United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR T KIBLING (OF COUNSEL) (Instructed by) Messrs Camillins Solicitors 21 Ely Place London EC1N 6TD
For the Respondents	MISS P WHIPPLE (OF COUNSEL) (Instructed by) Messrs Le Brasseur J Tickle Solicitors Drury House 34-43 Russell Street London EC2B 5HA


 


JUDGE WILSON: This has been the final hearing of the Appeal brought by the original Applicant against the original Respondent and I shall refer to them by their original statuses in this Judgment. The Applicant is being represented today by Mr Kibling, having been unrepresented before the Employment Tribunal sitting at London (South) on 30^th March 1998. The Respondent has been represented today, as they were before the Employment Tribunal by Miss Whipple. In view of the nature of the case we have been considerably assisted by the skeleton arguments prepared by both Counsel and those skeleton arguments are to be appended to this Judgment and to be regarded as part of it.

1. The Employment Tribunal came to the conclusion unanimously that the application for unfair dismissal was dismissed and that her other applications were stayed upon conditions which are set out in the decision. We have been concerned only with the finding that the dismissal was not unfair. Because of the conclusion which we have reached we think that it is prudent for us to say no more about the facts of the matter.
2. We are persuaded that the Employment Tribunal fell into error principally because it took account of matters after the 3^rd November 1997 which was the date upon which the Applicant's letter of resignation dated 29^th October was received by the Respondent.
3. We also are persuaded that if a finding, in the alternative or otherwise, that a dismissal is fair is made by an Employment Tribunal, in order to fulfil the requirements of Rule 10(3) of the Industrial Tribunal Regulations 1993 Schedule 1, the reasons for coming to that conclusion should be set out in full at that point in the decision. It is not sufficient to do it by reference to an earlier part of the decision.
4. In our view, having regard to the error of law fallen into which the Tribunal fell, this matter should be remitted to a differently constituted Tribunal and by way of guidance only, we suggest the following questions should be asked by the Tribunal.

I. Did the Respondent breach the contract between itself and the Applicant?

II. If so, was it a fundamental breach so as to entitle the Applicant to regard herself as freed from obligation under it?

III. If so, was the breach repudiatory or anticipatory?

IV. If so, was it fair?

V. If so, why was it fair?

5. As I say, those questions are by way of assistance only and we add also, that the question of reasonableness does not fall to be considered in answering those questions, having regard to the Court of Appeal decision in Western Excavating Ltd -v- Sharp [1978] IRLR P.27, (the judgment of Lord Denning). Apart from that case, we have found assistance in the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Pedersen -v- The Mayor and Burgess of the London Borough of Camden [1981] IRLR 173 and East Lindsay -v- Daubney which is an Employment Appeal Tribunal decision reported in 1977 IRLR 181.


 


Case No: EAT/798/98

IN THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL

(To be heard on 19^th July 1999)

B E T W E E N :

RITA SINGH

Appellant

- and - LAMBETH HEALTH CARE NHS TRUST

Respondent

OUTLINE SUBMISSION OF THE APPELLANT

I. GROUNDS OF APPEAL

6. The Employment Appeal Tribunal erred in law in that:

i. it failed to determine that the decision on 22^nd October 1997 to exclude the Appellant from her contractual duties as a health visitor and instead seeking to find her alternative employment was not a fundamental breach and/or anticipatory breach of her employment contract sufficient to entitle her to claim constructive dismissal (the breach of contract issue)

ii. in determining whether the Appellant was entitled to claim that she had been constructively dismissed it took into consideration matters post-dating her resignation on 29^th October 1997 (the post dismissal issue)

iii. in determining in the alternative that the dismissal was fair took into consideration matters post-dating her resignation on 29^th October 1997 (the unfair dismissal issue).

