United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellants	MR T KIBLING (of Counsel)
For the Respondent	MR D O'DEMPSEY (of Counsel)


 


HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER CLARK

1. This is a claim by the Applicant before the Nottingham Employment Tribunal, Mr Chapman for unfair dismissal, redundancy payment, pay in lieu of notice and failure to provide an itemised wage statement, contained in an originating application presented on 19^th February 1999. In that document he alleged that he had been employed by the Respondent, Beauvale Furnishings Ltd (The Company), from February 1996 until 16^th December 1998, that is in excess of the 2 year qualifying period of service for the purposes of his first two claims.
2. By their Notice of Appearance, the Company claim that his period of continuous employment commenced on 1^st April 1997. He had less than two years service on termination. It was there pleaded that between the 12^th February 1996 and 1^st April 1997, the Applicant worked for the Company on a self-employed basis; alternatively that any contract between the parties during that period was void for illegality, in that it was a fraud on the Revenue. The issue of continuous service was taken at the preliminary hearing held before an Employment Tribunal chaired by Mr T R Capp on 14^th April 1999. Two questions arose; was the Applicant continuously employed for a period of two years or more and if so was the contract tainted by illegality during that period? The Tribunal reserved their decision and met on the 5^th May 1999 for a discussion. Thereafter, by a decision promulgated with what are described as summary reasons on the 10^th June 1999, the Tribunal concluded that the Applicant was an employee from February 1996 until 16^th December 1998 and that the contract of employment was not tainted by illegality.
3. Against that decision the Company entered a Notice of Appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, relying on the decision promulgated with summary reasons, on 21^st July 1999. On the 29^th July 1999, realising that in fact the decision was promulgated with summary and not extended reasons, the Company's solicitors wrote to the Employment Tribunal asking that the title of the reasons be corrected under the Slip Rule, Rule 10(9), to show that they were in fact extended reasons. Alternatively, they asked for an extension of time for a request for extended reasons, the normal time for such application under Rule 10, having by then expired. On the 11^th August 1999, the Tribunal replied indicating that the Chairman did not intend to provide full reasons and therefore his reasons were correctly labelled as being summary and further refusing the application for an extension of time to provide extended reasons. Accordingly, the Notice of Appeal fails to comply with Rule 3(1)(c) of the Employment Appeal Tribunal Rule (1993). In these circumstances this meeting for directions before me has been convened in order to determine whether the appeal can nevertheless proceed, bearing in mind the provision contained in Rule 39(3) of the Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules as explained by the Court of Appeal and William Hill Organisation –v- Gavas (1990) IRLR 488. An example of a reported case in which extended written reasons were dispensed with and the appeal allowed to proceed on the basis of a fairly full summary reasons is to be found in Wolesley Centres Ltd –v- Simmons (1994) ICR 503.
4. Mr O'Dempsey opposes their application on behalf of the Applicant below, (Respondent in this Tribunal), on the basis that the grounds of appeal, particularly in relation to what I will call the Legal Aid Board point, to be found at paragraph 11 of the Notice, require fuller reasons in order for this Tribunal to properly adjudicate on the issues in the appeal. I have read and carefully considered the so-called summary reasons which extend to some 26 paragraphs and the issues raised in the Notice of Appeal. I am quite satisfied that this appeal can properly proceed on the basis of the summary reasons and accordingly I shall direct that the appeal proceed on that footing.
5. Further, I am satisfied that this appeal raises arguable points of law and in these circumstances I shall dispense with an ex-parte preliminary hearing in this case and direct that the appeal proceeds to a full inter partes appeal hearing after the Applicant has lodged a Respondent's answer. For that purpose I shall further direct that the appeal be listed for 3 hours Category C; there will be exchange of skeleton arguments between the parties not less than 14 days before the date fixed for the full appeal hearing, copies of both skeleton arguments to be then lodged with the Court. There is no requirement for Chairman's notes of evidence.
6. Finally, I am told by Counsel that the substantive hearing of this case before the Nottingham Employment Tribunal has been fixed for the 26^th January 2000, I do not anticipate that this appeal will be heard before that date. In these circumstances it would appear to me to be in the interest of both parties, and this is confirmed by Counsel, that that date be vacated. However, that will be a matter for the Regional Chairman and the parties are advised to make a formal application to him for a postponement.