United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	NO APPEARANCE OR REPRESENTATION BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT


 


JUDGE JOHN BYRT: This is a preliminary hearing in an appeal against the decision promulgated on 4th November 1998 of an Employment Tribunal Chairman sitting alone at Middlesborough. On that occasion, he held that Ms Griffiths' claim that she had been bullied, victimised and sexually harassed by officers and members of the Trade Union, UNISON was scandalous, frivolous, vexatious and accordingly, he ordered that the Originating Application be struck out for those reasons.

Ms Griffiths made two main allegations. One was that she had been unjustifiably disciplined contrary to Section 64(1) of the Trade Union Labour Relations Act 1992, because the union failed to support her in a particular claim she wished to mount; and secondly, that she was the victim of sexual discrimination by a Trade Union of which she was a member. This would be contrary to Section 12(3) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. At the insistence of the Respondents in this case, the Tribunal listed this case for hearing in order that Miss Griffiths might show cause why her application should not be struck out.

It was first listed in February of last year, on 6th April, again in early September and finally, on 20th October. On each of those occasions the hearing was postponed on the application of Miss Griffiths on the grounds that she was too unwell to attend. The medical conditions of which she complained were vertigo, tinnitus, stress, anxiety symptoms. On some occasions her application was supported by a medical certificate that vouched for her condition. With regard to the hearing on 20th October, however, no such medical certificate was forwarded and the result was that, on that occasion, the Chairman decided enough was enough, that the matter had to be dealt with and accordingly, he decided to hear the case in the absence of Miss Griffiths. As a result of that, he dismissed the claim under the Section 64 of the Trade Union Labour Relations Act on the basis that there was no conduct or belief in conduct as set out in Section 65. He determined there was no legal basis for the complaint being made under the former section.

So far as the allegations under the Sex Discrimination Act is concerned, he noted that the allegations made were wholly unparticularised. The Chairman took the view that Miss Griffiths never really intended to prosecute the claims and indeed, he noted that various letters had been sent to the Employment Tribunal with scurrilous allegations about the Respondents scribbled on the outside of the letters and he concluded that her main aim was to seek to maximise the Respondents' embarrassment. Accordingly, he struck the case out.

This matter now comes before us as an Appeal to see whether there is an arguable point that should go before a full hearing of this Tribunal. We have seen the grounds of appeal and we think the only phrase that can be used for the Appeal Notice is that it is a sad document. Basically, it alleges that the Employment Tribunal who heard her case was biased and furthermore, she complains that the case was heard in her absence. We have considered both those points in the context of the history of this matter and can find no point of law capable of being argued so as to warrant this matter going forward to a full hearing before this Tribunal. Accordingly, we think that the best course to take is that this appeal be dismissed at this stage and we dismiss it.