United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	Dr C H Travis Appellant in Person


 


JUDGE CLARK

1. The Appellant Clive Hathaway Travis, is a doctor of Philosophy. He was employed by the Respondent, Electronic Data Systems Ltd (EDS) as a senior programmer, that employment having commenced in February 1990.
2. During 1999 he suffered mental illness which required hospital treatment. On 8 September 1999 he presented an Originating Application to the Employment Tribunal complaining of constructive dismissal by EDS. By their Notice of Appearance EDS denied that he had been dismissed, contending that he remained in the employment.
3. On 25 November 1999 a hearing took place before a Chairman, Mr D N Cowling, sitting alone at Southampton. He struck out the claim under Rule 13(2)(d) of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure. That decision was promulgated with summary reasons only on 30 November 1999.
4. The decision was accompanied by the usual guidance note, advising parties of the time limits for applying for a review and appealing to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, for which latter purpose applications must be made to the Employment Tribunal within 21 days of the promulgation of the decision with summary reasons for the Employment Tribunal's extended reasons for their decision.
5. The Appellant appeared in person before the Employment Tribunal and tells us that he was advised by the Chairman to seek legal advice following announcement of the Chairman's decision. Shortly after the hearing he did seek advice from solicitors Woodfine Batcheldor. He has produced to us a letter from Mr Stephen Oliver of that firm dated 30 November 1999. The advice was not encouraging, Mr Oliver expressing his opinion that he agreed with the Chairman; the case for constructive dismissal was bound to fail because at no time had the Appellant actually resigned. Mr Oliver added:

"If however, you do wish to appeal then the appeal must be sent to the Employment Appeal Tribunal within 42 days of receiving the Tribunal's decision."

6. The time for requesting extended reasons for the Employment Tribunal decision promulgated with summary reasons expired on 21 December 1999.

In early January 2000 the Appellant began to compile on his word processor, but did not then send, 2 letters to the Employment Tribunal dated 7 and 8 January. The first was a letter of complaint about the way in which his case was handled on 25 November; the second was headed "Request for Review with Grounds and Extended Reasons (if applicable)."

7. On 10 January he submitted a Notice of Appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, accompanied by the Employment Tribunal decision with summary reasons promulgated on 30 November 1999.
8. On 17 January the Deputy Registrar wrote to the Appellant, pointing out the requirements for extended reasons under the Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules.
9. On 21 January the Appellant began to compose a letter to the Employment Tribunal requesting a review and extended reasons for the original Employment Tribunal decision. Enclosed with that letter among other documents were copies of his earlier letters begun on 7 and 8 January and subsequently completed and Mr Oliver's letter of 30 November. That letter and its enclosures were finally received by Employment Tribunal on 23 February 2000.
10. On 26 February he forwarded a copy of the Employment Appeal Tribunal letter dated 17 January. That letter was received by the Employment Tribunal on 1 March.
11. On 1 March the Employment Tribunal wrote to the Appellant informing him that the Chairman had refused his request for extended reasons and a review on the ground that it was made several weeks after the respective time limits had expired.
12. Against that refusal to provide extended reasons the Appellant brings this appeal by a Notice dated 3 March..
13. In support of this appeal Dr Travis, who has appeared before us today, although he did not wait for this judgment made the foll7owing points;

First that there had been maladministration by the Employment Tribunal, although that maladministration did not extend to any matter relating to the request for extended reasons. Secondly he points out that in addition to the first Originating Application (case no. 3103349/99) he presented 2 subsequent Originating Applications to the Employment Tribunal, one complaining of unfair dismissal and the other of disability discrimination. He contends that those 2 applications have not been disposed of by the Employment Tribunal and therefore his application for extended reasons for the decision made at the hearing on 25 November is perverse.

14. We have considered those submissions but are unable to accept that they have any bearing on the present appeal. In answer to the question, what error of law has been made by the Chairman refusing to provide extended reasons out of time, we received no satisfactory submissions.
15. This is a preliminary hearing held to determine whether the appeal raises any arguable point or points of law. In our judgment it does not and accordingly the appeal must be dismissed.
16. For the avoidance of doubt, although no specific application was made during the hearing before us by the Appellant, we have considered the summary of reasons promulgated on 30 November and we are not satisfied that the Original Substantive Appeal can properly proceed on summary reasons only under our powers under Rule 39. It follows that that underlying appeal must also be dismissed.