United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MS S DREW (of Counsel) Instructed By: Ms J Kinman Messrs Nelsons Solicitors Pennine House 8 Stanford Street Nottingham NG1 7BQ
For the Respondents	MISS T EADY (of Counsel) Instructed By: Mrs N Bennison Messrs Eversheds Solicitors 11 St James Court Friar Gate Derby DE1 1BT


 


MR JUSTICE NELSON: When the Employment Tribunal at Nottingham heard this case, it made an order under Rule 23 (2) of the EAT Rules 1993, whereby the names of the Appellant and the Respondents were not published nor stated on the grounds that the case involved allegations of the commission of a sexual offence.

1. The matter is raised in these proceedings as a preliminary point as to whether that order should be continued.
2. The power to make rules and under which Rule 23 (2) was made is provided by Section 31 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996. It is clear on the face of that section and, in particular, subsection (2) (a) and (b) that the rules, insofar as this Appeal Tribunal is concerned, are intended to refer to firstly, proceedings on an appeal against a decision of an Employment Tribunal to make or not to make a Restricted Reporting Order which is not, on the face of it, applicable here and secondly, under subsection (2) (b) of Section 31 to any interlocutory decision.
3. It is also agreed by the parties that this is not an interlocutory decision. On the face of it, therefore, the use of 23 (2) of the Rules is not one which this Tribunal can apply to this particular case.
4. It has however been said that as this is a Court of Superior Record (and this again is agreed by both parties) that the Court has an inherent jurisdiction to make such orders as are appropriate in order to protect the parties and their rights and that that inherent jurisdiction would extend to the making of an order, even if Section 31 does not permit the rules to apply in such circumstances as this Tribunal finds itself in.
5. Various factors must be weighed in the balance, when looking at the question as to whether the inherent jurisdiction should be exercised, not only the interests of the administration of justice but also the freedom of the press. A factor that must weigh heavily, as it did in the case of Chessington World of Adventures Ltd v Reed [1998] IRLR 56, is that if Parliament has not given powers beyond that which it is clearly expressed to make orders, the Court should be reluctant before exercising an inherent jurisdiction so as to go beyond that. The jurisdiction exists but the Court should be wary in exercising it.
6. We take into account the various factors that have been submitted to us here and, in particular, we take into account that the Appellant in this matter, we have been told by her Counsel, does not seek to assert her right to privacy and is, indeed, neutral as to whether the order made by the Employment Tribunal in Nottingham should be continued. It so happens that the Respondents also, for their part, adopt a neutral stance.
7. In those circumstances and weighing the balance, although satisfied that we do have an inherent jurisdiction, we are also conscious of the fact that only in an indirect sense does this case involve and depend upon an allegation of a sexual offence. The allegations themselves do not concern that, it is merely a part of the background.
8. Weighing these factors, whilst recognising that the Court does have an inherent jurisdiction, we are not satisfied that it is appropriate to exercise it in this case and therefore, we do not. The limitation of the description of the parties, as ordered by the Nottingham Employment Tribunal, is therefore no longer applicable to these proceedings.