United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	IN PERSON


 


MR JUSTICE CHARLES: The parties to this appeal are a Mr Morgan and an organisation called Kente. The appeal is against a decision of the Employment Tribunal which sat on 23 March 1998. The decision of that Tribunal was that the Respondent did not discriminate against the Applicant on the grounds of his sex.

The matter comes before us today on the preliminary procedure, pursuant to which Mr Morgan has to satisfy us that there is a reasonably arguable point of law that arises on this appeal.

In the original Notice of Appeal the grounds set out are in the following terms:

"The Tribunal misdirected itself in finding (at page 4) that the difference in the Applicant's treatment was not on grounds of sex: King v Gt Britain China Centre [1992] ICR 516]."

In Mr Morgan's PHD form it says he would seek to add to that ground the following:

"The Tribunal's conclusion that the Applicant was not discriminated by reason of his sex was perverse in the light of the previous findings that there was a difference in treatment in the ways the applications for a pay increase were dealt with and in May 1997 Miss Neckles made a remark that Mr Morgan, the Applicant, had problems being managed by a woman."

In our judgment it is clear from the Extended Reasons of the Tribunal and, in particular paragraphs 13 and 14, that they considered these points of fact and law. In paragraph 13 of the Extended Reasons they set out the relevant section of the Sex Discrimination Act and towards the end of the paragraph they say this:

"13. ... We also bear in mind the guidance given to the Tribunals in King v Great Britain China Centre [1992] ICR 516, Court of Appeal. We know that an employer is unlikely to come to the Tribunal and admit that he has unlawfully discriminated against an employee. This means that where there is a difference in sex and a difference in treatment, the Tribunal must look carefully at the employer's explanation and if it is dissatisfied with that explanation, it may infer that the difference in treatment was because of the Applicant's sex. We have regard to the law.

14. Conclusions. In this case the employers' explanation for the difference in treatment of Mr Morgan was that the cases of Mr Morgan and Miss Samuels were in fact different. Having looked very carefully at the facts, we accept that explanation. There was a difference in treatment in the ways the applications for a pay increase were dealt with but we are not satisfied that the difference in treatment was on the grounds of Mr Morgan's sex. We make that finding notwithstanding that in May 1997 Miss Neckles made the remark which is attributed to her in exhibit R2 that Mr Morgan had problems being managed by a woman."

It is clear that Mr Morgan is disappointed with those findings of fact but, in our judgment, they do not demonstrate that the Tribunal were perverse. On the contrary, the Extended Reasons demonstrate clearly that the Tribunal had regard to the relevant principles of law and applying them reached conclusions of fact, which is a matter that is within their province.

We accordingly have concluded that this appeal discloses no reasonably arguable point of law and we dismiss it.