United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR MARC JONES Instructed by: The Employment Law Advice Appeal Scheme.
For the Respondent


 


JUDGE WILCOX:

1. This is an appeal against the decision of the Industrial Tribunal. Mr Buckley sitting alone of 20 August 1999 at Stratford. It relates to an allegation of breach of contract over pension rights. I need not rehearse fully the matters, suffice it to say that they are comprehensively set out in the extended findings of the Chairman. In relation to the law it is clear to us that he had properly directed himself as to the law and really what this appeal is directed to, is to matters of fact and by necessary implication that there was a perversity of finding. To that end, a great number of grounds of appeal have been put before us. It is right to say that we have had the opportunity to read each and every one of those. We have had the opportunity to read the written submissions and all the matters, so carefully prepared in this case, on behalf of the Appellant.
2. The Appellant is today represented by a representative from Employment Law Appeal Advice Scheme and that representative has had the best part of ¾ of a day to take careful instructions from the Appellant and her experienced Accountant Husband. He has succinctly and helpful fined down the issue that really, we as an Appeal Tribunal should look at. It relates to matters of fact, crucial matters of fact and events from which the Tribunal below concluded that the limitation period in contract terms, namely six years started. The submissions focus on that vital period and analysis has been done before us as to some of the documentation that was before the Tribunal, which we accept for the purposes of this appeal.
3. One matter about which emphasis was placed was that in the statement of the pension Supervisory Officer, Mr Sedgwick, there was reference to backdating but in terms of a tax year, rather than a financial year. It is a question of some five days difference and it may be vital but what is evident is that when she did exercise her option, and when in fact backdating occurred it was not in terms of tax year it was clearly in terms of the financial year. Small matters like that give rise to suspicion. They give rise to a festering worry; we understand that. But here we have an experienced Tribunal Chairman, considering matters of fact and hearing some evidence in a matter that is primarily, a matter of law and appropriately suited for the determination of a Chairman sitting alone.
4. Our attention has very properly been drawn by counsel on behalf of the Appellant, to the s.4 Industrial Tribunals Act 1996 s.4 and the desirability, where matters are essentially matters of fact, to have what I would categorise as an Industrial Jury to consider matters. When one is dealing with complicated matters of contract and sophisticated arguments that are put before it, one can well understand the exercise of discretion by the Chairman to sit alone.
5. There is nothing before us that would warrant us to come to the conclusion, that his exercise of discretion was a wrong discretion at the highest, even if it were, it would be perhaps, an irregularity not going to the findings or to the status of his findings. We have considered carefully the matters that were put before us. We have no doubt that they were put before and considered by the Tribunal Chairman. They are essentially matters of fact.
6. We think that in all the circumstances that this being a matter of fact is a case in which we should not warrant interference in the decision of the Tribunal Chairman and therefore we dismiss these appeals.