United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	NO APPEARANCE BY OR REPRESENTATION ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT


 


JUDGE C SMITH QC: This is an application by the Applicant before the Industrial Tribunal, Miss Douglas, for leave to proceed to a full hearing of her appeal against the decision of an Industrial Tribunal sitting at Liverpool on 6 May 1997, when the Industrial Tribunal decided on a preliminary issue that the Applicant's complaint of racial discrimination had been presented out of time and that the time for presenting it should not be enlarged so that it was dismissed.

We have, of course, reminded ourselves today that, if there is a reasonably arguable point of law we shall allow the matter to proceed to a full hearing. We have also taken note of the fact that Miss Douglas is not present today and we have carefully read the papers in the bundle that relate to her case and considered of course the Notice of Appeal and the grounds of appeal which she has put forward.

As appears from the findings of fact by the Industrial Tribunal, it appears that from September 1995 the Applicant had enrolled as a student with the Respondents at Chester, the Respondents being the College of Law, Chester, with a view to becoming a Solicitor.

By her complaint presented on 26 March 1997, she complained that a tutor at the College had made a racially offensive remark in her presence on 8 September 1995 and, secondly, that the Respondents had practised racial discrimination when failing her on her examinations on 21 October 1996.

The Industrial Tribunal, correctly in our judgment, held that her complaint should have been presented, at latest, within three months of 21 October 1996 and thus it was presented some two months late. They therefore had to decide whether, in all the circumstances, it was just and equitable to enlarge her time for presenting the complaint.

We should also mention that we have noted that the Applicant has complained of misconduct and bias on the part of the Chairman of the Industrial Tribunal, who sat with two Members, and we have considered the correspondence in that regard and also the affidavits sworn by the Applicant and the response by the Chairman. We have taken all that into account in our consideration of this matter and have unanimously concluded that there is no substance in those allegations.

The Industrial Tribunal set out its findings of fact in paragraph 3 of its decision. In our judgment it is quite clear that the Industrial Tribunal took considerable care in the way it approached the matter. Those findings of fact speak for themselves. In particular, we note that the Industrial Tribunal found that the tutor concerned had been severely reprimanded for the remark he had made and that, after the foundation week in September 1995, he had not taught the Applicant.

We note that the Applicant, for many months, was content that her complaint against the tutor should be left on the file, as the Industrial Tribunal put it, and that she only revived it in May 1996, some eight months later, after she had failed exam papers on the course.

The Industrial Tribunal noted that, after she had failed her exams in October 1996, the college provided her then representative, a Mr Vitti of MCCR, with a full explanation of how the system of marking worked, to the effect that it was anonymous and involved external re-assessment with the result that Mr Vitti pronounced himself satisfied as to the propriety of the Respondent's marking system.

At paragraph 4 (b) to (e) inclusive, the Industrial Tribunal carefully analysed the facts and circumstances relevant to the exercise of its judicial discretion to decide whether or not it was just and equitable to allow the complaint to be presented out of time. They noted, among other things, the long delay before the complaint against the tutor had been revived and the fact that the tutor had been severely reprimanded about the remark.

After giving what we regard as sympathetic consideration to the Applicant's personal difficulties and circumstances, they concluded that such had not been the cause of her delay in presenting her complaint. They noted that there was really no substance in the complaint about the marking system and concluded that the Applicant had chosen to negotiate with the Respondents rather than complain to an Industrial Tribunal.

We find that we cannot fault the way in which the Industrial Tribunal exercised its discretion. Indeed, we would have all exercised that discretion in the same way. Accordingly, we must decide that this application gives rise to no arguable point of appeal and must be dismissed.