfair dismissal.
5. The Employment Tribunal, by their decision with extended reasons promulgated on 16 November 1999, following a hearing on 12 – 14 October, decided the individual Appellant's cases as follows.
6. Mr Webster His complaint was time-barred. Had it not been, the Employment Tribunal found, having heard all the evidence, that he was fairly dismissed. He appeals on the limitation point only.
7. Mr Anthony Markland His complaint was also time-barred. Had it not been the Employment Tribunal would have found that he was unfairly dismissed because, having sought alternative employment with the Respondent, he was not provided with his marks under the selection matrix. However, such information would have made no difference to the result, so the Tribunal found. He suffered no loss, and therefore received no compensation.
8. Mr Macdonald & Mr Breen Both, like Mr Markland, were unfairly dismissed, but similarly the Employment Tribunal held that they had suffered no loss.
9. In this appeal Mr Lambe attacks the Employment Tribunal's findings both on limitation as to Messrs Webster and Markland, and the finding on remedies in relation to all Appellant's save for Mr Webster. It is convenient to deal with those submissions in reverse order.

Remedies

10. Having listened to Mr Lambe we are quite satisfied that these appeals are directed to the Employment Tribunal's findings of fact in the individual cases. Having considered the Employment Tribunal's reasoning we can see no grounds in law for interfering with those findings. Consequently the appeals against that part of the decision which held that these 3 Appellants' have suffered no loss must fail.

Limitation

11. We might have been persuaded, just, to allow the appeal of Messrs Markland and Webster to proceed to a full hearing, the issue being as to the Effective of Date of Termination of their contracts of employment.
12. However, the Employment Tribunal, having heard all the evidence as to the merits of those claims, found that Mr Webster was fairly dismissed. There is no appeal against that finding. Consequently there is no purpose in allowing his appeal on the limitation point only to proceed to a full hearing.
13. In the case of Mr Anthony Markland we have dismissed his appeal against the remedies finding. Thus any success on the limitation point would at most open the way to a declaration that he had been unfairly dismissed and no more.
14. Mr Lambe does not ask us to allow his appeal to proceed on that basis only. We think that is correct. Applying the principal of proportionality, the expense to both sides of an appeal on the limitation point only in Mr Markland's case cannot be justified.
15. In these circumstances we dismiss these appeals.