At the Tribunal | |
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE H WILSON
LORD DAVIES OF COITY CBE
MR R N STRAKER
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
For the Appellant | MRS S MORRIS (Representative) MORRIS LACEY MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS LTD 27 The Green Ewell, Epsom Surrey KT17 3JS |
HIS HONOUR JUDGE H WILSON: Mr Bellwood, a Clinician of many years standing and a Budget holder of many years standing, was dismissed for misconduct, in that he did not obtain authorisation from his Line Manager to attend the course in question, provided his own authorisation for that course and failed to obtain authorisation to take time off to do the course. That was found by the Trust to be a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence. The questions urged by Mrs S Morris were whether the investigation carried out by the Trust was reasonably thorough and whether the sanction of dismissal was one that fell within the bound of reasonable responses open to a fair minded and reasonable employer.
The Tribunal correctly identified and directed itself about the law in question and referred to the authorities to which it had been referred. We note that there was a bundle of correspondence and other documents amounting to 171 pages, and that four witnesses on behalf of the Trust were called and three on behalf of the Applicant, Mr Bellwood. The findings of fact were set out in the Extended Reasons. In particular, one finding of fact was that in December 1996, guidelines had been issued for Line Managers and Budget Holders which stipulated the circumstances under which money should be allocated and distributed. As a Budget Holder, it was Mr Bellwood's duty to familiarise himself with those guidelines and to apply them. He did not do so. The Tribunal went on to make a large number of findings of primary fact (including a finding that Mrs Hall who conducted the disciplinary procedures in the first place took into account his service), and concluded that the Applicant had deliberately conducted himself in an underhand manner which constituted gross misconduct for which dismissal was merited.
A final finding of fact was that, in the course of the hearing, the evidence of Mr Lees and other management figures was preferred to that of Mr Bellwood. It was accepted that Mr Bellwood had no authority to authorise his own course. What followed from that situation was a failure to cover for his other contractual commitments.
So far as the investigation was concerned, that was done by Mr Sparrow. The Tribunal devoted two pages of Extended Reasons to consideration of the investigation that was carried out and concluded that the enquiries were reasonable and indeed, resulted in the deletion of one of the four charges originally faced by Mr Bellwood. Under the circumstances, the Tribunal concluded that the enquiry was reasonable and provided sufficient material upon which a genuine belief in Mr Bellwood's conduct could be formed, sustained and fairly considered by the Disciplining Officer and the Officer who heard the appeal.
So far as the matter of dismissal is concerned, the Tribunal bears in mind in paragraph 12 that there was no procedural issue in the case and that the question focused entirely on the appropriateness of dismissal alone. They concluded that there is no disciplinary procedure which can cater for every contingency. It is clear from the procedure of the Respondent that breach of trust was a matter which would justify disciplinary action. In the circumstances of this case, the Tribunal was clear that Mr Bellwood was well aware that, if he acted in an unauthorised manner concerning substantial amounts of money for which he had some responsibility, dismissal would be a sanction that would be open to the Respondent in accordance with its disciplinary procedures.
Finally, the Tribunal stated that the conclusion which the Dismissing and the Appeal Officers had come to indicated that they genuinely believed that Mr Bellwood committed a determined and underhand piece of misconduct. As they were genuine in that understanding, the Tribunal is not in a position to find that their decision to dismiss was unreasonable.
Nothing is urged in the skeleton argument or in the submissions made by Mrs Morris to us today, which disturbs the findings of the Tribunal. Those findings to us have been based upon two days of evidence and a very careful consideration of all the appropriate matters which had to be considered. As the Tribunal itself said, the fact that it was a severe punishment and perhaps one which would not have been chosen by another employer is not a matter which either the Tribunal or we can take into account. Accordingly (because we can see no reasonable prospect of success f rom a full hearing) this appeal must be dismissed.