United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

JUDGMENT ON COSTS
1. Pursuant to our order dated 7 July 1999 we have received written submissions from the parties as to costs. Neither party has asked for the opportunity to make oral submissions on costs.
2. Our power to award costs is contained in Rule 34 of the Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules, which reflects and is the rule authorised by s 34 Industrial Tribunals Act 1996. Mr Deakin was not in receipt of legal aid for the appeal. Rule 34 provides as follows:

(1) Where it appears to the Appeal Tribunal that any proceedings were unnecessary, improper or vexatious or that there has been unreasonable delay or other unreasonable conduct in bringing or conducting the proceeding the Tribunal may order the party at fault to pay any other party the whole or such part as it thinks fit of the costs and expenses incurred by that other party in connection with the proceedings

(2) Where an order is made under paragraph (1) of this rule, the Appeal Tribunal may assess the sum to be paid or may direct that it be assessed by the taxing officer, from whose decision an appeal shall lie to a judge.

3. In our judgment having regard to the findings set out in our earlier judgment as to the conduct of the appeals in this case (and in particular to paragraphs 67 and 98 thereof) we are satisfied that Appellant company should pay Mr Deakin's costs of the appeal against (a) the decision of the Employment Tribunal as to quantum, and (b) the decision of the Employment Tribunal as to costs, and thus all Mr Deakin's costs in connection with the appeal proceedings before us. In our judgment having regard to those findings both in bringing and in conducting both aspects of the appeal the Appellant company acted unreasonably within Rule 34.
4. On the information provided, and having regard to the dispute as to whether YES were acting voluntarily or on a contingency fee basis for Mr Deakin, we are not in a position to assess such costs and therefore we direct that they should be taxed. Further we direct that they be taxed on an indemnity basis.
5. In our judgment a taxation on an indemnity basis is warranted by the misconduct found in paragraph 98 of our earlier judgment.