United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	IN PERSON


 


MR JUSTICE CHARLES: This appeal comes before us as a preliminary hearing, the purpose of which is for the Appellant to satisfy us that the appeal raises reasonably arguable points of law.

1. The matter was last before this Tribunal on 21 June 1999 when I gave a short judgment, adjourning what was then an inter-partes interlocutory hearing which resulted in today's hearing. Since then I have refused an application for an adjournment made by a Citizens Advice Bureau on behalf of Mr Bigmore.
2. The subject matter of the appeal is a decision of the Employment Tribunal sitting at Bury St Edmunds. The Extended Reasons for that decision were sent to the parties on 18 November 1998. The decision was as follows:

"The unanimous decision of the Tribunal is that the applicant was not at any relevant time a disabled person within the meaning of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and the claim of discrimination on grounds of disability is therefore dismissed."

3. Directions were then given in respect of the complaint of unfair dismissal which is not the subject matter of this appeal.
4. In his Notice of Appeal which was prepared by Solicitors on his behalf the grounds of appeal advanced by Mr Bigmore are in the following terms:

"The grounds upon which this Appeal is brought is that the Employment Tribunal erred in Law in finding that the Applicant, who suffers from Peri-tendonitis Crepitans was not a disabled person within the meaning of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 since on the basis of the medical evidence set [out] before the Employment Tribunal and the evidence given by the Appellant clearly indicated that the Appellant is a disabled person as defined by the said Act."

5. In summary that is an assertion that the conclusion reached by the Employment Tribunal is not a permissible option, having regard to the provisions of the Act.
6. Before us this morning Mr Bigmore appeared in person and made some additional points and in doing so, in particular referred to paragraphs B5 and C6 of the guidance relating to the definition of disability under the Act. He also pointed out that one of his complaints was that in their reasoning the Employment Tribunal focus upon the manner in which he can avoid problems arising from the diagnosed illness. At home he accepts that he could do that, but says that he would have difficulty in taking such steps to avoid the problems whilst at work.
7. Turning to the Extended Reasons, in our judgment they show that the Employment Tribunal considered and applied the correct statutory provisions and the correct provisions of the Code and Guidance.
8. It follows, in our judgment, that in their approach they did not err in law. Indeed, their approach accords with that which is set out in the decision of Goodwin v Patent Office [1999] IRLR 4, which was not reported when they made their decision. In our judgment, notwithstanding that we accept that Mr Bigmore disagrees with the conclusion reached by the Employment Tribunal on the basis of the points that he has advanced, the decision that the Employment Tribunal reached is one which is well within the band of decision that is open to them, on the application of the relevant primary legislation and the guidance that has been issued in respect of it. Indeed, we would go further and comment that, in our judgment, having regard to their findings of fact the conclusion reached by the Employment Tribunal was correct.
9. It follows that in our judgment the Notice of Appeal and the additional arguments put by Mr Bigmore today do not raise points that are reasonably arguable in law. Our jurisdiction is limited to dealing with errors of law and in these circumstances this appeal is dismissed.