United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	Appellant in Person


 


MRS JUSTICE SMITH: This is the preliminary hearing of an appeal from a decision of an Industrial Tribunal sitting in Manchester on 17 March 1998. The unanimous decision of the Tribunal was that the Appellant had not been unfairly dismissed in contravention of Section 152 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 and that his claim for damages for breach of contract should be dismissed, as should be his complaint pursuant to Part II of the Employment Rights Act 1996. The Appellant was ordered to pay costs to the Respondent of £49.15.

The background of the matter was that, the Appellant was employed as an Associate Grade Postman, by the Respondent, from the 24 February 1997 until 26 April 1997 when he was dismissed. He alleged that he had been dismissed for taking part in trade union activities, namely, a strike on 10th to 13th March 1997.

The Respondent said that the Appellant had been dismissed for misconduct. The witnesses' account was that on 1 April 1997, the Appellant had been charged with a disciplinary offence of failing to carry out the correct procedures in respect of registered packets. This alleged misconduct had resulted in the possible loss of three items. It was not known whether the items had been lost or whether they had been delivered but not signed for. A disciplinary hearing was conducted by Mr Conway on 4th April. The Appellant's explanation for the loss of the items was that they had been stolen by another postman on the instruction of his manager, Mr Knott, who wished to engineer the Appellant's dismissal. Mr Conway did not accept that explanation. He came to the conclusion that he had no confidence in the Appellant and he dismissed him.

The Appellant appealed and it is noteworthy that in the course of that appeal he said nothing about having taken part in a strike, or that having been a reason for his dismissal.

When the Appellant made his complaint to the Industrial Tribunal, the matter was brought on for a pre-hearing review, on the 1 September, before a Miss E R Donnelly, sitting alone. She reached the conclusion that the claims had no reasonable prospect of success, because the applicant had insufficient continuous service with the Respondent to bring a claim of unfair dismissal and although he alleged that he had been dismissed for trade union activities, this had not been raised at either the Disciplinary Hearing or the Appeal. She directed that he must pay a deposit of £150 as a condition of being permitted to continue the proceedings.

At the main hearing, the Appellant's case was that the disciplinary procedure had been a sham and the true reason for his dismissal was that he had taken part in the strike on 10 to 13 March. The Tribunal said that they were satisfied that the dismissal was for the reasons stated by the Respondent, and moreover they were satisfied, even though this was not necessary to their decision, that the procedure had been fair and proper. They were also satisfied that the strike had not affected the Respondent's mind. The evidence before the Tribunal was that practically every employee had taken part in the strike which was a protest against plans to privatise the Post Office. Thus the claim for unfair dismissal was rejected.

The Appellant had also claimed for damages for breach of contract. He alleged that he was on a six month fixed term contract, and if dismissed within that time, the dismissal was unlawful and he was entitled to damages. The Industrial Tribunal examined the terms and conditions of employment and were satisfied that this was not a fixed term contract. They dismissed that claim. We have seen the letter of appointment and their conclusion is plainly right.

The Appellant also claimed that he was entitled to be reinstated if he could establish a breach of contract. This argument was clearly misconceived. In any event, the Appellant had not established a breach of contract nor had he established that he had been unfairly dismissed. As we have said, he was ordered to pay a modest sum in costs.

In the Notice of Appeal, the Appellant complains that the decision of the Tribunal was perverse, and such that no reasonable Tribunal could have reached. He has set out his version of the facts again in his Notice of Appeal. The written grounds are plainly misconceived for it is obvious that there was evidence upon which the decisions could properly have been reached.

Before us this morning, the Appellant has advanced different and additional grounds of appeal. He has submitted that the Tribunal was rigged, biased and negligent. He drew our attention to the fact that at the pre-hearing review, the Chairman was Miss E R Donnelly. She had said that he had no reasonable prospect of success. He says that it is plain that she was biased against him and biased in favour of the State and the Post Office, being a nationalised industry. It is clear that because her initials are "ER", standing for "Elizabeth Regina", she is closely associated with the State.

He says that at the main hearing the Tribunal followed the decision of the first Chairman because lawyers do follow precedent. It may be that Mr Gill is not aware of the rules by which the Tribunal operates, that where one Chairman has heard and made an adverse decision in a pre-hearing review, that Chairman must take no further part in the proceedings. The second Chairman and members are unaware of the decision reached by the first Chairman at the pre-hearing review until after the Tribunal has reached its own decision on the merits.

Mr Gill also advised us that he had been the victim of negligence. During the early stages before the hearing he had consulted a solicitor named Roy Sharma. He submitted to us that that one could see that this man was also biased towards the state because his name "ROY" was closely related to the word "Royal" and the last two letters of his surname "MA" were closely related to the word "Mail". Hence he must be taken to have been biased in favour of the Royal Mail and against the Appellant.

We cannot accept that there is any validity in these submissions at all. We have listened patiently and carefully to Mr Gill, but we are quite satisfied that there is no point of law at which can validly be argued in this case. The Appeal is dismissed at this preliminary stage.