At the Tribunal | |
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE D M LEVY QC
MR D CHADWICK
MR W MORRIS
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
For the Appellant | MS L WARREN (of Counsel) appearing under ELAAS |
HIS HONOUR JUDGE LEVY QC: On 22 April 1998, Mr Mohammed Rafiq ("the Appellant") sent a complaint to the Industrial Tribunal. He said that he had been unfairly dismissed and he had been the victim of racial discrimination. The circumstances in which this occured are these: as a Manager of a branch of Travis Perkins, he was required to send in returns detailing customers' vehicles leaving the branch which had been subject to search. The requirement arose because of the incident of theft. The employer alleged that some of his returns were false. He was dismissed. There was a hearing of the Appellant's complaints before an Employment Tribunal sitting at Leicester on 13 and 14 August. There were written representations made to the Tribunal which were considered on 21 September. The Tribunal sent its decision to the parties on 29 September 1998.
The unanimous decision of the Tribunal was that the Appellant was not unfairly dismissed. His claim alleging racial discrimination failed and was also dismissed. From that decision, the Appellant appeals by Notice of Appeal dated 9 November 1998. In his appeal, he challenges the decision both on racial discrimination and on unfair dismissal. The representative of the ELAAS scheme who appeared for him today, Ms L Warren, has told us that the Appellant wishes to withdraw the appeal against the finding of no racial discrimination. This leaves us to consider whether it would be right to let the appeal on unfair dismissal proceed to a full hearing.
The Appellant has prepared prior to the hearing, a full skeleton argument setting out matters on which he relies and both he and Ms Warren have addressed us on that skeleton argument. Essentially, the Appellant's case is that there was a conspiracy between other employees of the Respondent which led to him being held for the wrongdoing alleged by the Respondent. He complains that his conspiracy theory was not considered in the Extended Reasons of the Employment Tribunal. Further he complains that his original disciplinary hearing was not fair, in that the person who held it had been involved in the prior investigation. He complains that neither of these matters are dealt with in the Extended Reasons.
The Extended Reasons, however, do set out in some detail the case presented by the Respondent against the Appellant. There is a very clear finding that whatever imperfections there were at the initial hearing, the appeal hearing of the complaint against the Appellant was fairly and very fully conducted. Having regard to the findings of the Employment Tribunal, we are left with no doubt that the Respondent acted reasonably and not unfairly in dismissing the Appellant. In those circumstances, that Tribunal was not entitled to interfere with the decision made by the Respondent, even if it thought a different employer might have reached a different conclusion. We are not entitled to overturn a decision of the Employment Tribunal unless we perceive there to have been an error of law. Here we see no such error.
As we have explained to Ms Warren, and Ms Warren we understand has explained to the Appellant, an appeal only goes forward if a point of law arises. The Appellant has frankly said to us in his own address that what he wants is another bite of the cherry. He has had, in our judgment, a full and fair hearing before an Employment Tribunal. He is not entitled to a further hearing. No point of law arises on his appeal. There is sufficient detail in the Extended Reasons for him to know why he lost and why Mr Reynold's evidence was preferred to that which he presented. Essentially the Respondent was properly satisfied that the Appellant himself had made false returns. In those circumstances the appeal has no hope of success if it goes to a full appeal. We dismiss it at this stage.