II. THE BREACH OF CONTRACT ISSUE

It failed to determine that the decision on 22^nd October 1997 to exclude the Appellant from her contractual duties as a health visitor and instead seeking to find her alternative employment was not a fundamental breach and/or anticipatory breach of her employment contract sufficient to entitle her to claim constructive dismissal

The relevant findings of fact

7. The Employment Tribunal made the following findings of fact:

i. since 1992 the Appellant had worked for the Respondent as a health visitor (paragraph 2)

ii. on 21^st October 1997 Dr Assoufi provided a medical report which state that the Appellant could return to her health visit duties but that she was likely to be off work in the future with sickness if she did so (paragraph 13)

iii. at a meeting on 22^nd October 1997 the Appellant disagreed with Dr Assoufi's assessment as she felt she was able to return to health visiting duties without excessive absence in the future (paragraph 13)

iv. the Respondent's Ms McLaughlin wrote to the Appellant on 22^nd October 1997 and told her that health visitor duties would no longer be available to her (paragraph 13)

v. as a consequence of the letter dated 22^nd October 1997 the Appellant resigned on 29^th October 1997 (paragraph 14)

The documents before the Employment Tribunal

8. The following documents were before the Employment Tribunal:

i. The Appellant's contract of employment and job description which defines her post as a health visitor (see supplementary bundle)

ii. The letter dated 22^nd October 1997 from Dr Assoufi to Ms McLaughlin (see supplementary bundle)

iii. The letter dated 22^nd October from Ms McLaughlin to the Appellant (see supplementary bundle)

"We discuss the option of redeployment into sedentary work and Anita Sharma agreed to identify what posts were available to you. Clearly, this option depends on firstly such posts being available and secondly you agreeing to take this option. At the meeting you stated that you did not wish to undertake this type of work. I explained that the only option available, if a sedentary post was either not available or you did not wish to pursue this option would be dismissal on the grounds capability."

iv. the resignation letter dated 29^th October 1997 from the Appellant to the Respondent's Anita Sharma (see supplementary bundle).

Whether there was a "constructive" dismissal

9. In Pedersen -v- Camden London Borough Council [1981] ICR 674 Court of Appeal Lawton LJ identified three questions that need to be addressed to determine whether there has been a "constructive" dismissal:

i. what are the terms of the employment contract,

ii. did the facts as found by the Tribunal constitute a breach (or anticipatory breach) of contract by the employer, and

iii. was the breach a fundamental breach of contract. (See pages 677H to 678D and 680H.

10. The Employment Tribunal did not ask itself these questions but determined that there was no breach of contract at paragraph 21:

"The employer was at all times willing to employ the Applicant as a health visitor if the employer could be satisfied that she could attend regularly to do that job. Failing that, he would find other work for her if possible. That cannot possibly breach any of the duties an employer has to his employee, whether expressed or implied."

11. Had the Employment Tribunal asked itself the three questions at paragraph 4 above the only conclusion would have been that in the absence of a mobility clause as to job status/post that the decision not to allow the Appellant to work as a health visitor was in breach of her employment contract, and this breach was fundamental, see Coleman -v- S & W Baldwin [1977] IRLR 342 @ paragraph 10, Genower -v- Ealing, Hammersmith & Hounslow Area Health Authority [1980] AI:R297 @ paragraph 9 and Pedersen (Supra).
12. Alternatively, there had been an anticipatory breach of contract as the Respondent had told the Appellant in the letter dated 22^nd October 1997 that if she did not accept the option of redeployment into a sedentary work that she would be dismissed on grounds of capability, see Harrison -v- Holst Group Administration Ltd [1985] IRLR 240 Court of Appeal, Greenaway Harrison -v- Wiles [1994] IRLR 380 @ paragraphs 6-7 and Coleman (Supra) @ paragraph 10.
13. It matters not that the Respondent "had a good reason" for the breach as an employee cannot seek to deny that a constructive dismissal has occurred on the grounds that the circumstances justified the breach, see Wadham Stringer -v- Brown [1983] IRLR 46 @ paragraph 15.

III. THE POST DISMISSAL ISSUE

In determining whether the Appellant was entitled to claim that she had been constructively dismissed it took into consideration matters post-dating her resignation on 29^th October 1997

The Employment Tribunal's Decision

14. The Employment Tribunal determined under the rubric "Our Decision" as follows:

"We decided to stand back and look at the three incidents of 22^nd October (the interview), 29^th October (the resignation) and 7^th November (the letter offering to consider any report provided by the Applicant ) as a whole"

The Error of Law

15. Section 95(1)(c) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 focus on the conduct of the employer which caused the employee to resign. The Employment Tribunal fell in error in considering the letter dated 7^th November 1997 in determining whether there was a fundamental breach of the employment contract.
16. The Employment Tribunal also made a finding in paragraph 17 relating to the appointment that the Appellant had with a neurologist on 30^th October 1997 and the lack of response to the letter dated 7^th November 1997. These two matters were not relevant for the purpose of determining whether there had been a "constructive dismissal" or further whether the dismissal was fair.

