United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	Mrs J Cookson (In Person)


 


JUDGE PETER CLARK: This is an appeal by the Applicant before the Southampton Employment Tribunal, Chairman Mr L J Guyer, sitting alone on 24 September 1998, against that Chairman's decision, promulgated with Extended Reasons corrected by a certificate dated 29 October 1998 dismissing her claims contained in an Originating Application presented to the Central Office of Employment Tribunals on 25 June 1998 on the grounds that they were time barred.

By her Originating Application the Appellant claimed that she had been constructively unfairly and wrongfully dismissed by the Respondent Hampshire Constabulary. She also included a claim for malicious/injurious falsehood, in respect of which the Tribunal has no jurisdiction. The Respondent took the point that her complaints of unfair dismissal and wrongful dismissal were out of time.

Based on the Appellant's oral evidence and documentary evidence adduced by both sides the Chairman made the following findings of fact. The Appellant commenced employment with the Respondent as a matron/detention officer at Southampton police station on 29 May 1991. On 24 September 1997 she wrote to Superintendent Wyeth at that police station stating: "as from the above date I give you one month's notice" and indicated that she had obtained a new position. She also asked to be considered for relief work as Detention Officer if required.

Her last day of full-time work was about 21 October 1997. Thereafter she received her form P45 and commenced a new job at Southampton Hospital. She then worked on 25 separate occasions for a total of just over 140 hours as a casual detention officer at Lyndhurst police station. On 11 February 1998 Deputy Chief Constable Nelson wrote to the Appellant informing her that her services as a relief matron would no longer be used. She did no further relief work after that date.

On 8 June 1998 she wrote to the Respondent saying that she was going to take the matter to an Industrial Tribunal for a claim of constructive dismissal. She then presented her complaint on 25 June.

The Chairman found that after 24 October 1997 the Appellant was not employed under a contract of employment by the Respondent. There was no mutuality of obligation between the parties. In the alternative he found that any continuing employment after that date ended, at latest on 11 February 1998. Accordingly the complaint was presented outside the ordinary three month time limit provided for in s.111(2)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. He then went on to consider whether it was reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented within time. For the reasons given at paras 21-22 of the reasons he found that it was. Accordingly the claim of unfair dismissal was time-barred. He also rejected her complaint of constructive dismissal based on her letter dated 8 June 1998. On any view she was not then employed under a contract of employment by the Respondent.

We should add, for completeness, that although not expressly referred to in the reasons, the complaint of wrongful dismissal was subject to precisely the same considerations as to limitation by virtue of Article 7 of the Employment Tribunal Extension of Jurisdiction Order 1994.

In this appeal Mrs Cookson appears before us in person. That is always a difficult task, particularly before this EAT whose jurisdiction is limited to correcting errors of law. She accepts that she did not put in her Form IT1 in time because she was awaiting the outcome of her internal appeal. That is not, on the authorities, an acceptable excuse. See Bodha v Hampshire Area Health Authority [1982] ICR 200. Further, the question as to whether it was reasonably practicable to present her complaint within time is essentially a question of fact for the Employment Tribunal, Palmer v Southend-on-Sea Borough Council [1984] ICR 372, 385B. Having considered the Chairman's reasoning we can find no grounds in law for interfering with his decision and accordingly this appeal must be dismissed.