United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	IN PERSON


 


MR JUSTICE CHARLES:

1. This appeal comes before us today by way of preliminary hearing pursuant to our Practice Direction. Our task is therefore to consider whether it raises any reasonably arguable points of law.
2. The parties are a Mr G P. Jones who was the Applicant before the Employment Tribunal and who is the Appellant before us and 3M Health Care Ltd, the Respondent.
3. Mr Jones appeals against part of a decision of an Employment Tribunal sitting at Leicester, the Extended Reasons for which were sent to the parties on 5 May 2000. The subject of the appeal is the decision of the Employment Tribunal that it had no jurisdiction to hear Mr Jones' claim under the Disability Discrimination Act 1996. The reason for that decision appears from paragraphs 5 (c) of the Extended Reasons and paragraph 1 of the Reasons for refusing Mr Jones' application for a review. Paragraph 5 (c) is in the following terms:

"5 (c) The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to determine the claims under the Disability Discrimination Act because, at the time of the refusal to return the [cards], the applicant was not employed by the respondent as required by Part II of the Act."

Paragraph 1 of the Reasons for refusing the review includes the following:

"The Tribunal's decision that it had no jurisdiction to hear the complaints under the Disability Discrimination Act 1996 did not depend on the finding of facts; it was a decision based on the law as the Tribunal understood it to be."

4. Mr Jones has provided us with a Skeleton Argument. In it and orally today he has said that he is not a skilled lawyer and has apologised for any deficiencies in it. We would comment that many skilled advocates would, in our view, be proud of the Skeleton he has produced. In that Skeleton he raises points of law as to the construction of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 by reference to other legislation and to authorities in this Tribunal and the Court of Appeal, in particular Coote, D'Souza and Adekey. In our judgment those points give rise to points of law which should go forward to a full hearing before this Tribunal.
5. The nub of the point is whether a claim can be made under the Disability Discrimination Act for acts which took place after the termination of employment. That is a point which, it seems to us, should be determined by a full Tribunal on a full hearing.
6. In his Skeleton Mr Jones supports his grounds of appeal that the Employment Tribunal have misconstrued and misapplied the provisions of the Disability Discrimination Act in concluding that it had no jurisdiction to hear his complaint of discrimination under that Act, by asserting (and this is paragraph 15 of his Skeleton) as follows:

"15. The appellant alleges the Leicester Tribunal erred in failing to interpret the Act in such a way as to comply with the appellant's rights laid down in the international treaty known as the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention), which has been binding on the United Kingdom government since 1951."

That shows that Mr Jones has done a fair amount of research because that argument relates to the long standing principle of statutory construction that ambiguity in UK legislation should be construed in accordance with UK treaty obligations.

7. His Skeleton does not (I think) in terms rely upon the Human Rights Act, the relevant parts of which came into force after the time that this matter was before the Employment Tribunal. Mr Jones has indicated to us, during the course of this morning, that he would be inviting this Tribunal to apply the Human Rights Act. We indicate that, in our judgment, he should be entitled to put forward such argument as he wishes based on the Human Rights Act on the hearing of this appeal.
8. We give that direction subject to any further directions that the Tribunal hearing the appeal may wish to give, but we give the indication that subject to further direction of this Tribunal Mr Jones and, indeed, the Respondent, may put such arguments by reference to the Human Rights Act as they see fit on the hearing of the full appeal.
9. However, we direct that if either side wish to make points based on the Human Rights Act, they are to deal with them clearly in the Skeleton that they put before this Tribunal and, in particular, they must deal with the points as to how and why they say the Human Rights Act is applicable or should be taken into account in this case, having regard in particular to the fact that the relevant events took place before that Act came into force.
10. We give this case an A/B category and give it a time estimate of one day. We also direct that this matter be listed as soon as is practical, and that this Tribunal should look to see whether there are other cases which raise exactly the point, or a similar point, so that consideration can be given to listing them together with this one.