United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	IN PERSON


 


MR JUSTICE HOLLAND: For many years the Applicant, Mr Audley, was employed by Vauxhall Motors. He went to work for them in 1956 and it would seem that he remained with them until a date in 1987 or 1988, on which there was a transfer of the undertaking to another organisation. He has very strong views indeed about the behaviour of Vauxhall Motors with respect to the pension fund run for employees. As expressed by the Chairman of the Employment Tribunal:

"14 (k) The central issue of the claim against Vauxhall Motors, was that at the time of the transfer to AWD Ltd, Vauxhall had deliberately arranged for prospective pensioners to be transferred out of the main Vauxhall Pension Fund, so that after making actuarial capital transfers to the new pensions fund, Vauxhall could take advantage of the substantial capital over-funding in the original Fund. This was likely to substantially disadvantage employees such as Mr Audley."

Mr Audley has, in the intervening period, sought to find a remedy to this problem and indeed at one stage was involved in an action in the Chancery Division, heard by the then Vice Chancellor, Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson. We know no more about that matter other than that it did not give satisfaction that was sought.

The matter comes before us in these circumstances. On 1 August 1998 Mr Audley made an application to an Industrial Tribunal. The complaint, as drafted by him, was in these terms:

"Pension Fund maladministration by the Vauxhall Motors Company Director Trustee and the reneging by the Company of its written assurances to its employees in order to gain by deception, duress and coercion, a financial benefit of around £700 million at the expense of the employee and company pensioner. My personal loss after 34 years service with Vauxhall Motors is in the region of £100,000."

The matter came before an Employment Tribunal sitting at Bedford on 13 November 1998. The Tribunal was, on that occasion, constituted by a Chairman, Mr Robjant, sitting alone. Mr Robjant directed himself that he had to resolve a preliminary issue, namely as to whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate in this matter. It will be obvious that the complaint, as drafted by Mr Audley, did not immediately fit into any of the heads of jurisdiction that are appropriate, as a matter of law, for Employment Tribunals.

That, of course, was not the end of the matter. Mr Audley was unrepresented and it was important to see whether, with knowledge of the law, it could be accommodated by one of the heads of jurisdiction. To that end the Chairman, as appears from his Extended Reasons, set about identifying the matters about which Mr Audley complains. He then took those matters and sought to see whether any such could come within his jurisdiction. To that end he applied his mind to so much of the law as directs the jurisdiction of a Tribunal. He applied his mind further to an obvious problem, namely, that is, limitation. He directed himself that the nearest he could get to jurisdiction was on the basis that what was complained about was a breach of contract. He noted that the Tribunals had acquired jurisdiction to concern themselves with breaches of contract as from 12 July 1994 by virtue of the Employment Tribunals Extension of Jurisdiction (England and Wales) Order 1994. He notes that that provides:

"This Order does not enable proceedings in respect of a contract claim to be brought before an Employment Tribunal unless -

(a) the effective date of termination (as defined in section 55 (4) of the 1978 Act) in respect of the contract giving rise to the claim, or

(b) where there is no effective date of termination, the last day upon which the employee works in the employment which has terminated,

occurs on or after the day on which the Order comes into force."

He thereafter assiduously considered whether there could be any way in which, in the light of that provision, the matter could come before a Tribunal presented as a breach of contract issue, but was forced in the end to reach a conclusion set out at the end of his Extended Reasons in these terms:

"24. My principal finding is that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear this claim because it is statute barred, because the contract on which it is based (namely the employment contract with Vauxhall Motors) had come to an end at the time of the transfer to AWD Ltd, whilst the act on which Mr Audley relies (namely the changes made to the Pension Fund) had occurred at the latest in 1989. Furthermore, it appears that the relevant contract terminated well before the Tribunals acquired their contract jurisdiction on 12th July 1994. However, I have done my best to investigate what other arguments Mr Audley might be able to put forward. None appear to have any merit. It appears unlikely that it could be argued that the relevant contract terminated after 12th July 1994. But even if such an argument could be put forward, the latest date for which Mr Audley can argue is 31st December 1994: and that leaves him still having to face two time bars: the six year limitation period of the Limitation Act 1980, and the three months time limit of the 1994 Order and the 1996 Act. I can see no argument which might overcome the Limitation Act time bar. And I find that no reasonable Tribunal, in any event, would find that there was any basis on which it could be found to have been 'not reasonably practicable' for Mr Audley to have made his claims within three months of 31st December 1994. Accordingly, I dismiss these claims."

On receipt of those reasons Mr Audley wrote to the Tribunal paying a handsome compliment to the way in which the Chairman had dealt with the matter, but inviting him to review his decision. This he did by way of written reasons of 3 December 1998. That review served to confirm his decision. Thereafter, Mr Audley initiated an appeal to this Tribunal. As we explained to him at the outset of this hearing, our function this morning is to seek to identify a point of law raised by this appeal. If there is such, then it is our duty to direct that the matter come back for a hearing at which Vauxhall Motors would be represented. If we cannot identify such, then it is our further duty to dismiss this appeal.

Mr Audley has addressed us with candour. His essential theme is as foreshadowed by the documentation, namely that he feels very strongly indeed about the way in which Vauxhall Motors behaved. He suspects fraud. He is quite certain there has been a loss sustained on a wide scale, not only by him, but also by contemporaneous fellow employees. He says candidly he has come here to plead the justice of the situation. We have had to reply to him with equal candour that that regrettably does not, of itself, raise a point of law and since it does not raise a point of law and since our reading of the Extended Reasons is quite unable to identify such, we have no option but to dismiss this appeal. Can we emphasise, for Mr Audley's benefit, that the problem he has confronted, since initiating his complaint to the Tribunals in August, is as follows.

Tribunals (and by such we include this Tribunal) are set up by Parliament and their powers are entirely within the Acts of Parliament and the Regulations that bear upon our functions. We do not have any inherent jurisdiction. We cannot develop such on our own behalf. Each time, in each case, we can only act within the bounds that Parliament has set. Thus it is, that it was not in any spirit of contempt that we emphasise this need to find a point of law; that we emphasise that we simply could not act on our gut reaction. It is that we really have no other option. Our function is circumscribed. It is for that reason that the Chairman took such pains to see whether he could fit the complaint into his powers, as prescribed by Parliament, and it is, for the same reason, that we have had no hesitation in saying that this appeal has no success.