IV. THE UNFAIR DISMISSAL ISSUE

In determining in the alternative that the dismissal was fair took into consideration matters post-dating her resignation on 29^th October 1997

17. It is trite law that matters which post date the "constructive" dismissal are not relevant for the purposes of determining the fairness of the dismissal, see Polkey -v- A E Dauton Services Ltd [1988] ICR 142.
18. The Employment Tribunal determined in the alternative at paragraph 23 that the Appellant's dismissal if she had been constructively dismissed would have been fair.

"They (the Respondent) had been more than patient with the Applicant over many months and their actions in October and November could not be faulted"

19. The Employment Tribunal took into account matters which post dated the resignation and therefore erred in law.

V. ORDER OF THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL

20. This case was heard by the Employment Tribunal in a single day, 30^th March 1998. If the Appeal is allowed, the claim should be remitted to a new Tribunal to determine the claim again.

THOMAS KIBLING


 


Case No: EAT/798/98

IN THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL

(To be heard on 19^th July 1999)

B E T W E E N :

RITA SINGH

Appellant

- and - LAMBETH HEALTH CARE NHS TRUST

Respondent

THE MATERIAL DATES

27.07.92	The Appellant commenced employment with the Respondent as a health visitor
13.01.97	The Appellant off work on account of sickness
26.03.97	The occupational health assessment that the Appellant is not fit to return to work as a health visitor
22.10.97	The Appellant attends occupational health and report produced
22.10.97	The Appellant attends a meeting with Ms McLaughlin and Ms Sharma
29.10.97	The Appellant resigns
30.03.98	The claim before the Employment Tribunal determined
13.04.98	The written decision sent to the parties
28.10.98	The preliminary hearing before the Employment Appeal Tribunal
28.10.98	Amended grounds of appeal filed


 


Case No: EAT/798/98

IN THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL

(To be heard on 19^th July 1999)

B E T W E E N :

RITA SINGH

Appellant

- and - LAMBETH HEALTH CARE NHS TRUST

Respondent

RESPONDENT'S SKELETON ARGUMENT

Note:

(1) Respondent's Chronology attached.

(2) Reference in this Skeleton (and the Chronology) are to the Respondent's Bundle prepared for the Employment Tribunal hearing.

(3) This skeleton argument responds to the Amended Notice of Appeal dated 28^th October 1998 only. The Respondent understands that all other matters previously raised but not reflected in the Amended Notice of Appeal have been abandoned (as confirmed by Appellant's solicitors' letter dated 17^th November 1998).

THE DECISION

21. The knub of this case is that the Respondent told the Appellant on 22^nd October 1997 that she could no longer do health visiting duties but that alternative employment would be sought for her. In order to succeed, the Appellant has to show that that decision either (a) amounted to a dismissal (in the sense that her former employment was effectively withdrawn); or (b) was a fundamental breach of her contract entitling her to resign - ie was a constructive dismissal. The correct analysis is "ultimately a matter of fact and degree for the Industrial Tribunal to decide …"; further "much must be left to the commonsense of the Tribunal to reach the just conclusion in all the circumstances" (Alcan Extrusions -v- Yates [1996] IRLR 327).
22. The Tribunal clearly had in mind the 2 possible analyses of the situation when at paragraph 21 of the Decision it stated:

"We first asked ourselves was there a dismissal? This is always difficult when an employer in pursuance of a capability or redundancy situation seeks to find other work. It could be argued that either he has assigned a different task within the same employment contract or that he has ended the contract and immediately offered another, or that he has sought a variation of the contract."

23. The Tribunal then concludes on the facts that:

"The employer was at all times willing to employ the Applicant as a health visitor if the employer could be satisfied that she could attend regularly to do that job. Failing that, he would find other work for her if possible. That cannot possibly breach any of the duties an employer has to his employee."

