United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	THE APPELLANT IN PERSON WITH ASSISTANCE FROM MR CRAWFORD (OF COUNSEL) UNDER THE EMPLOYMENT LAW APPEAL ADVICE SCHEME (ELAAS)


 


JUDGE D M LEVY QC: This is the preliminary hearing ex-parte of an Appeal by Miss V Bugler, the Appellant from a decision of an Employment Tribunal sitting Cardiff. They sat for 3 days in October 1998 and for a further day in November 1998 to consider a complaint made by the Appellant that she had been unfairly dismissed. Their decision was promulgated to the parties on 3^rd December 1998. The decision was that she had not been unfairly dismissed.

1. From that decision the Appellant appealed by Notice of Appeal dated 3^rd January 1999. Because issues of bias were raised in the Notice of Appeal the Appellant was asked by this Tribunal to put the matters of which she complained on affidavit, which she did on 16^th March 1999. The Chairman commented on that affidavit by a document dated 6^th May 1999. This morning, the Appellant has presented her Appeal in person with some assistance from Mr Crawford, who is here on the ELAAS scheme. Below the Appellant was represented by her father and we understand that a Mr Clark, a solicitor, represented the Respondent. It is always of assistance to this Tribunal if, on the first sheet of the Extended Reasons, the representation of the parties is shown. It was not shown here.
2. We turn to the merits of the Appeal. The Appellant has put in, in her grounds of Appeal, a number of matters which really raise, apart from the issues of bias, questions of fact which were considered by the Tribunal in the course of the hearing. These are further documented in her Skeleton Argument which runs to some 8 pages. We have considered all the grounds of Appeal and all that she has said in her oral submissions made firmly and clearly, this morning, but we have found nothing in them which make us believe that this matter should go to a full hearing.
3. In a very full and careful decision the history of the Appellant's employment with the Respondent is set out by the Tribunal. It is also set out the difficulties with which the Respondent were faced with by the Appellant's own behaviour.
4. At page 11 of the Extended Reasons, the Tribunal having set out the basic facts found that the reason for dismissal was not victimisation as claimed by the Appellant but was conduct and they go to set out a number of reasons which led them to reach that decision. From the four corners of the decision, we are satisfied there was ample evidence to support each of the conclusions reached by the Tribunal.
5. As to the allegation of bias, we have carefully considered what the Appellant says in her affidavit and the Chairman's comments. Allegations of bias are always very seriously considered by this Tribunal because it is essential that a party has a fair hearing below. Having considered all the material before us, we are satisfied that the Appellant did have a fair hearing below and that there cannot be anything in her allegations that she did not have a fair hearing. She suffered because she was litigant in person, albeit assisted by her father and may sometimes have had difficulties in understanding such points as why the Tribunal made such decisions as why one document could properly be excluded and another included in the written material the Tribunal would consider.
6. The point which Mr Crawford brought to our attention as a potential decision of ground of Appeal was this. In the Chairman's comments, she had said in paragraph 1:

"I had no previous connection with either party or of any of the witnesses and no reason for bias."

7. Mr Crawford drew to our attention a document which was before the Tribunal which showed that on the 2^nd June 1994 the Chairman had, in fact, been party to a hearing of a different complaint where there had been an Application for a postponement by the Appellant, where the application had succeeded. Clearly, this is something which had escaped the Chairman's attention, but we do not think this error in her comment would be any reason for us to disbelieve anything which she says in her comments or any reason, as Mr Crawford tentatively submitted, for her refusing to hear the present case.
8. In all the circumstances of this case, we have, as we say, carefully considered all that has been said by the Appellant and by Mr Crawford. The decision to dismiss which the employers reached, the Employment Tribunal found , having properly considered all the facts, was a reasonable one. They therefore, were not entitled to interfere with it. We are not entitled to interfere with their decision unless we found it to be wrong in law. We find no error of law in the conclusion reached by the Employment Tribunal. In the circumstances, we dismiss this appeal at this stage.