United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR N S BAIN Messrs Pye-Smiths Solicitors The Hall 4 New Street Salisbury SP1 2QJ


 


JUDGE PETER CLARK: This appeal raises a novel point on the ambit of the Employment Tribunal's jurisdiction to hear a claim under the Extension of Jurisdiction Order 1994 made pursuant to what is now s.3 of Employment Tribunals Act 1996. Specifically, what is the ambit of the expression "a claim for damages for breach of a contract of employment or other contract connected with employment" contained in section 3(2)(a) of the 1996 Act?

The factual background is that the Applicant, a solicitor, practised under the style of Richard Griffiths & Co. Negotiations took place with a view to merging his firm with that of the Respondent, Pye-Smiths. On 6 February 1996 the firms merged and on that date three agreements in writing were signed.

The first was a Service Agreement made between the partners of Pye-Smiths and the Applicant and his wife Sarah Anne Griffiths. The second was a Work-In-Progress Agreement made between the Applicant and the partners of Pye-Smiths and thirdly an agreement headed Griffin Services made between the partners of Pye-Smiths and Griffin Services Limited. We are not strictly concerned with the third agreement.

It is common ground that the Service Agreement was a contract of employment within the meaning s.3(2)(a).

On 13 January 1998 the Applicant resigned and then presented an Originating Application to the Employment Tribunal on 9 April 1998 claiming unfair constructive dismissal and breach of contract. The breach of contract claim included a claim for breach of the Work-In-Progress Agreement. The question was whether that agreement was an "other contract connected with employment".

A Chairman, Mr D N Cowling, sitting alone at the Southampton Tribunal on 24 August, held that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to consider the claim based on the alleged breach of the Work-In-Progress Agreement. His Extended Reasons for that decision are dated 9 September 1998. It is against that decision that the Respondent firm now appeals.

Having considered the Respondent's argument we take the view that the point ought to be fully argued at an inter partes hearing. For that purpose we shall that the appeal be listed for two hours, category C. There should be exchange of skeleton arguments between the parties and copies lodged with this Tribunal not less than 14 days before the date fixed for the full appeal hearing. There are no further directions and in particular there is no requirement for the Chairman's Notes of Evidence in this case.