24. In other words, neither analysis put forward in Alcan Extrusions -v- Yates is applicable. There has been no breach of contract at all by the employer, and so no dismissal, constructive or "direct".
25. The Respondent to this Appeal maintains that that conclusion was plainly the correct one to reach on the evidence before the Tribunal, with which the Employment Appeal Tribunal should not interfere (Pedersen -v- Camden LBC [1981] IRLR 173).

THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL

Paragraph 13 of the Decision (paragraph 6.1 of the Notice of Appeal)

26. The Tribunal was correct to conclude that there was no fundamental breach or anticipatory breach by the Respondent. The facts found at paragraphs 7-13 demonstrate

a. a very long history of sickness by the Applicant (she had been off work for 10 months continuously before the events complained of in October 1997);

b. sustained attempts by the Respondent to consult with the Appellant, to ascertain her medical status and prognosis, and to identify an alternative job for her;

c. a failure by the Applicant to co-operate with those attempts ("she failed to attend the majority of meetings with management and doctors" - paragraph 10 of the Decision).

27. More specifically, in determining its management of the Appellant, the Respondent took steps to ensure it was well-informed as to her condition (by seeking information from her and by referring her to Occupational Health); and to consult with the Appellant (by setting up regular meetings) (see East Lindsay DC -v- Daubney [1977] IRLR 181).
28. When on 22^nd October 1997 the Respondent (by Ms McLaughlin) was determined that HV duties would no longer be available to the Appellant, the decision was based on the Occupational Health report of 21^st October 1997 (p.212 and paragraph 13 of the Decision). It was reasonable for the Respondent to rely on that report: Dr Assoufi (its author) had had available to him the reports of the Appellant's GP and consultant rheumatologist, and had examined the Appellant on several occasions. Indeed, Dr Assoufi agreed with the Appellant's own doctors that the Appellant was fit to return to work at that stage (the consultant rheumatologist indicating that she had been fit since August 1997). This was not a case where the employer was faced with conflicting reports. But of the 3 doctors, only Dr Assoufi addressed the issue of future performance, and concluded there was a likelihood of absence from work in the future.
29. It was a term of the Appellant's contract of employment that she would attend the Occupational Health services if required to do so in order to "determine your continued fitness to carry out the duties of this employment" (p.2).
30. The question then is whether it was reasonable for the Respondent to rely on Dr Assoufi' report. The Respondent, as a layman, was not required to evaluate the medical evidence (Liverpool Area Health Authority -v- Edwards [1977] IRLR 471). However, even to the layman, Dr Assoufi's opinion certainly strikes a chord of commonsense. His conclusions were reasoned and seemingly fair. The Respondent acted reasonably in relying on the report.
31. Thus, the Tribunal was correct on the evidence before it to conclude that there was no fundamental or anticipatory breach of the contract of employment.

Paragraph 21 of the Decision (paragraph 6.2 and 6.3 of the Notice of Appeal)

32. At paragraph 21 the Tribunal asks itself whether there was a dismissal. The conclusion on the facts was that the Respondent was "at all times" willing to employ the Appellant as a HV if the Respondent could be satisfied that she could attend regularly to do that job. That conclusion on the facts applies at whichever stage in the story the "snapshot" is taken, and obviously applies on 22^nd October 1997 when the decision to move the Appellant away from HV duties was taken.
33. Of relevance to the assessment of the Respondent's conduct is the fact that an offer of alternative employment was made. The Tribunal concludes that the Appellant had the opportunity "at any stage" and as late as 7^th October 1997 to take advantage of that offer. Again, the conclusion applies at whichever stage in the story the "snapshot" is taken and is certainly true on 22^nd October 1997.
34. Thereby, the Tribunal established that there was no dismissal on 22^nd October 1997 when the Respondent decided not to allow the Appellant to carry on being a HV. The Tribunal had plentiful evidence upon which to reach this conclusion which should not be interfered with.
35. On the analysis that the Appellant was dismissed on 22^nd October 1997, the Respondent accepts that events post-22^nd October are not relevant. However, it is to be remembered that in the Tribunal the Appellant had no representation and it was far from clear how she put her case. The Respondent makes the following observations:

a. The Tribunal was obviously correct to consider the "whole story" before attempting to analyse it for its legal significance. The events after 22^nd October are part of the whole story. The Tribunal, applying commonsense, was correct not to close its mind to them;

