United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	RUTH VINCENT (of Counsel) Instructed by: Every & Phillips Solicitors 1 Albion Street Exmouth Deven EX8 IJL


 


JUDGE H WILSON

1. On 4 February an application came before the Employment Tribunal sitting at Exeter. On that occasion the Applicant was represented by Miss Vincent of Counsel, instructed by solicitors, and she was opposed by solicitors appearing on behalf of the Respondent.
2. The Applicant was contending that she had been constructively dismissed. The unanimous decision of the Tribunal was that there had been no dismissal. That decision was supported by Summary Reasons which were dated 7 February 2000 and are succinct to the point of opacity. However that may be, there was no application for Extended Reasons, either at the time the decision was announced when the Appellant was represented, or within the time limit prescribed by the rules which is 21 days from the date when the Summary Reasons reach the parties. When an out-of-time application for Extended Reasons was made to the Chairman, the request was refused and the first matter before us on a preliminary hearing today concerns an appeal against that refusal.
3. Secondly, and as we understand Miss Vincent, alternatively, there is an appeal on a preliminary basis that we should, if necessary, rule that this is one of the rare cases where the matter could proceed without Extended Reasons on the basis of the Summary Reasons.
4. We deal with the appeals in the order to which I have referred to them. The ground upon which it is submitted we should allow the matter to go to full argument is that the Appellant having received the decision, and having funded herself thus far, wished to know whether she could obtain legal aid to pursue her appeal. We find that that submission is open to two insuperable difficulties: the first is that it would have cost nothing to ask for Extended Reasons, either at the hearing itself or within the time limited after receipt of the Summary Reasons which told the Applicant nothing. Secondly, we find that in order to decide whether or not an appeal should be pursued, any prospective appellant needs to know the details of why he or she has failed thus far: that detail is found in Extended Reasons. Furthermore, the appeal itself was finally lodged out of time before the Appellant knew the final outcome concerning legal aid. It was lodged at a time when her application had been refused, and an appeal to the legal aid authorities was being considered, but nevertheless before she knew what the outcome was going to be. It seems to us, therefore, that this is an appeal which has no hope of success, even were it to proceed to full argument.
5. Turning meanwhile, to the second application which is in the alternative, that really depends upon the contents of the Summary Reasons. As I have already indicated, they are succinct to the point of opacity; they say simply that the Applicant was employed as a Dental Surgery Assistant from 18 August 1986 till 21 October 1999, and that on the evidence, the Tribunal finds that there was no dismissal, as defined by section 95 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, as there was no conduct of the Respondent amounting to a fundamental breach of contract entitling the Applicant to terminate the contract of employment. Therefore the application for unfair dismissal is dismissed.
6. It would be impossible for any Appeal Tribunal to enquire into a matter about which so little is know from the Summary Reasons, and accordingly, that appeal is doomed to failure as well. Accordingly, with regret, so far as the Appellant is concerned, these appeals have no prospect of success and must be dismissed at this stage. We feel moved to say that it may well be that the Appellant might have a means of redress in other directions. Whether that is so, or not, will be a matter for her to seek independent advice about in due course, if she thinks fit. The application is dismissed.