United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR SENDALL (of Counsel) Appearing under the Employment Law Appeal Advice Scheme


 


MR JUSTICE HOLLAND: This matter started with a complaint by Miss Evadne Brown that she had been unfairly dismissed from her employment as a legal secretary with the Respondents, Messrs Gouldens, a firm of Solicitors. The complaint came for hearing before an Employment Tribunal held at London (North) on 9 October 1998 and the decision arrived at was in these terms:

"The unanimous decision of the Tribunal is that the Applicant was unfairly dismissed. The Applicant does not receive any compensation as the unfairness is due to the Respondents not following the proper procedures. We reflect the fact in assessing the compensation and we find that there was 100% chance that if the proper procedures had been followed the Applicant would have been dismissed."

From that finding the Applicant appealed to this Tribunal. The grounds of appeal were of her own composition and were lengthy, covering some pages of our bundle. Happily, she has had the advantage this morning of representation by Mr Sendall of Counsel, acting under the ELAAS Scheme. Mr Sendall has put before us a skeleton argument, commendably prepared in haste (and commendably to the point at that) and by such he has, in the judgment of this Tribunal, identified two points of law which merit an inter partes hearing, that is, a hearing at which the Respondents will be represented so this Tribunal may have the benefit of arguments on both sides.

The point that principally concerns us is the point taken in paragraph 3 of his skeleton argument and that is, as to the failure to make any basic award. He points out that the Tribunal did not, in terms, address itself at all to this matter and he puts forward a plainly arguable case that, by reference to Section 122(2) Employment Rights Act 1996, the scope for reducing that award to nil simply did not arise. We need say no more about the argument. We have identified it, it is plainly a matter to be resolved following an inter partes hearing.

We further give leave with respect to what essentially is his second point, and that is, his argument that had proper procures been followed so as to make any dismissal fair, nonetheless those would have inevitably taken time and, in the event, his client was deprived of the compensation that might otherwise have been due to her. He develops the point at various stages in his skeleton argument. He will forgive us if we regard this as secondary to his first point, but nonetheless we agree with him that it is arguable and it merits consideration at the inter partes hearing and thus it is, on the basis of those two essential points, that we have reached the decision already recorded in this judgment.

We conclude by drawing Miss Brown's attention to the advantage that she has had this morning arising out of representation by Mr Sendall. At the hearing below she had no representation to advance her case, and she may now appreciate that with issues of law such as we have identified, representation provides a considerable advantage. We say this in the hope that she will be able to arrange representation for herself at the inter partes hearing, so that her case may be advanced to similar effect as it has been advanced this morning.