United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellants	THE APPELLANTS NEITHER PRESENT NOR REPRESENTED


 


JUDGE PETER CLARK: This is an appeal by Mr and Mrs Panayiotis, owners of the Old Basford Fish Bar, against a decision of the Nottingham Employment Tribunal, promulgated with extended reasons on 29th September 1999, upholding the applicant, Mr Brailsford's complaint of unlawful sex discrimination and awarding him compensation for injury to feelings in the sum of £750. The Notice of Appeal was lodged on 8th November 1999.

1. The applicant's complaint, put simply, was that he saw an advertisement placed in the shop window for an assistant, went in to enquire about the job and was told that only a female was wanted since there were already two women working in the shop and they would not be happy working with a man. On this basis he was not considered for the post.
2. The tribunal found that the applicant was not a lucid witness. There were discrepancies in his account, both as to when he visited the shop and his description of the man who he said he spoke to.
3. However, the evidence given on behalf of the Mr and Mrs Panayiotis came only from their son-in-law, Mr Stylianou, who was not present at the shop when the appellant called.
4. Despite these shortcoming in the applicant's evidence the tribunal accepted his account and found that he had been unlawfully discriminated against on the grounds of his sex. They made the award of £750 to which we have referred.
5. This is a preliminary hearing, held to determine whether the appeal raises any arguable point or points of law which ought to proceed to a full hearing.
6. Today, the appellants do not appear and are not represented. However, solicitors, Martin Smalley & Co, were instructed to settle the Notice of Appeal and by letter dated 20th January 2000 those solicitors informed the EAT that for financial reasons the appellants would not be represented at this hearing. They asked that we consider the grounds of appeal contained in the Notice of Appeal. That we have done.
7. The grounds fall essentially into two categories. First, there is an attack on the tribunal's findings of fact, accepting the applicant's account. It is said that the tribunal has failed to explain its reasons for preferring the applicant's account. Our jurisdiction is limited to errors of law. We cannot retry the facts. That is, effectively, what we are being asked to do. It seems to us that the appellants failed in their defence principally because no direct evidence was given on their behalf. That brings us to the second ground of complaint.
8. It is said that the appellants asked for an adjournment of the hearing which had been listed for a date when they had a pre-arranged holiday abroad. That request was refused. Consequently they could not give direct evidence as to what happened on the day in question.
9. The listing history of this case is as follows. By letter dated 29th July 1999 to the Employment Tribunal Mr Stylianou asked for a postponement of the original hearing date, fixed for 19th August on the grounds that they would be abroad on holiday and would not be available for the hearing. He asked for a fresh date after 23rd August.
10. That application was allowed and by a letter dated 4th August the tribunal adjourned the hearing to 15th September 1999.
11. On 26th August Mr Stylianou wrote again to the tribunal. This time he asked for a postponement because on 15th September they would be bringing their parents back from Birmingham International Airport.
12. That application was refused by letter dated 8th September 1999. The Chairman considered that alternative arrangements for transporting the parents could be made.
13. We make two observations. First, the Notice of Appeal dated 8th November 1999 was out of time so far as the interlocutory order of 8th September 1999 is concerned. There are no grounds advanced for extending time. Secondly, the tribunal's discretion to order or refuse a postponement is a wide one. Carter v Credit Change Ltd [1979] ICR 908. Having allowed one postponement application we cannot say that the refusal of the second, for the reasons advanced by Mr Stylianou, ought to be characterised as perverse.
14. In these circumstances we have concluded that this appeal raises no arguable point of law and consequently it must be dismissed at this preliminary hearing stage.