At the Tribunal | |
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER CLARK
MR D A C LAMBERT
MRS J M MATTHIAS
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
For the Appellant | MR R THACKER (of Counsel) appearing under the ELAAS |
JUDGE PETER CLARK: By an Originating Application presented to the Employment Tribunal on 24 February 1998 the Appellant, Mr Dugdale complained of unfair constructive dismissal and disability discrimination against his former employer, the Respondent Woolworths PLC. The complaints were heard by an Employment Tribunal sitting at London (South) on 14-15 September 1998. By a reserved decision with Extended Reasons promulgated on 23 October 1998, both complaints were dismissed. Against that decision this appeal is brought by a Notice dated 2 December 1998. An application for review made by letter dated 9 November 1998 was dismissed by the Chairman under rule 11(5) of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure on 24 November 1998.
It was common ground that the Appellant was a disabled person within the meaning of s.1 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. He has cystic fibrosis.
His employment history with the Respondent began in august 1992 when he was taken on as a Saturday sales assistant. In the summer of 1995 he became a full-time sales assistant. His particular area of expertise was entertainment. In April 1996 the manager of the Wimbledon branch put him forward for consideration at a managerial assessment review. He was unsuccessful on that occasion but encouraged to reapply the following year when he had gained further experience.
In May 1996 he transferred to the Respondent's New Malden branch, where he came under a new manager, Mr Kabel. He started as a probationary entertainment specialist and was confirmed in that post one month later.
The thrust of the Appellant's case was that in various respects he was subjected to less favourable treatment by his manager on grounds of his disability, and those events, taken cumulatively amounted to a repudiatory breach of contract entitling him to treat himself as constructively dismissed. He resigned from the employment on 27 January 1998.
Before the Employment Tribunal the Appellant was represented by Counsel. The various matters of complaint are dealt with by the Employment Tribunal in their findings of fact and in their conclusions. It appears that where a conflict existed on the facts they preferred the version given by Mr Kabel to that given by the Appellant. We shall not repeat the Tribunal's factual findings and conclusions in this judgment; they speak for themselves.
In this appeal the Appellant is represented by Mr Thacker of Counsel under the ELAAS pro bono scheme. He has sought to persuade us that the Tribunal's decision is arguably perverse, principally on the ground that certain issues before the Tribunal were not dealt with specifically in their reasons. We have considered the detail of those submissions and we are unable to accept that any arguable point of law is made out. The Employment Tribunal is not obliged to set out each and every point raised during the hearing. It is sufficient that their reasons tell the parties why they have won or lost. Having considered the Tribunal's reasons we are satisfied that the Tribunal took into account all relevant matters and came to a permissible conclusion. Accordingly, this appeal must be dismissed at this preliminary hearing stage.