b. The Tribunal was at pains to ensure that the Appellant, acting in person, did not miss a good point. It was therefore correct to see whether events after 22^nd October 1997 gave her cause for complaint or affected the situation on or before 22^nd October 1997. (One point that could of course be made by the Appellant is that by offering her the opportunity to prove a second report from a specialist in the letter of 7^th November 1997, the Respondent was doing something which it should reasonably have done before coming to its decision on 22^nd October 1997). The Tribunal therefore correctly considered the events of 7^th November 1997 and concluded that in relation to them also the Appellant had no grounds for any complaint of unfairness;

c. The letter of 7^th November 1977 provides evidence, which the Tribunal was entitled to take into account, as to the Respondent's general approach to managing the Appellant's long-term sickness in the earlier period up to 22^nd October 1997. If it was in any doubt as to the Respondent's attempts to be fair, then the offer of 7^th November 1997 - which the Respondent did not need to make - demonstrates that the Respondent was applying a fair hand.

GENERAL

36. In summary, there is no merit in the Appellant's case at first instance or on appeal. The Tribunal clearly and correctly came to the conclusion that the Appellant's perspective on matters was wholly unreasonable. The efforts made by the Respondent to assist the Appellant are amply borne out by the documentary evidence, and are in stark contract to the lack of effort made by the Appellant who failed to appear for pre-arranged appointments and meetings (paragraph 10), failed to return to work even though her specialist declared her fit in August 1997 (paragraph 12); and failed to tell Ms McLaughlin on 22^nd October 1997 that she was due to see a neurologist on 30^th October 1997 (paragraph 17). She failed to help herself. She further failed to appreciate the effect of her absence on the Respondent's ability to comply with its statutory and contractual obligations to provide health visiting services to the community.
37. The Tribunal reached the correct decision on the basis of overwhelming evidence from the Respondent.

PHILIPPA WHIPPLE


 


Case No: EAT/798/98

IN THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL

B E T W E E N :

RITA SINGH

Appellant

- and - LAMBETH HEALTH CARE NHS TRUST

Respondent

CHRONOLOGY (prepared by the Respondent)

{The references to page numbers are to the Respondent's Bundle before the Employment Tribunal}

