At the Tribunal | |
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER CLARK
MR K M HACK JP
MR R SANDERSON OBE
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
For the Appellant | Mr J Rosenblatt (in Person) |
JUDGE PETER CLARK: By an Originating Application presented to the London (North) Employment Tribunal on 16 December 1997 the Appellant, Mr Jason Rosenblatt, made a complaint of unfair dismissal against his former employer, the University of North London. He contended that he had been employed as a Basketball Coach by the University for a period of 2 years from September 1995 to September 1997.
By its Notice of Appearance the Respondent contended that he was employed from 1 February 1996 until 23 May 1997. That raised two points; first that his Originating Application was out of time, secondly, that he had not completed two years continuous service for the purpose of bringing his complaint. Further, it was denied that his dismissal was unfair.
At a preliminary hearing held on 25 February 1998 a Tribunal chaired by Mr C Robson found that the effective date of termination of the employment was not earlier than the 22 September 1997. Accordingly the complaint was presented within time and the matter was allowed to proceed to a hearing on the remaining issues. That decision, promulgated with extended reasons on 23 March 1998, is the subject of an appeal by the Respondent, University (EAT 687/98), listed to follow the present appeal brought by the Appellant against a subsequent decision of an Employment Tribunal chaired by Mr Geoffrey Davies, (the Davies Tribunal,) sitting on 1 May 1998. It is to that decision, promulgated with extended reasons on 26 May 1998, that we now turn.
The issues for the Davies Tribunal were first, whether the Applicant had had two years service and if so, secondly, whether the dismissal was fair or unfair. In the event the Tribunal decided the second issue only.
It was the Respondent's case on the merits that the Appellant was dismissed for some other substantial reason and that the dismissal was fair. The material facts found by the Davies Tribunal were that in 1997 the Respondent carried out a reorganisation, primarily for financial reasons, whereby for the benefit of a national lottery bid the Respondent entered into an arrangement with the London Towers Basketball team which obviated the need for an individual basketball coach. Coaching duties were to be carried out by members of the London Towers team. Consequently the Appellant became surplus to requirements and there was a discussion between Mr Ian Jennings, the Respondent's Sport and Recreation Co-ordinator and the Appellant in August 1997, when the Appellant was told, on the Tribunal's findings, that there was no question of further paid coaching for him.
The Tribunal accepted that the Respondent carried out a necessary reorganisation and that it was justified in dismissing the Appellant following expiry of his last fixed term contract. It acted reasonably in so doing. The dismissal was fair.
In an engaging submission to us this morning, Mr Rosenblatt accepts that our jurisdiction is limited to correcting errors of law. He apparently has only recently become aware of the review procedure and is now out of time to apply to the Employment Tribunal for a review of the Davies Decision, although he wishes to raise a number of new factual matters which he did not put before the original Tribunal. Questions of fact are not matters for us.
In his outline argument, he first deals with a point which goes to the question of whether or not he met the requirement of two years continuous service. Since the Davies Tribunal made no finding on that issue, that is not a matter strictly before us. The principle point which he takes in this appeal is that the Davies Tribunal made no findings and no reference to the question of whether or not the University had dismissal procedures and if so, whether they complied with those procedures. We have considered that submission carefully, and it is right to say that there is no reference, for example, in the Davies Tribunal reasons to the question of consultation with the Appellant before his dismissal.
However, we note that a number of cases were cited to the Tribunal, including Hollister -v- National Farmers' Union [1979] ICR 542, Richmond Precision Engineering Ltd -v- Pearce [1985] IRLR 179 and Catamaran Cruisers Ltd -v- Williams and Others [1994] IRLR 386.
In those circumstances, it seems to us that the question of whether or not the dismissal, for some other substantial reason, was procedurally fair was plainly before the Tribunal and we infer that they considered the question among other things of consultation with the Appellant, before concluding that the reason for dismissal as found, was a sufficient reason so as to render the dismissal fair. Accordingly, we find that there is no arguable point of law raised in relation to the procedural question.
In addition, Mr Rosenblatt has referred to a 'without prejudice' offer of £200 made to him prior to the Tribunal hearings by the University in order to dispose of this matter. We do not take that into account in our deliberations in this appeal.
The final point we should mention is that in paragraph 13 of the Davies Tribunal's reasons, that Tribunal said this:
"The Respondent no longer required an individual basketball coach when it made the arrangement with the London Towers Basketball Team. In fact, the Applicant basically acknowledged that position to the Tribunal."
Before us, Mr Rosenblatt submits that he did not accept that position before the Tribunal, and in any event there was obviously a need for a coach for the University team. As we read that particular sentence in the Tribunal's reasons, the reference to an individual basketball coach, is a reference to someone performing the role which Mr Rosenblatt performed, rather than the coaching duties being shared out amongst members of the London Towers Basketball team.
In short, we have concluded at this preliminary hearing that this appeal raises no arguable point of law to go forward to a full hearing and accordingly the appeal must be dismissed at this stage.