United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR D RICHARD the Appellant in person


 


THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE HOLLAND Mr David Richard, the Applicant in this matter, was in seemingly part-time employment with the Respondent, British Council, from 1964 to 1979. Ever since leaving this employment, he has from time to time sought by way of complaints to Industrial Tribunals to seek compensation for redundancy and sex discrimination.

The history of this effort appears from a judgment of this Tribunal of 22 October 1997, from which we learn as of that date he had made no less than five applications, two of which had resulted in adverse decisions from this Tribunal. The judgment on that occasion commenced as follows:

"We hope that Mr Richards will not commence proceedings for the fourth occasion. He may appeal higher if he thinks we are wrong in this decision, but to commence further proceedings before an Industrial Tribunal would be wrong, a waste of time, inviting trouble. We hope you will take this advice in the spirit in which it is offered."

Unhappily, Mr Richards did not take this advice. Seeing reports of two cases in the newspaper, he reiterated his complaint, this time by way of an IT1 dated 13 May 1998. That complaint came on for hearing before a Tribunal at London (South) on 4 August 1998. On that occasion, the Applicant, Mr Richards, did not attend. Furthermore, he had given no notification of his potential absence. In such circumstances, the Tribunal dismissed his application. He appeals to this Tribunal. His essential primary case is that that decision of the Employment Tribunal to proceed in his absence was perverse, so perverse so as to give grounds to this Tribunal for dealing with the matter as a point of law.

When challenged by us as to how it comes about that, notwithstanding the advice of this Tribunal, he had commenced proceedings again, he told us that it was by way of a pre-emptive strike, anticipating some further decision that might ultimately unlock the gates and allow him access to compensation for that employment terminating it in 1979.

Turning back to the way the matter proceeds before us today, our only concern is whether this calls for an inter-partes hearing or whether there is no point of law so that we could and should dismiss it. We readily find there is no point of law. The decision of the Tribunal cannot conceivably be impugned as perverse. Further, in any event, in considering the weight and merits of the stance taken by that Tribunal, we happily bring into the balance the earlier history of this matter, the strong views expressed by this Tribunal, all of which go to suggest that this complaint was from the outset, vexatious. In all those circumstances, this appeal is dismissed.