At the Tribunal | |
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT)
MR K M HACK JP
LORD GLADWIN OF CLEE CBE JP
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
For the Appellant | MS MARIE DEMETRIOU (Of Counsel) Appearing under the Employment Law Appeal Advice Scheme |
MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT): The purpose of this hearing is to see whether there is an arguable point of law in an appeal which the Appellant here, Mr Meyer wishes to make against a decision of an Industrial Tribunal not to extent time for his application that the Tribunal should give Extended Reasons for a decision arrived at in February 1998.
We have a decision in summary form which is not susceptible to a review by this Court, because of the way in which it has been expressed. No sensible appeal can be conducted on the basis of the summary reasons as they have been provided to us as Ms Demetriou has very properly accepted. We therefore cannot deal with this appeal without Extended Reasons. The Tribunal refused to provide Extended Reasons, by letter dated 6 May, because the Appellant had failed to advise the Tribunal of his change of address. He then wrote to us saying that he would very much like to appeal, could we persuade the Tribunal to give Extended Reasons and that document was sent to the Industrial Tribunals with a request that they provide us with certain formal documentation. At that stage the Tribunal wrote again on 9 July 1998 saying this:
"The Chairman has directed that I write and explain that our letter to the applicant on 6 May 1998 was misleading and should have made clear that the application for Extended Reasons was refused on the grounds that the request was made too late."
The submission which has been made to us, is that the reason in the letter of 6 May 1998 is arguably not a proper ground for refusing to extend time. And in relation to the second letter, it is further submitted that it is not at all clear that the learned Chairman has addressed his attention to the exercise of the discretion which he had, under Rule 15 of the Tribunal Rules of Procedure, which gives him power to extend time for somebody applying for Extended Reasons.
In any event, the proper exercise of a discretion in the case in question demanded, so it is argued, that time should have be extended. Firstly because the Applicant was unrepresented at the original hearing. Secondly he did not receive as parties normally do, a copy of the leaflet which accompanies the written decision until shortly before he applied for Extended Reasons. That was due to the fact that he had changed his address and did not receive the summary reason decision, until quite late on. Thirdly, he was not told that he had to keep in touch and nor was he told that the Industrial Tribunal would be producing a further document at the hearing which he attended. At that hearing, he was told that his claim had failed and was told that that did not mean that he had necessarily been guilty of misconduct, but that the employers had followed their correct procedure and were entitled to conclude that he should be dismissed, but he was not told, so we are informed, that there would be a written document which would come later.
The final point which Counsel relies upon, is that the Applicant acted promptly so soon as he became aware of the Industrial Tribunal's decision, together presumably with the leaflet.
We regard the position as arguable, having regard to the submission which has been admirably made to us by Ms Demetriou. She was representing the Applicant under the ELAAS system. We are grateful always for the assistance that that system gives us and in particular to those who participate in it and we would like to express our thanks to Ms Demetriou for giving up her valuable time to appear on behalf of Mr Meyer this morning.
It seems to us that Mr Meyer would greatly benefit from being represented at the full hearing which is now going to have to take place, and I can indicate to him that as leave has been given for his case to proceed and bearing in mind, what I have been told about his circumstances, he may well be entitled to seek legal aid, which would entitle him to representation at the full hearing. This is not a particularly easy, straightforward case, bearing in mind the Tribunal Chairman was exercising a discretion or may have been exercising a discretion and we think that it would be to his advantage if he were to be legally represented in one form or another at the hearing. But obviously, he is entitled to appear before us himself, if that is what he wishes to do.
On that basis, we allow the matter to proceed to a full hearing. If the appeal is allowed, then Ms Demetriou argues that when the Tribunal has produced its Extended Written Reasons for its decision, time will start to run from that date and appeal then can be launched against that decision. That is not a point which we have considered for the purposes of this preliminary hearing, but it may arise for further consideration at the full hearing. By giving leave at this time, we are not intending to indicate one way or the other as to how the appeal will be resolved in due course.
This is a category C case, it will take approximately one hour to argue. Notes of Evidence are not required at this time for the purposes of this appeal. There are no further directions to be given. In giving these directions I have taken into account the PHD form which the Respondents have kindly provided to us.