13.01.97	RS goes on sick leave
04.02.97	RS referred to Occupational Health (p.143)
18.02.97	RS fails to attend Occupational Health appointment (but there is confusion on dates - see p.144)
26.03.97	RS attends Occupational Health. Not fit for her duties (p.146)
10.04.97	JM writes to RS to tell her of meeting on 23.04.97 (p.147)
18.04.97	RS writes to JM to postpone meeting until after she has seen her specialist on 28.04.97
15.05.97	JM writes to confirm rescheduled meeting on 21.05.97 (p.149)
21.05.97	RS doe not turn up at meeting (p.151). Another meeting schedule for 05.06.97 (p.151) and Occupational Health appointment on 18.06.97 (p.150)
27.05.97	RS writes explaining non-appearance at meeting on 21.05.97 (did not get notification) (p.152). Wants to cancel meeting on 05.06.97 due to treatment day before and suggests meeting on 18.06.97)
30.05.97	JM reschedules meeting for 23.06.97 (p.153)
23.06.97	Meeting with JM and Anita Sharma (Personnel). Discuss options given long-term absence (p.156). Further meeting scheduled for 07.07.97
02.07.97	Occupational Health appointment at 10.00 am. RS does not attend (p.157). Sends fax to explain non-attendance at 9.40 am - she has been unwell since ultrasound on 30.06.97 (p.158)
05.07.97	Meeting with JM and Anita scheduled for 07.07.97 cancelled by RS (p.159)
08.07.97	JM writes re-arranging appointment with Occupational Health for 21.07.97; and meeting with JM and Anita on 29.07.97, at which decision re future employment will be made (p.160-161)
17.07.97	RS faxes requesting taxi dockets to enable her to attend Occupational Health (not in bundle)
21.07.97	RS again does not attend Occupational Health appointment (p.162)
22.07.97	JM writes to RS. Last chance for attending Occupational Health on 30.07.97. Meeting with JM and Anita on same day. Failure to attend could result in disciplinary action. Employment options to be discussed (p.163)
23.07.97	RS writes JM requesting home assessment by Occupational Health because she risks breaking her neck if she visits Occupational Health (p.166)
25.07.97	JM writes reminding RS of the importance of attending Occupational Health appointment and meeting afterwards; and confirming taxi available (p.167)
30.07.97	RS fails to attend Occupational Health. But Occupational Health (Dr Assoufi) reports that she has received a GP report stating she had a medical condition. He considers she will remain off sick for foreseeable future and he does not support retirement on medical grounds (p.168). Also fails to attend meeting with JM and Anita (p.169). Meeting arranged for 07.08.97. Future employment will be discussed.
31.07.97	RS complains to Sir Alan Renz (Trust Chairman) re JM (p.172-178). Grievance hearing scheduled for 18.08.97
07.08.97	RS fails to attend meeting. JM writes: she has reviewed employment options, and has concluded only option to termination contract on grounds of incapability; and to offer another meeting on 21.08.97 to finalise this (p.184-185).
18.08.97	RS cancels scheduled Grievance hearing for same day
18.08.97	Jane Schofield (Director) writes to notify of Grievance hearing on 08.09.97; and meeting with Personnel on 10.09.97 (p.186)
?21.08.97	RS writes to say cannot attend on 21.08.97 and requests meeting for 26.09.97 (p.183)
21.08.97	RS does not attend meeting with JM. JM writes to reschedule for 10.10.97 (p.187)
26.08.97	RS writes to Ms Schofield to rearrange Grievance hearing scheduled for 08.09.97; to JM to reschedule meeting for "unfair dismissal" to 26.09.97; and to Sir Alan (p.188-190)
29.09.97	Ms Schofield writes to RS refusing to change Grievance hearing date - 08.09.97 (p.191-192)
02.09.97	JM writes refusing to change meeting of 10.09.97 (P.193)
08.09.97	RS fails to attend Grievance hearing (p.195). Ms Schofield writes asking if RS wants another date
10.09.97	RS attends meeting with JM, Anita and union representative. Options discussed. Further appointment with Occupational Health arranged for 18.09.97; and further meeting with JM on 19.09.97 (p.196-197)
18.09.97	RS attends Occupational Health, but has not obtained report from specialist (p.199)
19.09.97	Meeting between RS and Jill Payne, Anita Sharma, Bernard Morgan. Report required from specialist; further meeting scheduled for 07.10.97 (p.202-203)
25.09.97	RS writes saying she will be well to return to work as HV on 03.11.97 and has chased her specialist for a report (p.204)
09.10.97	Occupational Health (Dr Assoufi) writes, having received report from specialist (Dr Venables, consultant rheumatologist) saying "I believe she will continue to have symptoms for the foreseeable future"; and that if she did resume work immediately she "will have sickness absence in the future because of her condition. Her symptoms are made worse by walking and climbing stairs and I understand her job as a Health Visit involves a great deal of these", and recommending a sedentary post (p.210)
10.10.97	Meeting with JM, Dawn Atkinson (union rep) and Sam James (Personnel). Discussed Occupational Health report. Further Occupational Health appointment 22.10.97; and meeting later on same day (p.211)
22.10.97	RS attends Occupational Health. Occupational Health reports again: "she is likely to have above average sickness absence" and "her pattern of sickness absence will continue"; "physical demands of HV post may be too much for her"; "I do not believe that reducing her hours of work will impact on her sickness absence in the future. Were a sedentary job to be available to her, I would anticipate that she would be less likely to be periodically unfit … but still higher than average" (p.212)
22.10.97	RS attends meeting with Dawn Atkinson (union rep), JM and Anita were present. RS disagreed with Occupational Health report. Further meeting arranged for 03.11.97. If redeployment (into sedentary job) not possible, RS's contract will be terminated (p.213-214)
29.10.97	RS writes: "I consider decisions made as a fundamental breach of my contract, and am forced to discontinue my employment with LHC Trust" (p.215)
03.11.97	RS does not attend meeting (p.216)
07.11.97	Anita Sharma writes saying RS can obtain second report from specialist of her own choosing, by 24.11.97. Invited to attend another meeting, but must notify by 12.11.97 if wishes to (p.216-217)
20.11.97	RS has not contacted Anita. Dawn Atkinson unable to contact RS. Anita writes: assumes RS stands by resignation of 29.10.97 (p.218)