United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MS D ROMNEY (of Counsel) ELAAS


 


JUDGE PETER CLARK:

1. The appellant, Mrs Ioannou, who is of Chinese racial origin, commenced employment on a casual basis in the Finance Section of the Benefits Agency as an Administrative Assistant on 30th June 1997. Her supervisor was a white woman, Mrs Pugh.
2. On 18th December 1997 she presented an Originating Application to the Employment Tribunal which she herself prepared. It was her case that she had been treated unfavourably and suffered discrimination on racial grounds. Her complaints were directed towards Mrs Pugh, whom she alleged had set her unrealistic performance targets, failed to send her on a training course, and misused the performance appraisal procedure in her case, causing the appellant to lodge an internal complaint to the Personnel Department on 17th November 1997. The unfavourable treatment she alleged continued after that complaint giving rise to a claim of victimisation under the 1976 Act. She sought compensation for injury to feelings and a declaration.
3. The respondent entered a Notice of Appearance disputing the claims. Thereafter the appellant obtained legal representation through the CRE and an amended Originating Application was lodged, dated 10th June 1998.
4. The tribunal made an order for discovery by the respondent dated 3rd April 1998 and held a directions hearing on 30th April. Orders made on that occasion by a Chairman, Mr Andrew Bano, are contained in a letter dated 5th May 1998.
5. The substantive hearing of the complaint took place before a tribunal sitting at London (South) under the chairmanship of Ms C E Taylor, between 12th-16th October 1998. By a reserved decision promulgated with extended reasons on 22nd December 1998, the tribunal dismissed the complaint. They considered the alleged acts of less favourable treatment, set out at paragraph 4 of their reasons, and rejected the appellant's case. They found as fact that the appellant's work had consistently fallen below the standard expected of her. Any member of staff, regardless of race, would have been treated as was this appellant in these circumstances. They dismissed the claims, both of direct discrimination and victimisation, on the facts.
6. Against that decision the appellant now appeals. This is a preliminary hearing held to determine whether or not the appeal raises any arguable point or points of law to go forward to a full appeal hearing.
7. The appellant is represented today by Ms Romney of Counsel under the ELAAS pro bono scheme.
8. Prior to the hearing we have had the advantage of being able to read the papers in this case and in particular, the Notice of Appeal and a skeleton argument prepared by the appellant herself.
9. At the outset and with characteristic realism, Ms Romney abandoned two principal points advanced by the appellant in this appeal. First the challenge to the tribunal's finding that the appellant was too slow in her work. That is a question of fact and our jurisdiction is limited to correcting errors of law only by Employment Tribunals. Ms Romney accepts that it was conceded below by Counsel, who then appeared on behalf of the appellant, that she was too slow in her work and accordingly that matter cannot now be re-opened.
10. Similarly, the appellant took a point that the respondent had failed to disclose documents in accordance with the earlier interlocutory orders made by the tribunal. Again, Ms Romney accepts that no issue as to discovery was raised by Counsel on behalf of the appellant at the substantive hearing.
11. Ms Romney focuses her submissions on two matters. First, she submits that the tribunal erred in law in giving an indication at the close of the appellant's case as to the likely award for compensation for injury to feelings in the event that the claim succeeded. The indication given was a figure of £2,000. Ms Romney submits that it is wrong in law for the tribunal to give an indication at the halfway stage in a case simply because public money is being expended on both sides in the case. That overlooks, she submits, the burning sense of grievance felt by this appellant and the importance of a declaration as to racial discrimination or victimisation which was the primary remedy which she sought.
12. We could see the force of that submission in circumstances where as a result of that indication either an applicant in person decided that it was not worth pursuing her claim to the bitter end, or indeed, in circumstances where an applicant later complained that her representative applied some pressure to her in the light of the tribunal's indication to reach a settlement with the respondent. However, none of that happened in this case. The case proceeded, the respondent called its evidence and the tribunal reached a conclusion on liability adverse to the appellant. In these circumstances, we can see that no valid criticism can be made of the tribunal's approach.
13. Secondly, Ms Romney complains that the tribunal in their extended reasons failed to make sufficient or adequate findings of fact on matters which were in dispute during the course of hearing and on which a ruling was required. For example, an allegation by the appellant that Mrs Pugh had altered an assessment on her, ex post facto, the fact that apart from the appellant two other non-white employees had given evidence that they regarded themselves as badly treated and a further factual dispute as to whether or not Mrs Pugh set an unrealistic work target for the appellant.
14. We have considered those submissions in the light of the decided cases dealing with the tribunal's obligation under the Rules of Procedure to provide a reasoned decision. Reference is frequently made, as it was by Ms Romney, to Meek v City of Birmingham District Council [1987] IRLR 250 and we would refer specifically to a passage in the judgment of Donaldson LJ as he then was in UCATT v Brain [1981] ICR 542 where he said this at page 551D:

"Industrial tribunals' reasons are not intended to include a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the case, either in terms of fact or in law. … their purpose remains what it has always been, which is to tell the parties in broad terms why they lose or, as the case may be, win."

15. We have considered the way in which the Chairman has formulated the tribunal's reasons in this case. We are quite satisfied that they sufficiently meet the criteria for proper and adequate reasons. Again, we find that this second ground of appeal raises no arguable point of law.
16. In these circumstances we must dismiss this appeal.