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At the Tribunal | |
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MORISON (P)
LORD GLADWIN OF CLEE CBE JP
MR K M YOUNG CBE
APPELLANT | |
MRS L SPENCER |
RESPONDENTS |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
Revised
For the Appellant | IN PERSON |
For the Respondents | IN PERSON |
MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT): This is an appeal against the decision of an Industrial Tribunal held at Leeds on 19 November 1996.
The issue between the parties for the purposes of this appeal is whether the learned Chairman erred in law in reaching the conclusion that the payment which had been made in lieu of notice, counts as pay in lieu of notice. The Chairman said:
"... Clearly it does not. The applicants were entitled to be paid for service up to 31 August 1996 on their existing contracts, as is indicated by their P45s. Only after that day should their notice begin to run. It follows that they are each entitled to 12 weeks' pay in lieu of notice, ie £813.36."
The facts giving rise to this dispute may be very shortly stated. Both Applicants had been employed for very many years at a preparatory school, which subsequently came to be owned and managed by a Mr Renel, who is the Appellant in these proceedings. As a result of their long service with the school, they were entitled on the termination of their employment to 12 weeks' notice.
In normal circumstances they were paid their salary each week, throughout the year, whether or not the school term time was continuing. In other words, when the school was on holiday the Applicants were paid as though they were at work. In order to provide them with some facility for enjoying a holiday, in normal circumstances when it came to the summer time they were paid in advance from the end of the summer term to the end of August.
The school got into difficulties for reasons which do not need to be elaborated and, as a result, it was in the Appellant's view necessary that their service should be terminated. Accordingly, what he did was to give them notice of termination as from 13 July and pay them up to the end of August, which was a period of some seven weeks. They presented an application to the Industrial Tribunal, saying that they had been underpaid and that they were entitled to damages for breach of contract. The Tribunal's decision is as I have indicated.
As I understand it, the learned Chairman was saying that, somehow or another notice could not date from the date when it was purported to be given, but had to be put into suspense until after 31 August because they were entitled to be paid monies up to that date, regardless of the termination of their employment.
It seems to us, as a matter of law, that the learned Industrial Tribunal Chairman's decision is wrong. The Applicants were entitled to 12 weeks' notice of termination of their employment. That notice could be given at any time during the course of their employment, whether the school was in session or on holiday. Accordingly, under their contract of employment they were entitled to be paid, and paid only, for the 12 weeks' notice period, either by way of monies in lieu of notice or each week during that notice period.
It seems to us in those circumstances, that the Chairman was wrong to imply, as he does, that the notice could not start to run until after 31 August. That does not give effect to what actually happened in this case, nor to the contractual provisions under which they were working. That being so, in addition to the seven weeks which they were paid under cover of a letter (I think) dated 18 July, they were entitled to be paid a further five weeks monies in lieu of notice, which sum has already been paid, pursuant to the judgment of the Industrial Tribunal and a judgment of a local County Court to enforce the Tribunal's decision.
That is sufficient to dispose of the issue in the appeal. The appeal will be allowed to that extent.
Mr Renel was seeking to submit that the Respondents have behaved unreasonably or vexatiously. I would like to say that, so far as the EAT is concerned, that suggestion should not have been made. They are, in a way, themselves, the victims of what has occurred on this occasion. Their valued employment has come to an end. They acted throughout in good faith on the advice of the Citizens Advice Bureau. They succeeded before the Industrial Tribunal, albeit, as we think, wrongly as a matter of law and they have come to the Employment Appeal Tribunal to put forward such assistance as they could to the Court, for which the Court is grateful.
Accordingly, I hope that no further suggestion will be made that, in any way, they have behaved unreasonably in relation to this matter. The effect of this judgment will be, I think, that the remainder of the monies which are currently in the County Court will now be paid out to Mr Renel, as I think it follows from our judgment that the Applicants are entitled to no further monies as a result of the termination of their employment.