At the Tribunal | |
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER CLARK
MRS T A MARSLAND
MR L D COWAN
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
For the Appellant | NO APPEARANCE BY OR ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT |
JUDGE PETER CLARK: This is an appeal by Ms Hartley against a decision of the London (South) Employment Tribunal, promulgated with Extended Reasons on 5 August 1998 following a hearing held on 21 July, dismissing her complaint of automatic unfair dismissal by reason of pregnancy or for a connected reason contrary to s.99 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. A further complaint by her of unlawful sex discrimination was withdrawn at the hearing.
The Notice of Appeal settled by Counsel, was lodged by the Appellant's solicitors. She was represented by Mr Donnan a member of that firm, Edward Harte & Co., before the Employment Tribunal.
Those solicitors have notified the EAT that they no longer have instructions and have been removed from the record. On 20 January 1999, the Registrar wrote to the Appellant at her home address informing her of that fact, reminding her of the preliminary hearing fixed for today and inviting her to inform the EAT whether she would be attending the hearing. No reply was received to that letter and today she has neither appeared nor is she represented before us. In those circumstances, we shall proceed to consider this case on the papers, the issue before us being whether or not the appeal raises any arguable point of law fit to go for to a full appeal hearing.
The Facts
The Appellant commenced employment with the Respondent as payroll manager on 2 June 1997. Her case was that on 15 August 1997 she discovered she was pregnant. She had been absent from work on 9 July and between 4-8 of August 1997 suffering from illness later found to be pregnancy-related. Under the terms of her contract of employment she was not entitled to paid sick leave during the first three months of employment.
The Respondent discovered what they believed to be a breach of trust by the Appellant in her position of payroll manager resulting in her being paid for her periods of absence; pay to which she was not entitled. Disciplinary proceedings were held resulting in her summary dismissal on grounds of gross misconduct on 19 September 1997.
It was the Appellant's case that the reason for her dismissal was related to her pregnancy. The Respondent contended that the sole reason related to her alleged misconduct.
The Employment Tribunal carefully reviewed the evidence; made all necessary findings of fact, having formed a favourable impression of witnesses called on behalf of the Respondents and preferred the case advanced by them.
The grounds of appeal proceed on the premise that it was for the Respondent to provide its reason for dismissal. That is not correct in circumstances where the complainant does not have the necessary continuous service to bring a claim of ordinary unfair dismissal, and is relying on an inadmissible reason, see Smith v Hayle Town Council [1978] ICR 996.
Based on that false premise the grounds of appeal amount, essentially, to an attack on the Tribunal's factual findings leading to their conclusions as to the real reason for dismissal in this case. That is not permissible. Our jurisdiction is limited to considering questions of law, not issues of fact.
It these circumstances we can find no arguable point of law which ought to proceed to a full appeal hearing. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.